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Philosophy Imagination
by
Peter Lamarque

Introduction

It is a commonplace to preface discussions of imagination with disclaimers about how unclear the concept is and how the history of the subject is riddled with confusion and ambiguity. It is also often said that there have been few treatments by analytical philosophers, and that this is largely a “neglected” concept. In fact, as the readings cited here indicate, there is a substantial literature on the subject over the past sixty to seventy years (what follows being merely an illustrative selection with the focus largely, but not exclusively, on analytical approaches), revealing many an effort to clear up the confusions and pin down imagination as a workable concept in, for example, philosophy of mind or aesthetics. There is little evidence of neglect in recent decades, although the degree of clarity attained is certainly a matter of judgment. What is plain is that there are many different aspects of imagination—from creativity to mental imagery, from a cognitive faculty to art appreciation—and it is far from obvious that there is a unified conception underlying all such applications.

General Overviews

Scruton 2009 is probably the best place to start to get a short introduction to philosophical issues about imagination, and Beaney 2005 is a straightforward and accessible discussion of arguments, both in the history of the subject and in contemporary treatments. The magisterial Brann 1991 is a comprehensive survey covering the historical context from the Greeks to the present day, the science of imagination, and literary applications. White 1990 also covers the historical frame, with short chapters on nearly all the main players. It also offers a close conceptual analysis of the concept itself, remarking on the wide range of uses to which “imagine” and its cognates are put. Stevenson 2003 finds twelve distinct conceptions, and thereby reveals both how elusive the concept is and the importance of making clear which conception is at issue. Well-chosen examples reveal the complexities. Warnock 1976 and Warnock 1994 provide a broad and urbanely characterized intellectual framework in reflecting on the central importance for imagination in human thought.

Modern Treatments Of Historical Views

There are many modern studies of the role of imagination in the philosophical tradition. Aristotle’s formative work on the subject has received much attention, of which Nussbaum 1978 and Schofield 1978 are significant examples. Kearney 1988 offers a polemical study across the whole history of the subject, while Cocking 1991 takes the story from the Greeks to the Renaissance. Kant and Hume have drawn the bulk of modern treatments, and there is a large literature on each. While most general works on Hume’s philosophy will have sections on his views of imagination, Wilbanks 1968 is a rare full-length study of this aspect of his philosophy alone. Urmson 1967 is a short paper that makes important observations about Hume’s distinction between imagination and memory. Gibbons 1994 offers a full-scale treatment of Kant on the imagination, while Strawson 1974 presents an often-cited analysis of Kant’s place for imagination in perception. Crawford 1982 examines Kant’s view of imagination in aesthetics, connecting it to his broader epistemological themes.

The Mind

There are many different issues that arise in philosophy of mind concerning the imagination, a selection of which appears in this section. (Note that a separate section on mental images appears under Imagery.) One broad issue is where and how to accommodate imagination within the structures of the mind—in relation to perception, for example. A bold attempt to find a distinct location is McGinn 2004, which is critically discussed in Hopkins 2006. For a philosophical approach to imagination rather different from that of analytical philosophy, Casey 1976, written from the perspective of phenomenology, is a notable example. One very prominent issue for analytic philosophy might be called “Berkeley’s Problem,” which examines whether it is possible to sensorily imagine an unseen object. This issue is raised in Williams 1966, which argues against Berkeley’s position (that it is not possible), and it is taken up in Peacocke 1985, which offers a qualified defense of Berkeley. A similar issue reappears in Martin 2002 and Noordhof 2002, although now focused on the idea of sensory imagining largely independent of the Berkeleyian context. Philosophers, finally, have taken an interest in the role of imagination (particularly deficiencies in imagining) in mental disorders such as autism and schizophrenia. Currie 2000 and Currie and Ravenscroft 2002 are good examples of concerns of this kind.

Imagery

The traditional view of mental images as “pictures” in the head came in for sustained challenge in the mid-twentieth century, not least from philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre (Sartre 1972) and Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 2009). Since then, the pictorialist conception has found new adherents (e.g., Hannay 1971, Block 1983). The outlines of the debate are well captured in Tye 1991 and Block 1981, where the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides are delineated. Kind 2001 returns to a version of another traditional view in arguing that imagination itself is conceptually connected to imaging. Thomas 1999 argues that neither the pictorialist nor the propositional (or descriptivist) theory is correct, defending a view of images as perceptual activity. For a helpful overview of the multiple debates about mental imagery in both philosophy and cognitive science, see Thomas 2008.

In Aesthetics

Philosophical aesthetics is a natural context for discussions of the imagination, not least because of the relation to creative uses of the imagination in the arts. Gaut 2003 provides a clear and persuasive account of just how imagination and creativity are related. Perhaps surprisingly, though, more attention has been given to the role of imagination in the appreciation, rather than the creation, of art. Kieran 1996 examines the role of imagination in the learning processes afforded by art. Walton 1994 looks at imagination in responses to music, and Feagin 1984 turns to literature and the importance, as Feagin sees it, of images in the reading process. Savile and Wollheim 1986 debates the place of imagination in understanding pictures. Several central issues are discussed in the papers collected in Kieran and Lopes 2003, and Scruton 1974 is a classic analytical treatment of imagination in the arts. Currie 1995 develops the theory of imagination as simulation, which the author uses in his discussion of film.

Fiction

The fictional and the imaginary are often connected, although there is not universal agreement on exactly what the connection is. Currie 2000 spells out some of the options, and Nichols 2006 presents some views of prominent contributors on different issues relating to fiction and imagination, including that of “imaginative resistance,” raised in Gendler 2000. Gilbert Ryle’s classic paper (Ryle 1933) relates fiction to pretence, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to a special class of “imaginary objects.” Walton 1990 is one of the most important recent analytical treatments of fiction, in terms of make-believe, although some aspects are criticized in New 1996. Novitz 1987 argues for the importance of the creative imagination in the pursuit of knowledge. Moran 1994 looks at problems relating to emotion and fiction. Smith 1997 takes the idea of “imagining from the inside” and applies it to aspects of film.

LAST MODIFIED: 05/10/2010

DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0130

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