Linguistics Cooperative Principle
by
Laurence Horn
  • LAST MODIFIED: 30 June 2014
  • DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199772810-0192

Introduction

The basis of Gricean pragmatics is the cooperative principle (CP): “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange” (Grice 1989, cited under Foundational Works, p. 26). This general principle is instantiated by a set of Maxims of Conversation that govern rational interchange (see the separate Oxford Bibliographies article on Maxims of Conversation) and bridge the gap between what is said and what is meant. The CP and the maxims represent not sociological generalizations or prescriptions for proper conversational etiquette but baseline presumptions that, by their observance or their apparent violation, generate conversational implicatures. In saying p and implicating q, S[peaker] counts on H[earer]’s disposition to work out what was meant by S’s uttering p at a given point in the interaction, based on what was said, on how it was said, and on the interlocutors’ shared assumption that they are rational agents interacting cooperatively to reach a joint (or partially joint) goal. In particular, S assumes H will assume that S’s conversational contribution is truthful, informative, relevant, and perspicuous, even when that assumption cannot be directly sustained at the surface of the utterance. While implicature is an aspect of speaker meaning and not of utterance interpretation, it is S’s assumption that H will draw the appropriate inference based on taking CP as a touchstone that makes implicature recovery a rational expectation. (Implicature is used in this article to stand for Grice’s conversational implicature; his notion of conventional implicature, which in many ways traces back to ideas of Frege’s, cannot be discussed here because of space limitations and because by definition it is entirely independent of CP.)

Foundational Works

As Chris Potts remarked in his 2006 review of Chapman 2005 (cited under Assessments and Overviews, Mind 115: 743–747), “within current pragmatic theory, just about every position is in some sense defined by its relationship to Grice’s William James lectures” (p. 745). These lectures, delivered at Harvard in 1967 and circulated thereafter in samizdat form, had an immediate impact on the philosophy of language and launched the field of linguistic pragmatics but were not available in full until the posthumous publication of Grice 1989. It is in the second of those lectures, “Logic and Conversation,” that Grice first proposed and developed the CP, the Maxims of Conversation, and their role in the generation of conversational implicature. Both that lecture and its immediate successor were published in important collections within the Syntax and Semantics series (Cole and Morgan 1975, Cole 1978), both containing related works by other linguists and philosophers. The first excerpt from the James lectures that actually appeared in print was Grice 1968, which reflects later material in the series of talks; it includes a definition of conversational and conventional implicature and their relation to speaker meaning but does not refer directly to CP or the maxims.

  • Cole, Peter, ed. 1978. Syntax and semantics. Vol. 9, Pragmatics. New York: Academic.

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    Grice’s follow-up essay “Further Notes on Logic and Conversation” proposes criteria for implicature; examines disjunction, stress, and irony; and motivates the influential “Modified Occam’s Razor” (“Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”). Other contents include McCawley on implicature and the lexicon, Morgan on short-circuited implicature, and Sadock on diagnostics for implicature.

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    • Cole, Peter, and Jerry Morgan, eds. 1975. Syntax and semantics. Vol. 3, Speech acts. New York: Academic.

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      Contains (for the first time in print) “Logic and Conversation,” the most influential single writing of Grice on CP, the Maxims of Conversation, and implicature, his second William James lecture. Other papers in the volume by Searle, Fraser, Schmerling, Garner, and Wright directly address aspects and implications of Gricean pragmatics.

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      • Grice, H. P. 1968. Utterer’s meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning. Foundations of Language 4:225–242.

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        The first published reference to conventional and conversational implicature by name, appearing one year after it was presented as one of the William James lectures (see Grice 1989, chapter 6). Introduces the distinction between what is said (“in a certain favoured, and maybe in some degree artificial, sense of ‘said’”; p. 225) and what is implicated and relates the former to conventional meaning.

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        • Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the way of words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

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          The central scripture on CP and conversational (and conventional) implicature. Chapters 1 through 7 contain the full text of the seminal William James lectures on Logic and Conversation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967) and circulated as samizdat afterward. Other important writings by Grice include a Retrospective Epilogue whose Strand Six (pp. 368–372) revisits conversational implicature.

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          Anthologies and Collections

          Before the unified posthumous publication of the William James lectures two decades after Grice presented them, his model of cooperation and rationality was developed and extended in papers appearing in several widely circulated collections. These are listed here in two groups, the first representing anthologies by that appeared in the 20th century when the model was crystallizing and the second grouping together 21st-century papers by philosophers and linguists elaborating varieties of neo-Gricean and post-Gricean approaches to meaning.

          Gricean Pragmatics in the 20th Century

          Cole 1981 and Grandy and Warner 1986 are important compilations of work by Grice and others on CP, implicature, and pragmatic theory, largely oriented toward linguists and philosophers, respectively. Other important examinations of Grice’s work and its implications include Berkeley Linguistics Society 1990, a parasession on Grice’s legacy, and Kasher 1998, a huge (but hugely expensive) six-volume collection of papers on pragmatics.

          • Berkeley Linguistics Society. 1990. Parasession on the legacy of Grice. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Edited by Kira Hall, 355–540. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Linguistics Society.

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            The first posthumous collection in Grice’s honor, containing sixteen papers by linguists, philosophers, and ethnographers examining the background of the Gricean paradigm and its applications to language universals, grammatical and lexical structure, discourse, reference, jokes, reading, social practice, and formal pragmatics.

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            • Cole, Peter, ed. 1981. Radical pragmatics. New York: Academic.

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              An important collections of papers by Grice on implicature and presupposition (see “Presupposition and Conversational Implicature,” pp. 183–198) and other philosophers and linguists—Atlas and Levinson, Donnellan, Fillmore, Nunberg, Sadock, Sperber and Wilson, and others—exploring the ramifications of Grice’s work on cooperation and rationality for the study of linguistic meaning and form.

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              • Grandy, Richard, and Richard Warner, eds. 1986. Philosophical grounds of rationality: Intentions, categories, ends. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

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                This festschrift, “P-GRICE,” features “a view of his work” by philosophers Grandy and Warner and Grice’s wryly titled “Reply to Richards.” Papers by Suppes, Davidson, Schiffer, Searle, Strawson, Hintikka, and Wilson and Sperber address Grice’s contributions to the study of speaker meaning and implicature. Includes lists of Grice’s publications and “unpublications.”

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                • Kasher, Asa, ed. 1998. Pragmatics: Critical concepts. 6 vols. London: Routledge.

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                  Massive compilation of classic and still influential 20th-century writings on pragmatics and its interfaces with syntax and semantics, with considerable focus on CP and implicature. Numerous reprinted papers are followed by useful postscripts by the authors, revisiting their earlier work from a more current perspective and providing new bibliographical pointers.

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                  Gricean Pragmatics in the 21st Century

                  By the turn of the 21st century, some of the fault lines in the relatively new field of pragmatic theory had begun to take shape, along with a sense of the multiple applications of Gricean, neo-Gricean, and post-Gricean theory. (The distinction between neo- and post-Gricean, first identified by Steve Levinson and Larry Horn in their joint linguistic institute seminar at the 1987 Stanford Linguistic Institute, refers to the relatively Gricean orthodoxy of the work of neo-Griceans like Atlas, Levinson, Horn, Sadock, and Gazdar in that era, as against the more substantive departures from basic Gricean tenets in the pragmatic theories associated with post-Griceans, especially those developing relevance theory (RT): Wilson, Sperber, Carston, Blakemore, and others.) Horn and Ward 2004 surveys this entire domain, with contributions on a variety of key topics from figures representing diverse conceptions of pragmatic theory. The essays in Birner and Ward 2006 are largely couched within the neo-Gricean tradition; Bach’s “Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature” (pp. 21–30) is particularly germane to the Gricean project, although his findings on what does and does not count as misconceptions will not find universal acceptance. Burton-Roberts 2007 contains several papers developing themes in RT as well as Gricean pragmatics, while the essays in Petrus 2010 address the impact of the Gricean revolution for theories of meaning. Published eight years after Horn and Ward’s handbook, Allan and Jaszczolt 2012 is a complementary compilation of essays on a variety of pragmatic themes; the entries on implication and its relatives and on the role of intention offer particularly useful perspectives on the CP.

                  • Allan, Keith, and Kasia Jaszczolt, eds. 2012. The Cambridge handbook of pragmatics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

                    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139022453Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                    Among the thirty-one chapters, those particularly relevant to CP and Grice’s project for meaning and implicature include Bach’s “Saying, Meaning, and Implicating,” Horn’s “Implying and Inferring,” Ariel’s “Research Paradigms in Pragmatics,” Allan’s “Pragmatics in the (English) Lexicon,” Haugh and Jaszczolt’s “Speaker Intentions and Intentionality,” and Mauri and van der Auwera’s “Connectives.”

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                    • Birner, Betty, and Gregory Ward, eds. 2006. Drawing the boundaries of meaning: Neo-Gricean studies in pragmatics and semantics in honor of Laurence R. Horn. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

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                      Eighteen papers by leading scholars in linguistics and philosophy that examine several pragmatic and semantic themes developed by Horn and his contemporaries from ideas of Grice’s. Topics include the properties and limits of implicature, presupposition, and negation; reference; lexical structure; information structure; and the relations of pragmatics to classical logic.

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                      • Burton-Roberts, Noel, ed. 2007. Pragmatics. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

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                        An anthology that demonstrates the range of lively debate on issues in current neo-Gricean pragmatic theory and RT, with papers by leading figures on the semantics/pragmatics boundary, pragmatic intrusion, the status of “what is said,” and issues in lexical and experimental pragmatics.

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                        • Horn, Laurence, and Gregory Ward, eds. 2004. The handbook of pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell.

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                          Handbook chapters on pragmatic theory and its interfaces and applications that stem directly or indirectly from Grice’s pioneering work on CP and the maxims. Connections between pragmatics and syntax, semantics, lexicon, philosophy of language, cognitive psychology, and artificial intelligence. Contains an eighty-seven-page volume bibliography that will be a useful resource tool for those working on pragmatics from a variety of perspectives.

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                          • Petrus, Klaus, ed. 2010. Meaning and analysis: New essays on H. Paul Grice. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

                            DOI: 10.1057/9780230282117Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                            The (nonexclusive) focus of this volume is on the possible ways of incorporating Grice’s insights on cooperation, rationality, and meaning into formal models of semantics and pragmatics. Includes a useful introductory essay on Grice and his impact by the editor. The other thirteen essays include discussions of the nature of implicature and its implications for the debate between minimalist and contextualist semantics.

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                            The Gricean Model

                            As Grice’s program for conversational implicature came to the attention of linguists and philosophers of language, applications began to be made to a number of thorny problems in meaning theory. The texts, monographs, and articles in Assessments and Overviews situate Gricean thought in its historical perspective and survey its influence on theories of natural language meaning. The relation between Grice’s work and that of other members of the ordinary language school of Oxford philosophers, particularly in developing their overlapping definitions of a rule or strength (or Maxim of Quantity), is at the heart of the readings in the Precursors, Contemporaries, Rivals section. The motto “Grice saves,” alluding to the simplification of semantics allowed by ascribing to independently motivated general principles the apparent mismatches between traditional logic and natural language intuitions, is particularly applicable to the analysis of logical operators—quantifiers, modalities, connectives, and their interaction with negation. The analysis of conditional statements has proved a fruitful area for this approach, whether or not one is willing (as many have not been) to embrace Grice’s own defense of the material conditional. In pursuing the applications of CP to natural language meaning and communication, one question is the relation between the expectations on speakers and hearers on the one hand and the linguistic principle of least effort on the other; it has been argued that several of Grice’s submaxims (Brevity, Quantity-2, Relation) are natural correlates of least effort in determining economy of form, lexical choice, and meaning change. A related question is whether cooperation per se is the driving engine for a CP-based pragmatic theory or whether (as Grice himself at times suggested) the central notion should be in fact that of rationality, given that rationality extends naturally to complex interactive scenarios involving adversarial contexts in which interactants are rational but not necessarily cooperative actors.

                            Assessments and Overviews

                            For well over a decade, Levinson 1983 served as the standard introductory text for the field of pragmatics, in part because of its excellent coverage of the foundations of the Gricean framework in its treatment of CP and implicature generation. Both Neale 1992 and Chapman 2005 provide excellent accounts of Grice’s theory of CP, speaker meaning, and implicature within the broader context of his contributions to philosophy and the nature of meaning and communication; Chapman’s is the definitive biography of Grice as “philosopher and linguist.” The online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides two useful and quite different assessments of Grice’s work on implicature and its broader impact by Davis 2010 and Perry and Korta 2011. Birner 2012 is an excellent new introductory text for pragmatics that includes an exceptionally helpful synopsis of Gricean, neo-Gricean, and relevance-theoretic approaches to implicature and its foundations.

                            • Birner, Betty. 2012. Introduction to pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

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                              Three decades post-Levinson, Birner’s text focuses on the semantics/pragmatics interface, with chapters devoted to Gricean and neo- and post-Gricean theories of implicature (Horn, Levinson, RT) and to the study of inferential relations and reference. Chapter 2 provides a through grounding in CP, the maxims, and the nature and genesis of conversational implicature.

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                              • Chapman, Siobhan. 2005. Paul Grice: Philosopher and linguist. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

                                DOI: 10.1057/9780230005853Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                The standard intellectual biography of Grice, with a detailed examination in chapter 5 of CP and the logic of conversation and their genesis in Grice’s stance as the reconciler of formalist goals and ordinary-language intuitions in the philosophy of language. Chapter 9 traces the development of “Gricean pragmatics.”

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                                • Davis, Wayne. 2010. Implicature. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Edited by Ed Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.

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                                  Relatively even-handed overview of Grice’s and competing views of conversational implicature by a skeptic. Surveys the extent to which Grice’s approach, along with its neo-Gricean developments and RT competitors, can deal with problems arising from “overgeneration, lack of determinacy, clashes, and the fact that speakers often have other goals.”

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                                  • Levinson, Stephen. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

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                                    Chapter 3 of this classic textbook examines conversational and conventional implicature in depth, summarizing earlier work by Grice, Horn, Gazdar, Atlas, and Levinson himself. Addresses conceptual and definitional issues and problems in the Gricean program and explores the relation of implicature to logical form, linguistic structure, and metaphor.

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                                    • Neale, Stephen. 1992. Paul Grice and the philosophy of language. Linguistics and Philosophy 15:509–559.

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                                      Review article providing “a critical commentary on the development of Grice’s work on language and meaning on display in [Grice 1989]” (p. 511) from a philosopher’s perspective. Section 2 includes an exegesis of CP and conversational implicature, and Section 3 surveys the implications of Grice’s program for an account of the “Logic of Natural Language.”

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                                      • Perry, John, and Kepa Korta. 2011. Pragmatics. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Edited by Ed Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.

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                                        Presents in Section 2 a superb synopsis of Grice’s theory of conversational implicature, situated within a discussion of other foundational work in classical pragmatics (Austin, Searle, Bach, and Harnish). Subsequent sections offer excellent summaries of neo-Gricean and relevance-theoretic pragmatics and a useful glossary.

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                                        Precursors, Contemporaries, Rivals

                                        While it may have become standard practice to regard 1967 as the birth of pragmatic theory with Grice’s William James lectures and the formulation of CP, the Maxims of Conversation, and the doctrine of conversational implicature, these ideas did not arise fully formed ex nihilo, as Grice himself would have conceded. The leading idea of the Maxim of Quantity was prefigured in Grice’s own remarks on the “general rule of linguistic conduct” cited under Strawson 1952, while various notions of contextual implication and the circumstances licensing hearer’s to draw inferences based on what a speaker says (and doesn’t say) are posited and evaluated in Nowell-Smith 1954, Hungerland 1960, and indeed Grice 1961, the latter in the form of Grice’s “first shot” at the general principle that was to later surface as the first Maxim of Quantity. (Grice’s paper also provides a draft version of the theory of conversational and conventional implicature and of the now-familiar diagnostics for distinguishing them, although those labels were not to appear for another six years, along with the CP itself.) Grice 1961, Fogelin 1967 (cited under Gricean Reasoning and the Analysis of Logical Operators), and O’Hair 1969 converge on a “rule of strength” that precludes a speaker from using a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless the stronger information is unavailable to the speaker, assumed to be irrelevant to the hearer, or would involve unjustified effort to express. But while this rule or Maxim of Strength was clearly “in the air” around Oxford in the mid-20th century, it can be traced back to Mill and DeMorgan in the mid-19th, as chronicled in Horn 1973 and Horn 1990.

                                        • Strawson, P. F. 1952. Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen.

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                                          Strawson regarded Grice, his tutor at Oxford, to be one of most brilliant thinkers of the time and the mutual influence between the two was profound. Strawson here attributes to “Mr H P Grice” a “general rule of linguistic conduct”: “One should not make the (logically) lesser, when one could truthfully (and with greater or equal clarity) make the greater claim” (pp. 178–179).

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                                          • Grice, H. P. 1961. The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 35(Suppl.): 121–152.

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                                            Provides in Section 3 the first published version of Grice’s approach to nonlogical implication. Employs (non-)cancelability and (non-)detachability as diagnostics to distinguish the categories later to be labeled conversational implicature (exemplified in both generalized and particularized form) and conventional implicature from each other and from semantic presupposition.

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                                            • Horn, Laurence. 1990. Hamburgers and truth: Why Gricean inference is Gricean. Berkeley Linguistics Society 16:454–471.

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                                              A survey of “the first 2,300 years of Gricean cooperation” that attempts to demonstrate “the influence of Grice on Aristotle” (p. 454). Traces the relation of some to not all from classical logic to the 19th-century disputes between Hamilton and his proto-Gricean adversaries De Morgan and Mill, who prefigure implicature as “a sous-entendu of common conversation” arising from rational expectations (p. 457).

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                                              • Horn, L. R. 1973. Greek Grice: A brief survey of proto-conversational rules in the history of logic. CLS 9:205–214.

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                                                A look at treatments of the logical connectives, especially the quantificational and modal operators, from Aristotle to De Morgan and Jespersen, that invoke an implicitly proto-Gricean understanding of the key relations. Includes a brief discussion of logical fallacies as pragmatically motivated inferences, including the tendency to infer from “if p then q” that “if not-p, not-q”.

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                                                • Hungerland, Isabel. 1960. Contextual implication. Inquiry 3:211–258.

                                                  DOI: 10.1080/00201746008601311Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                  Reexamines this relation as invoked in Nowell-Smith 1954 and extends it from declaratives (my uttering “it’s raining” contextually implies that I believe it’s raining) to nondeclaratives (my promising to marry you contextually implies that I intend to do so). Given the noncancelability of these sincerity conditions, neither Nowell-Smith’s nor Hungerland’s cases can be assimilated to Gricean conversational implicature.

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                                                  • Nowell-Smith, P. H. 1954. Ethics. Harmondsworth, UK: Pelican.

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                                                    A major mid-century treatise on ethical theory, of interest here for its introduction of the notion of “contextual implication,” a forerunner of Grice’s implicature: “A statement p contextually implies q if anyone who knew the normal conventions of the language would be entitled to infer q from p in the context in which they occur” (pp. 80–82). A proto-maxim of Relation is also defined and illustrated.

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                                                    • O’Hair, S. G. 1969. Implications and meaning. Theoria 35:38–54.

                                                      DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.1969.tb00358.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                      Motivates a relevance-constrained version of Grice’s Maxim of Quantity: “Unless there are outweighing good reasons to the contrary, one should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one if the audience is interested in the extra information that would be conveyed by the latter” (p. 45). Emphasizes the role of form (how what is said is said) in generating implications.

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                                                      Gricean Reasoning and the Analysis of Logical Operators

                                                      Grice initiates his remarks on the CP and the Maxims of Conversation at the start of the “Logic and Conversation” lecture (Grice 1989, p. 22, cited under Foundational Works), by observing the discrepancy between the standard logical value of the connectives—“~, ∧, ∨, (∀x), (∃x), (ιx)”—and “their analogues or counterparts in natural language”—not, and, and so on; this discrepancy helps motivate his program for meaning. It is thus useful to review the ways in which “Grice saves,” to quote Jim McCawley. Some of the relevant work was carried out in independence from or in parallel to Grice, such as Doyle 1951, an eerie foreshadowing of Grice’s quantity-based analysis of or and some and Fogelin’s pragmatic reanalysis of the subcontrary relations on the post-Aristotelian Square of Opposition. (Much of Horn 2001, a monograph on negation first published in 1989, is devoted to the recalibration of Aristotelian logic in the hindsight of Gricean pragmatics.) The French linguist Ducrot develops his own theory of cooperation, nonlogical inference, and scalar pragmatics for some and its analogues that in some ways parallels that of Grice and the neo-Griceans (Ducrot 1972). Particular implications of Gricean pragmatics for the expression of logical connectives, in particular for the case of inclusive and exclusive disjunction, are given in Gazdar and Pullum 1976 and Pelletier 1977, as well as in Horn 2001. The constraint against lexicalizing values made redundant by quantity implicature (whence the nonexistence of nall [“not all” or “some not”], nalways [“not always”], or the unambiguously wide-scope negation of cannot and can’t vs. the ambiguity of can not), first posited in Horn 1972 (see The Conversationalist Hypothesis and its Critical Reception) is summarized in Horn 2012 and revisited in Katzir and Singh 2013.

                                                      • Doyle, John. 1951. In defense of the square of opposition. The New Scholasticism 25:367–396.

                                                        DOI: 10.5840/newscholas195125449Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                        An overlooked precursor to Grice’s take on some, or, and others: “What can be understood without being said is usually not said . . . A person making a statement in the form, ‘Some S is P’, generally wishes to suggest that some S also is not P. For . . . if he knew that all S is P, he would say so” (p. 382).

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                                                        • Ducrot, Oswald. 1972. Dire et ne pas dire. Paris: Hermann.

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                                                          Working independently of Grice, Ducrot developed his own analogue of the first Quantity maxim, a Law of Exhaustivity requiring that the speaker give the addressee the strongest information he or she possesses on the relevant topic and (based on their shared assumption that this rule is in operation) licensing the addressee to infer that the speaker was not in a position to say something stronger.

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                                                          • Fogelin, Robert. 1967. Evidence and meaning. New York: Humanities Press.

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                                                            Based on his version of the strength rule—“Make the strongest possible claim that you can legitimately defend!”—Fogelin (p. 20) points out that the subcontraries on the traditional square of opposition “collapse together,” so that Some F are G and Some F are not G (= Not all F are G), while semantically distinct, typically convey the same information in context.

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                                                            • Gazdar, Gerald, and Geoffrey Pullum. 1976. Truth-functional connectives in natural language. CLS 12:220–234.

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                                                              A demonstration that general semantic and pragmatic considerations, including Gricean implicature, rule out the vast majority of possible two-place truth-functional connectives as potential lexical items in natural languages, leaving only (at most) the three connectives that are actually attested.

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                                                              • Horn, Laurence. 2001. A natural history of negation. Stanford, CA: CSLI.

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                                                                Close look at the interaction of CP and the maxims with phenomena affecting the expression and meaning of natural language negation, including scale reversal under downward entailment, the distribution of contradiction and contrary negation (as in “neg-raising”), and the “Jespersen Cycle” of reanalysis and repositioning of negative markers. Originally published by University of Chicago Press, 1989.

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                                                                • Horn, Laurence. 2012. Histoire d’*O: Lexical pragmatics and the geometry of opposition. In The square of opposition: A general framework for cognition. Edited by Jean-Yves Béziau and Gilmann Payette, 383–416. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.

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                                                                  Culminating earlier work dating back to chapter 4 of his 1972 dissertation, Horn invokes Grice’s Maxim of Quantity to motivate the asymmetry of the Square of Opposition and the constraints on lexicalizing the O corner illustrated by the cross-linguistic absence of lexical items nall (“not all”) and nand (“or not”) alongside lexicalized no(ne) (“all not”) and nor (“and not”): Logical operators made redundant by implicature tend not to lexicalize.

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                                                                  • Katzir, Roni, and Raj Singh. 2013. Constraints on the lexicalization of logical operators. Linguistics and Philosophy 36:1–29.

                                                                    DOI: 10.1007/s10988-013-9130-8Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                    A related take on the asymmetrical distribution of lexicalized operators that builds on the earlier analysis of Horn invoking implicature and markedness. The nonexistence of XOR (semantic exclusive disjunction) in natural language is argued to follow from an alternative view of implicature and from a notion of markedness built into the definition of scalar alternatives.

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                                                                    • Pelletier, F. J. 1977. Or. Theoretical Linguistics 4:61–74.

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                                                                      A Gricean account of the nonexistence of true semantic exclusive disjunction and the pragmatic derivation of apparent exclusive uses of or from logically inclusive disjunction in relevant contexts of utterance.

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                                                                      Conditionals

                                                                      While Grice wielded his pragmatic analysis in the service of maintaining a conservative approach to the logical operators, nowhere was this move more controversial than in the case of conditionals, where Grice’s defense of the material conditional (or “hook”) as an adequate representation of natural language if-then, buttressed by the doctrine of implicature, placed him in the minority among philosophers of language, many of whom rejected the view that conditionals are propositions or have truth values. DeRose and Grandy 1999 argues that a conditional assertion analysis, drawing on Gricean pragmatics, allows for a unified analysis of both ordinary indicative conditionals and so-called biscuit conditionals (If you’re hungry, there are biscuits in the cupboard). Bennett 2003 surveys the philosophical literature on conditionals, including Grice’s analysis (which Bennett ultimately rejects), and Edgington 2006—the author a leading proponent of the non-truth-conditional conditionals camp—considers Grice’s views along with other propositionalist and nonpropositionalist accounts in an Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry. One clearly pragmatic aspect of the interpretation of conditionals is the tendency, notorious among introductory logic students (and others), to “perfect” conditionals, turning if into if and only if. Geis and Zwicky 1971 distinguishes this “invited inference,” as the authors call it, from Gricean implicatures, but dozens of other pragmaticists, as van der Auwera 1997 shows in a valuable chronology, have offered their own accounts. Horn 2000 argues for assimilating conditional perfection to the general pattern of pragmatic strengthening as exemplified in linguistic phenomena from neg-raising to narrowing of meaning.

                                                                      • Bennett, Jonathan. 2003. The material conditional: Grice. A philosophical guide to conditionals. By Jonathan Bennett, 20–33. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

                                                                        DOI: 10.1093/0199258872.003.0002Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                        Chapter of a guide aimed at graduate students that reviews Grice’s defense of the material conditional as an adequate representation of natural language if-then statements, a defense hinging on an appeal to the theory of conversational implicature. Grice’s account is rejected on the grounds that it cannot explain why indicatives obey the “Ramsey test.”

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                                                                        • DeRose, Keith, and Richard Grandy. 1999. Conditional assertion and “biscuit” conditionals. Noûs 33:405–420.

                                                                          DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.00161Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                          Proposes a conditional-assertion analysis of biscuit or speech act conditionals (e.g., Austin’s There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some extending to cases in which the antecedent is false or the consequent is a nondeclarative). The authors draw on Gricean considerations involving the Maxim of Relation and the implicature that the consequent is true.

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                                                                          • Edgington, Dorothy. 2006. Conditionals. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Edited by Ed Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.

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                                                                            Comprehensive review of philosophical treatments of indicative and subjunctive conditionals. Section 2.3 summarizes Grice’s support for a truth-conditional propositional account of indicative conditionals, on which the question of why conditionals that we believe to be true are nevertheless unassertable receives a pragmatic answer.

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                                                                            • Geis, Michael, and Arnold Zwicky. 1971. On invited inferences. Linguistic Inquiry 2:561–566.

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                                                                              Much-cited squib addressing pragmatic tendency to “perfect” an if-then conditional (If you mow the lawn I’ll give you $5) to iff-then via an “invited inference” (If you don’t mow the lawn I won’t give you $5). The authors claim this invited inference cannot be assimilated to Gricean implicature, but that hasn’t stopped generations of pragmaticists from trying to do just that.

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                                                                              • Horn, Laurence. 2000. From if to iff: Conditional perfection as pragmatic strengthening. Journal of Pragmatics 32:289–326.

                                                                                DOI: 10.1016/S0378-2166(99)00053-3Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                History of conditional perfection and related classical fallacies dating back to Aristotle (denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent, conversion of conditionals). Relates conditional perfection, derived via R-based implicature, to other instances (clausal and lexical) in which sufficient conditions are pragmatically strengthened to necessary and sufficient conditions.

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                                                                                • van der Auwera, Johan. 1997. Pragmatics in the last quarter century: The case of conditional perfection. Journal of Pragmatics 27:261–274.

                                                                                  DOI: 10.1016/S0378-2166(96)00058-6Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                  Exhaustive (and instructive) review of treatments of conditional perfection as a pragmatic inference, encompassing “+GRICE” and “–GRICE” approaches (although the distinction sometimes appears elusive); portrays history of treatments of conditional perfection as a microcosm of the development of pragmatic theory over a quarter of a century. Argues for a Quantity-based approach, contra Levinson and (sometimes) Horn.

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                                                                                  Cooperation and Least Effort

                                                                                  As the two halves of the Maxim of Quantity and the descriptions of maxim clash make clear, linguistic cooperation is a two-way street. The interplay of the speaker’s and the hearer’s “economies” was recognized as early as the classical poets and rhetoricians, from Horace’s “I strive to be brief, I become obscure” to Aristotle’s golden mean “If it is prolix it will not be clear, nor if it is too brief; it is plain that the middle way is best” to Quintilian’s edict of “not saying less, but not saying more, than the occasion demands” (see Horn 2007 for references). In modern linguistics, Paul 1889 was the first to formulate a minimax of reduction of form constrained by sufficiency of content, but the author of Zipf 1949 is recognized for his effort, and partial success, in developing algorithms for the dialectic of speaker and hearer, a dialectic whose effects cut a wide swath across language functions, as Martinet 1962 demonstrates. McCawley 1978 is an important step in showing the explanatory potential of Gricean pragmatics in determining the relation between speaker’s choice of linguistic forms and hearer’s inferences about the intended message, which in turn (along with Aronoff’s and Kiparsky’s work on semantic blocking effects) contributed to Horn’s development of the Division of Pragmatic Labor (see Horn 1984, cited under Neo-Gricean Extensions) and the Manichaean Manifesto within neo-Gricean theory (Horn 2007).

                                                                                  • Horn, Laurence. 2007. Neo-Gricean pragmatics: A Manichaean manifesto. In Pragmatics. Edited by Noel Burton-Roberts, 158–183. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

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                                                                                    Defends the dualistic Zipfo-Gricean approach to linguistic pragmatics against theories positing more or fewer basic principles. Surveys the effects of the interaction of the Q principle (informational sufficiency/discriminability) and the R principle (least effort) in phonological, semantic, and diachronic domains, including the division of pragmatic labor equilibrium and the avoidance of homonymy and synonymy.

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                                                                                    • Martinet, André. 1962. A functional view of language. Oxford: Clarendon.

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                                                                                      Extends Zipf’s model of the opposition between “the requirements of communication, the need for the speaker to convey his message, and the principle of least effort, which makes him restrict his output of energy, both mental and physical, to the minimum compatible with achieving his ends” (p. 139). Explores implications of these forces for linguistic diachrony.

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                                                                                      • McCawley, James D. 1978. Conversational implicature and the lexicon. In Pragmatics. Vol. 9 of Syntax and semantics. Edited by Peter Cole, 245–259. New York: Academic.

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                                                                                        Study of the penetration of Gricean implicature into choice of expressions, noting that the speaker’s use of a marked, more effortful form (She got the car to stop) signals a marked messages (She didn’t use the normal braking methods), viewing such inferences as “consequences of general principles of cooperative behavior” (p. 258).

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                                                                                        • Paul, Hermann. 1889. Principles of the history of language. Translated by H. A. Strong. London: Macmillan.

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                                                                                          A century before Grice’s Quantity maxim, philologist Paul described the interplay of two functional principles—the tendency to reduce expression and the communicative requirements on sufficiency of information: “The amount of linguistic material employed varies . . . with the situation, with the previous conversation, with the relative approximation of the speakers to a common state of mind” (p. 351).

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                                                                                          • Zipf, G. K. 1949. Human behavior and the principle of least effort. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

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                                                                                            Zipf, known for developing a model for the linguistic principle of least effort, here anticipates Grice’s maxim clash in delineating the dialectic between the speaker’s and the hearer’s economies, as well as the inverse relation of frequency and length, constrained by the speaker’s assumptions about the hearer’s knowledge and shared common ground.

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                                                                                            Cooperation and Rationality

                                                                                            Despite its name, many have suggested that the reference to cooperative interaction belies the fact that the heart of the Gricean program is in fact rationality rather than cooperation. Kasher 1982 makes this explicit by formulating a work around CP in the form of the author’s rationality-based principle of effective means. Cohen and Levesque 1990 is one of several works by these authors and their colleagues in artificial intelligence that attempts to formalize the role of rationality and its interaction with speech acts and propositional attitudes. Hilton 1995 revisits social psychologists’ scenarios such as the Linda-the-bank-teller case from the perspective of cooperation- and rationality-based pragmatic considerations. Attardo 2003 develops a “perlocutionary cooperative principle” to incorporate the author’s own take on rationality to account for the interaction of information transfer with politeness, self-interest, and adversarial exchanges. Davies 2007 addresses the problems incurred by misinterpretation of Grice’s technical use of cooperation as if it were the ordinary language concept, focusing on the key role the Gricean project assigns to rationality for both linguistic and nonlinguistic exchanges. Rothschild 2012 attempts to derive the theory of implicature directly from assumptions about the rationality of conversational agents without invoking CP and the maxims, concluding that this can be done in most but not in all cases of communication.

                                                                                            • Attardo, Salvatore. 2003. On the nature of rationality in (neo-Gricean) pragmatics. International Journal of Pragmatics 14:3–20.

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                                                                                              Seeks to account for “practical” features of rationality by revising and extending the author’s earlier good-Samaritan perlocutionary CP (cooperate with speaker’s linguistic and nonlinguistic goals) by adding defeasible principles of politeness, noncooperation, rationality, and self-interest that interact with CP.

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                                                                                              • Cohen, Philip, and Hector Levesque. 1990. Rational interaction as the basis for communication. In Intentions in communication. Edited by Philip Cohen, Jerry Morgan, and Martha E. Pollack, 221–255. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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                                                                                                Working from the perspective of artificial intelligence, the authors develop a rationality-based agent theory of speaker intention as a basis for explaining speech acts and linguistic communication. Introduces logical predicates for belief and goals with interpretations defined in possible-world semantics.

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                                                                                                • Davies, Bethan. 2007. Grice’s cooperative principle: Meaning and rationality. Journal of Pragmatics 39:2308–2331.

                                                                                                  DOI: 10.1016/j.pragma.2007.09.002Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                  Points out that Grice’s use of “cooperative” in the CP has led to confusion (“cooperation drift”); it is a technical term that must be understood in the context of his wider work. The key issues in fact are the distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning and the centrality of rationality to human action, including conversational exchanges.

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                                                                                                  • Hilton, Denis. 1995. The social context of reasoning: Conversational inference and rational judgment. Psychological Bulletin 118:248–271.

                                                                                                    DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.118.2.248Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                    Proposes an attributional model of conversational inference to predict how utterance interpretation is guided by hearers’ assumptions about the speaker and applies the model to studies in decision making and social and developmental psychology. Draws on CP and the maxims as well as work by social psychologists such as Tversky and Kahneman.

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                                                                                                    • Kasher, Asa. 1982. Gricean inference revisited. Philosophica 29:25–44.

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                                                                                                      Extension of author’s earlier work, focusing on philosophical aspects of Gricean implicature and emphasizing the role of rationality. The “principle of effective means,” stipulating “Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus” (p. 32) can generate the maxims directly without invoking CP.

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                                                                                                      • Rothschild, Daniel. 2012. Grice, utterance choice, and rationality. Unpublished manuscript.

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                                                                                                        Investigates the degree to which the theory of conversational implicature is derivable from plausible assumptions about communication. Determines that scalar implicature and other instances of maxim application often but not always can be shown to follow directly from the assumption that the speaker is behaving as a rational agent with the goal of being informative.

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                                                                                                        The Conversationalist Hypothesis and its Critical Reception

                                                                                                        The reception of the Gricean project was largely positive, especially among linguists who eagerly exchanged copies of the still-unpublished William James lectures, struck by the promise of its intuitive and explanatory characterization of a wide range of meaning relations and formal properties of language. Within philosophical circles, there was more resistance, especially given long-entrenched views on the semantic properties of logical elements. One of the earlier and most influential critiques is Cohen 1971, based on the observed effect of purported implicata on the truth conditions of sentences containing the relevant expressions; the author maintained that this compositionality effect pointed to serious flaws in the “conversational hypothesis” as against the traditional “semantical hypothesis” for asymmetrical readings of conjunction. Walker 1975, in response, conceded the significance of the data but argued that there are equally significant problems for Cohen’s “semantical hypothesis” while recognizing additional advantages of the Gricean view. Horn 1972 lays the foundation for the theory of scalar implicature, on which scalar values like some, or, and warm are lower-bounded by truth-conditional meaning and upper-bounded by quantity-derived implicature; this in turn predicts the absence of lexicalizations for negated universals (*nall = “not all”) and logically exclusive or. Harnish 1976 is an important early endorsement and extension of the Gricean program for simplifying the goals of linguistic semantics, while Sadock 1978 follows up on Grice’s acknowledgements that the diagnostics for conversational implicature given in “Logic and Conversation” don’t always yield the intended results; in particular, they can’t decide between cases of implicature and cases of logical ambiguity.

                                                                                                        • Cohen, L. J. 1971. Some remarks on Grice’s views about the logical particles of natural language. In Pragmatics of natural language. Edited by Yehoshua Y. Bar-Hillel, 50–68. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel.

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                                                                                                          First explicit example of “pragmatic intrusion” based on the apparent projection of temporally asymmetric conjunction out of embedded (conditional) contexts: If you get married and have a baby, Grandma will be pleased can be true while If you have a baby and get married, Grandma will be pleased is false. Cohen takes this as an advantage for the “semantical hypothesis” over the “conversationalist hypothesis.”

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                                                                                                          • Harnish, R. M. 1976. Logical form and implicature. In An integrated theory of linguistic ability. Edited by Thomas G. Bever, Jerrold J. Katz, and D. Terence Langendoen, 313–391. New York: Crowell.

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                                                                                                            Explores some implications of the Gricean program and its interaction with natural language syntax and semantics. Proposes a combined Maxim of Quality-Quantity: “Make the strongest relevant claim justifiable by your evidence” (p. 362), encompassing three potentially clashing subrules: Be as informative as necessary, be relevant, and have evidence for what you say.

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                                                                                                            • Horn, Laurence. 1972. On the semantic properties of logical operators in English. PhD diss., University of California, Los Angeles.

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                                                                                                              Introduces scalar implicature, based on the Quantity maxim and the implicit competition among formally similar and semantically related items (some/all, or/and, warm/hot) as determined by a scale ordered by entailment (e.g., <some, many, most, all>), where the use of a weaker item scalar implicates that the speaker was not in position to have uttered any informationally stronger competitor. (Distributed by Bloomington: Indiana University Linguistics Club, 1976.)

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                                                                                                              • Sadock, Jerry. 1978. On testing for conversational implicature. Syntax and semantics. Vol. 9, Pragmatics. Edited by Peter Cole, 281–297. New York: Academic.

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                                                                                                                While sympathetic to Grice’s goals, Sadock finds most of the diagnostics for conversational implicatures either circular or inconsistent, a point partially conceded by Grice’s acknowledgment that there is no “knock-down test” for implicature. Cancelability emerges as the one useful criterion, although Sadock argues that it can be supplemented by the possibility of nonredundant affirmation (I was able to solve the problem, and I did).

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                                                                                                                • Walker, R. C. S. 1975. Conversational implicatures. In Meaning, reference, and necessity. Edited by Simon Blackburn, 133–181. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

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                                                                                                                  In response to Cohen, Walker offers a partial defense of the “conversational hypothesis” over the view that the relevant aspects of meaning must be built into the truth-conditional contribution of the connectives, concluding that neither Grice’s position nor Cohen’s can be definitively shown to be correct and allowing for a third, polysemy-based approach.

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                                                                                                                  Neo-Gricean Extensions

                                                                                                                  Linguists and philosophers whose work complemented, extended, and revised Grice’s program while retaining the basic goals and for the most part accepted CP and at least some version of the Maxims of Conversation came to known as neo-Griceans. Two particularly influential monographs in this tradition, seeking to formalize both Grice’s “Logic and Conversation” and Horn’s work on scalar implicature (Horn 1972, cited under the Conversationalist Hypothesis and its Critical Reception) are Gazdar 1979 and Hirschberg 1991, both growing out of earlier dissertations and both expanding the range of data considered and the degree of formal rigor. One subgoal of work in this area is determining how many maxims or basic principles are actually needed to establish an empirically sound pragmatic theory. If, like Horn and Levinson (and against relevance theorists) we follow Grice in taking the Maxim of Quality (or a truthfulness convention) as primary and unreducible, can all the remaining seven submaxims be reduced to two principles? Atlas and Levinson 1981 is the first foray in this direction, arguing for a Principle of Informativeness or inference to the best explanation or stereotype, alongside the first Quantity submaxim. Horn 1984 argues for a reduction of all the Gricean submaxims (after Quality) to two principles, Q (for Quantity) and R (for Relation, although the second submaxim of Quantity and Brevity are subsumed as well); it is the interaction of these two principles that yields the Division of Pragmatic Labor stipulating the correlation of unmarked form with unmarked meaning, with the corollary that a speaker who has gone out of her way to use a marked form must have been signaling a marked meaning or situation. Levinson 1987 (see also Levinson 2000, cited under “Pragmatic Intrusion,” “Embedded Implicature,” and the Grammatical Alternative) retains three principles or heuristics: Horn’s Q, Atlas and Levinson’s I[nformativeness], and Grice’s M[anner], as well as the related Q/M to capture the (un)marked form/(un)marked meaning correlation. Jay Atlas’s extensive publications presenting a “radical pragmatic” reorientation of philosophy of language culminated in the impressively wide-ranging Atlas 2005.

                                                                                                                  • Atlas, Jay. 2005. Logic, meaning, and conversation. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

                                                                                                                    DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195133004.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                    The culmination of a lifetime project on the part of a key figure in neo-Gricean philosophy of language, this collection of interrelated essays offers in-depth studies of ambiguity versus generality of meaning, the semantics–pragmatics interface, and the analysis of almost and cleft constructions. Chapter 2 (pp. 45–79) is a “critical exposition” of Grice’s theory of implicature.

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                                                                                                                    • Atlas, Jay, and Stephen Levinson. 1981. It-clefts, informativeness, and logical form. In Radical pragmatics. Edited by Peter Cole, 1–51. New York: Academic.

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                                                                                                                      Focusing on (but not only on) cleft sentences, the authors propose an enrichment of logical form (beyond truth conditions) as part of a project to eliminate semantic presupposition in favor of entailment and conversational implicature, the latter divided into two general categories based on the Maxims of Quantity and (in their formulation) Informativeness.

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                                                                                                                      • Gazdar, Gerald. 1979. Pragmatics: Presupposition, implicature, and logical form. New York: Academic.

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                                                                                                                        The earliest attempt to provide a formally explicit account of conversational implicature (in particular, Quantity-based scalar and “clausal” implicature) and its interaction with presupposition and entailed meaning. Investigates the role of context in canceling potential implicatures and presuppositions and provides an algorithm for the calculation of semantic and pragmatic relations.

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                                                                                                                        • Hirschberg, Julia. 1991. A theory of scalar implicature. New York: Garland.

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                                                                                                                          Published version of author’s influential 1985 University of Pennsylvania dissertation combines descriptive insight with formal rigor. First detailed look at rank orders and non-entailment-based contextually derivable (“ad hoc”) scales and at the implicatures they generate, as when “I’ve seen the movie” or “I’ve read the first chapter” implicates that I haven’t read the book.

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                                                                                                                          • Horn, Laurence. 1984. Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based implicature. In Meaning, form, and use in context. Edited by Deborah Schiffrin, 11–42. Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press.

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                                                                                                                            Reduces the non-Quality (sub)maxims to two functionally motivated pragmatic principles. The hearer-oriented Q Principle (≈ “Say enough”) collapses Quantity-1 and Avoid Ambiguity and Obscurity; the speaker-oriented R Principle (≈ “Don’t say too much”) collapses Quantity-2, Relation, and Be Brief and Orderly. Q and R interact in the Division of Pragmatic Labor, which correlates (un)marked forms with (un)marked meanings.

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                                                                                                                            • Levinson, Stephen. 1987. Minimization and conversational inference. In The pragmatic perspective. Edited by Jef Verschueren and Marcella Bertucelli-Papi, 61–129. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

                                                                                                                              DOI: 10.1075/pbcs.5Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                              Invokes a partial reduction of Grice’s program for the maxims and implicature based on three principles, Q (for Grice’s Quantity-1 and Horn’s Q), I (for Informativeness, as in Atlas and Levinson 1981), and M (for Manner), with the possibility of Q/M inference to explain the effect of Horn’s “Division of Pragmatic Labor.”

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                                                                                                                              The Bach Variations

                                                                                                                              A particularly influential and prolific scholar in the fleshing out of the Gricean project and its implications for the semantics/pragmatics interface is Kent Bach, whose work can be sampled on his website; note especially the “Semantics/Pragmatics Series.” Bach 1994 argues that Grice’s distinction between what is said and what is implicated should be understood as allowing for a category between the two, to deal with cases Grice never considered: An impliciture is not part of literal meaning and satisfies the cancelability criterion but is (unlike conversational implicature) an enrichment (expansion or completion) of what is said. Bach 2001 argues on conceptual and empirical grounds that something like Grice’s original tightly constrained notion of what is said should be retained, alongside principles (such as those advanced by Carston, Recanati, and Bach himself) that help predict our intuitions about enriched content associated with what is asserted, questioned, and so on. Saul has argued, with Bach, for an “austere” conception of what is said and for the need to relax Grice’s position that whatever is said must be meant, a position that leads to some apparent absurdities. In Saul 2002 the author also makes the case for allowing a new category of audience-implicature.

                                                                                                                              • Bach, Kent. 1994. Conversational impliciture. Mind and Language 9:124–162.

                                                                                                                                DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1994.tb00220.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                Argues that the categories of what is said and what is implicated, while mutually incompatible, are not mutually exhaustive. Expanding or completing the semantically determined meaning to convey a pragmatically enriched proposition—I haven’t eaten {today}. She’s tired enough {to sleep}—yields an impliciture, an implicit component of what is said.

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                                                                                                                                • Bach, Kent. 2001. You don’t say? Synthese 127:11–31.

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                                                                                                                                  Contra Recanati and relevance theorists, Bach defends a purely semantic notion of what is said that rejects pragmatic intrusion, endorses Grice’s connection between what is said and what the syntax of the uttered sentence projects, and allows for proposition radicals, so that an utterance like I’m ready expresses no proposition directly but must be enriched to yield the communicated proposition the speaker intended.

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                                                                                                                                  • Saul, Jennifer. 2002. Speaker meaning, what is said and what is implicated. Noûs 36:228–248.

                                                                                                                                    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0068.00369Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                    With Bach, Saul stresses that “what is said” cannot coherently be wholly subsumed within speaker intention, given the problems posed by slips of the tongue, performed utterances, and certain instances of nonliterality. While retaining CP, Saul argues that the full range of Grice’s remarks on the topic motivates a category of audience-implicature along with the traditional utterer-implicature.

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                                                                                                                                    The Universality Question

                                                                                                                                    Keenan 1976 questions the extent to which the Gricean framework of “conversational postulates” can be universal, in the light of cultures like those of the Malagasy, whose interactions seem not to involve any direct application of the Maxim of Quantity. But as Prince 1982 notes, if we take CP and the maxims to be ethnographic descriptions of Anglo-Saxon society (or “Western culture” more generally), they would be “silly,” for Westerners as much as for those in the more exotic or complex cultural contexts described in Keenan 1976 and, more extensively, Wierzbicka 2003. Related points are made in Green 1990, which stresses that the work CP does happens not simply when speakers observe it but when they flout it or opt out; if we didn’t take CP and the maxims as presumptions, we could not predict the nonlogical inferences that are actually drawn in a given cultural situation. It is unclear whether the disagreement between philosophers of language like Grice and sympathetic linguists like Prince and Green on the one hand and critics like Keenan or Wierzbicka on the other is substantive or reflective of cross-disciplinary misunderstandings and differences in research goals.

                                                                                                                                    • Green, Georgia. 1990. The universality of Gricean interpretation. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society. Edited by Kira Hall, 411–428. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Linguistics Society.

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                                                                                                                                      Clarifies the goals and methods of Gricean pragmatics, focusing on the intended breadth of Grice’s notion of “conversation,” the universal application of CP to language use, and its centrality over the maxims, which “are neither culturally prescribed standards, nor mere customs, but more like default instantiations of the CP” (p. 411).

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                                                                                                                                      • Keenan, Elinor Ochs. 1976. The universality of conversational postulates. Language in Society 5:67–80.

                                                                                                                                        DOI: 10.1017/S0047404500006850Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                        Historically significant challenge to the view that if CP and the maxims follow from principles of rationality they should be universal. Cites evidence from the interaction of Malagasy speakers to reject the universal status of the first maxim of Quantity, given that in certain circumstances speakers systematically withhold relevant information and no inference is thereby generated.

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                                                                                                                                        • Prince, Ellen. 1982. Grice and universality: A reappraisal. Unpublished manuscript, Univ. of Pennsylvania.

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                                                                                                                                          Refutes Keenan’s argument by showing that inferences described in her data in fact require the assumption that Quantity-1 is in force in Malagasy culture, interacting (as in our own culture) with other maxims and culture-specific precepts. Argues that no culture in which the maxims are absent allows the kind of inferences necessary for human interaction.

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                                                                                                                                          • Wierzbicka, Anna. 2003. Cross-cultural pragmatics: The semantics of human interaction. 2d ed. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

                                                                                                                                            DOI: 10.1515/9783110220964Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                            Seeks to challenge the universal applicability of Gricean principles for human interaction, based on the view that CP and the maxims fail to generalize to contexts in which norms of human interaction reflect different cultural attitudes and values. Empirically rich survey of specific situations in which cross-cultural communication must be relearned and negotiated.

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                                                                                                                                            Challenges to the Model

                                                                                                                                            Three substantial challenges to the Gricean model of CP and the concomitant maxims were presented first by a group of studies examining the constraints on the operation of quantity implicatures arising from the nature of scalar competitors, second by the development of an influential alternative to Grice’s theory in the form of RT focused on the relation between cognition and communication, and third by the recognition by both neo-Griceans and their rivals of the (apparent) empirical inadequacy of the simple Gricean model positing an autonomous truth-conditional semantics and a postsemantic pragmatics.

                                                                                                                                            Constraints on Scalar Implicature

                                                                                                                                            Within pragmatic theory, one challenge leveled at the Gricean (and, later, neo-Gricean) approaches to implicature focuses on the area of the theory on which most of the research has centered: the derivation of scalar implicatures. A much-cited paper, Van Kuppevelt 1996 addresses the relation between implicatures and information structure, invoking the notion of question under discussion that has since become familiar through the work of Craige Roberts; this approach also frees implicatures from their restriction to sentence-level analyses. Green 1995 brings up problems for the way Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, which generates scalar implicature, has been interpreted in neo-Gricean theories. The interaction of Quantity with maxims of Relation and Manner is the focus of Matsumoto 1995, which adduces evidence against any crucial role for Brevity (or grammatical complexity) in the computation of when implicatures arise and when they don’t, despite standard examples such as the asymmetry in scales like <p or q, p, p and q>: Despite the parallel in entailment, an utterance of p or q is more likely to implicate ~p than an utterance of p is to implicate ~(p and q). This question is revisited in Katzir 2007, which argues that considerations of complexity are indeed relevant as potential overriding factors, although adjustments to the definitions of the crucial concepts are necessary to achieve the right empirical results.

                                                                                                                                            • Green, Mitchell. 1995. Quantity, volubility, and some varieties of discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 18:83–112.

                                                                                                                                              DOI: 10.1007/BF00984962Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                              Critiques earlier work on scalar implicature by Horn, Gazdar, Hirschberg, and Levinson and argues against “volubility,” the tendency to read Grice’s first Quantity maxim as enjoining the speaker to be as informative as possible (modulo the effect of the other maxims), on the grounds that such an injunction is unreasonable.

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                                                                                                                                              • Katzir, Roni. 2007. Structurally defined alternatives. Linguistics and Philosophy 30:669–690.

                                                                                                                                                DOI: 10.1007/s10988-008-9029-ySave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                Reexamines the question of how to determine the alternatives relevant for generating scalar implicatures and confronts the “asymmetry problem”: why does Some F are G implicate the negation of All F are G but not that of Some but not all F are G? Contra Matsumoto, defends the view that the relative complexity of the potential alternatives is relevant in evaluating scalar competitors.

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                                                                                                                                                • Matsumoto, Yo. 1995. The conversational condition on Horn scales. Linguistics and Philosophy 18:21–60.

                                                                                                                                                  DOI: 10.1007/BF00984960Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                  Posits a “Conversational Constraint” on the scalar alternatives that affect which quantity implicatures are recovered in a given context: to generate a scalar implicature, the choice of the logically weaker over the stronger expression must be attributable only to the Maxims of Quality and Quantity-1. Argues for the crucial role of semantic monotonicity.

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                                                                                                                                                  • van Kuppevelt, Jan. 1996. Inferring from topics: Scalar implicatures as topic-dependent inferences. Linguistics and Philosophy 19:393–443.

                                                                                                                                                    DOI: 10.1007/BF00630897Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                    Argues for redefining implicature-relevant scales by situating them within a topic-oriented approach to discourse structure on which propositions constitute answers to the explicit or implicit question under discussion at a given point in the discourse. This extends the treatment of scalar implicature beyond the local sentential level standardly assumed in pragmatic theory.

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                                                                                                                                                    Relevance Theorists and Other Radical Dissenters

                                                                                                                                                    These represent the most sustained challenge for Gricean and neo-Gricean theory. While sharing with Grice (as against approaches reviewed in the following section) the emphasis on inferential rather than code-based approaches to communication, RT departs from the Gricean model by focusing on the psychology of utterance interpretation rather than speaker’s intentions and by reducing the original set of maxims and submaxims to one all-encompassing principle of relevance, defined in terms of the interplay between cognitive effects and processing effort: The greater the effects and the less the effort, the more relevant the contribution. Wilson and Sperber 1981 is an early foray in this debate, sharpened and considerably extended in Sperber and Wilson 1986 (second edition: 1995), probably the most cited single work in pragmatics after Grice. One of the most important relevance theoreticians has been Robyn Carston. Carston 1993 is a microanalysis of one important question: Can we reconcile the positive results of Grice’s non-ambiguist approach to the temporal and causal asymmetry of conjunctions of events like They had a baby and (they) got married with the intuition that the enriched meanings arising in the relevant contexts constitute part of the speaker’s explicit message, thus affecting truth conditions of what is said? Carston 2002 is a broadside against the minimalist Gricean and neo-Gricean accounts of what is said and an appeal for a more elaborated view of what counts as explicit; the RT notion of explicature (for pragmatically determined aspects of enriched content) plays a major role in this project, and a strong case is made against attributing any major theoretical significance to the distinction between generalized and particularized implicature. RT as a whole is reviewed concisely in Wilson and Sperber 2004. While not a relevance theorist per se, the contextualist philosopher François Recanati is a leading figure in what he has termed “truth-conditional pragmatics”; many of his leading ideas on meaning, communication, free enrichment, and logical form are presented in Recanati 2004. A differently motivated critique of the Gricean model (extending as well to much work in RT) is given in Davis 1998, the first monograph on implicature by a philosopher; Davis’s focus is on what he sees as insufficiencies in the treatment of the role in communication played by linguistic conventions that extend beyond literal meaning.

                                                                                                                                                    • Carston, Robyn. 1993. Conjunction, explanation and relevance. Lingua 90:27–48.

                                                                                                                                                      DOI: 10.1016/0024-3841(93)90059-6Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                      A classic RT-based microanalysis of the asymmetry of (some instances of) natural language conjunction as representing pragmatically enriched propositional content. Shares with Gricean approaches the rejection of lexical ambiguity for and but differs in invoking not implicature but truth-conditionally relevant material (temporal, causal, etc.) contributing an explicature.

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                                                                                                                                                      • Carston, Robyn. 2002. Thoughts and utterances: The pragmatics of explicit communication. Oxford: Blackwell.

                                                                                                                                                        DOI: 10.1002/9780470754603Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                        Important challenge to Gricean and neo-Gricean approaches to pragmatics and communication by a major exponent of RT. Empirically rich and theoretically deep exploration of a wide range of issues related to the semantics–pragmatics interface, semantic underdetermination, utterance interpretation, and the distinction between explicit and implicit communication.

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                                                                                                                                                        • Davis, Wayne. 1998. Implicature: Intention, convention, and principle in the failure of Gricean theory. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

                                                                                                                                                          DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511663796Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                          Strongly critical examination of the theories of implicature developed by Grice and his successors, based on what Davis sees as Grice’s failure to successfully accommodate the roles of speaker’s intention and of linguistic convention. Distinguishes “speaker implicature” from “sentence implicature,” corresponding to Grice’s particularized and generalized implicature, respectively.

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                                                                                                                                                          • Recanati, François. 2004. Literal meaning. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

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                                                                                                                                                            A major figure in contextualist philosophy of language, Recanati argues for a truth-conditional pragmatics and a notion of what is said that allows for extensive saturation, modulation, and “free enrichment” of underspecified linguistic meaning. For Recanati, “the contrast between what a speaker means and what he or she says is illusory, and the notion of “what the sentence says” is incoherent” (p. 4).

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                                                                                                                                                            • Sperber, Dan, and Deirdre Wilson. 1986. Relevance: Communication and cognition. 2d ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

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                                                                                                                                                              While taking Grice’s model as a starting point, the ostensive-inferential model of RT rejects the primacy of CP and reduces the maxims to one overarching “principle of relevance” (p. 158): By uttering U, the speaker guarantees that his or her message will provide cognitive effects worth the hearer’s effort to process U.

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                                                                                                                                                              • Wilson, Deirdre, and Dan Sperber. 1981. On Grice’s theory of conversation. In Conversation and discourse. Edited by Paul Werth, 155–178. London: Croom Helm.

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                                                                                                                                                                Initial objections, refined in the authors’ later work, to aspects of Grice’s account, including the invocation of CP and the maxims, the focus on pragmatic processes contributing to implicatures rather than to explicit content (“what is said”), the role of deliberate maxim violation, and an alternative approach to the figurative readings that Grice took to arise from the flouting of a Maxim of Quality.

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                                                                                                                                                                • Wilson, Deirdre, and Dan Sperber. 2004. Relevance theory. In The handbook of pragmatics. Edited by Laurence Horn and Gregory Ward, 607–632. Oxford: Blackwell.

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                                                                                                                                                                  Useful overview of the landscape of RT by its founders, with a synopsis of the major results of two decades of work within that framework and detailed comparisons of the theory with Grice’s pragmatic theory and others.

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                                                                                                                                                                  “Pragmatic Intrusion,” “Embedded Implicature,” and the Grammatical Alternative

                                                                                                                                                                  Within the Gricean paradigm, implicatures are read off what is said with the semantically interpreted logical form of the expressed proposition serving as input. In certain cases, this global approach seems to get the facts wrong, prompting a series of moves to “localize” the computation of implicature and in some cases to stipulate implicated meanings as part of the grammar or compositional semantics rather than derive them through CP and assumptions of speaker and hearer rationality. Ironically, one early move in this direction was undertaken by the erstwhile neo-Gricean Levinson (Levinson 2000), who takes sentences like Wilson’s example It’s better to meet the love of your life and get married than to get married and meet the love of your life to be symptomatic of the general possibility of “pragmatic intrusion”; he argues, contra Grice, that generalized implicatures arise by default and can serve as input to truth conditions. (The same data are taken by Bach, Recanati, and relevance theorists to show that it is not implicatures that are involved in such cases but rather implicitures or explicatures.) For some apparently problematic cases, global approaches do seem to be tenable, as Sauerland 2004 shows for the case of exclusive disjunction. Locality effects result in a more wholesale abandonment of the Gricean paradigm in Chierchia 2004 and other works, on which scalar implicatures are reanalyzed as grammatical phenomena with the locally computed upper bound (when it applies) contributing to the compositional semantics. Gricean responses to this work have supported pragmatic approaches invoking the Maxim of Quantity. Following Horn 2005, Geurts 2009 does allow for limited “reconstrual” effects when the local context, including focus on the scalar item, may force a reanalysis of normally implicated material into what is said (If it’s WARM we’ll sit outside but if it’s{HOT/VERY warm} we’ll go in and turn on the air conditioner). For the propositional attitude cases involving what appear to be stronger implicatures than the global account predicts, Geurts 2009 follows Russell 2006 in establishing independently motivated reasons for the apparent effects and points to the failure of the grammatical theory to account for weak implicatures, when an epistemically limited speaker uttering Some of the students failed can be taken to implicate that he or she doesn’t know for a fact that all of them failed, without necessarily implicating that he or she knows not all of them did. Geurts 2010 refines, supports, and generalizes these positions in in an important monograph, which also draws on some of the work in the burgeoning field of experimental pragmatics (see the separate Oxford Bibliographies article on Maxims of Conversation).

                                                                                                                                                                  • Chierchia, Gennaro. 2004. Scalar implicatures, polarity phenomena, and the syntax/ pragmatics interface. In Structures and beyond. Edited by Adriana Belletti, 39–103. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                    Addresses the apparent blocking (actually, reversal) of scalar implicatures in downward entailing contexts by reanalyzing such implicatures as locally computed elements of compositional semantics introduced by specific lexical items rather than arising globally from rationality and CP. Treats scalar implicature and negative polarity items as related strengthening effects.

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                                                                                                                                                                    • Geurts, Bart. 2009. Scalar implicature and local pragmatics. Mind & Language 24:51–79.

                                                                                                                                                                      DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.01353.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                      Extends Russell’s approach to scalar items in the scope of propositional attitudes into a general Gricean account of C[herchia]-type locality effects, noting that the localist theory cannot explain weak (primary) implicatures. Concedes that L[evinson]-type locality effects under focus remain as marked exceptions to the traditional Gricean account motivating pragmatic reconstrual.

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                                                                                                                                                                      • Geurts, Bart. 2010. Quantity implicatures. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

                                                                                                                                                                        DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511975158Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                        An important monograph supporting the Gricean derivation of implicatures from CP and rationality as against current grammatical and conventionalist alternatives. Draws on conceptual and empirical arguments (including those based on experimental studies) to show the robustness of the relevant patterns of pragmatic inference and its implications for complex syntactic and lexical structures in natural language.

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                                                                                                                                                                        • Horn, Laurence. 2005. The border wars: A neo-Gricean perspective. In Where semantics meets pragmatics. Edited by K. Turner and K. von Heusinger, 21–48. Oxford: Elsevier.

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                                                                                                                                                                          Defends a relatively orthodox version of Gricean pragmatics against revisionist approaches (Chierchia on locality, Ariel on most as semantically upper-bounded, Levinson on implicatures as defaults) but allows for focus-induced retroactive accommodation of standard implicatures as part of what is said for cases like Eating SOME of the cake is better than eating all of it.

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                                                                                                                                                                          • Levinson, Stephen. 2000. Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                            The chef d’oeuvre of a leading neo-Gricean pragmaticist, this book departs from Gricean orthodoxy in treating (generalized) conversational implicatures default inferences and in allowing implicatures to serve as input to truth-conditional content to account for “pragmatic intrusion.” A goldmine of linguistic observations, including a chapter (pp. 261–365) advancing a pragmatic reananalysis of binding.

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                                                                                                                                                                            • Russell, Benjamin 2006. Against grammatical computation of scalar implicatures. Journal of Semantics 23:361–382.

                                                                                                                                                                              DOI: 10.1093/jos/ffl008Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                              Presents evidence that Chierchia’s grammatical theory of local scalar implicature is neither necessary nor desirable for predicting the intuitions that motivated that work. Provides an alternative analysis consistent with Grice’s globalist implicature mechanism that yields the apparent embedded implicature effects, drawing on independently motivated assumptions about speakers’ beliefs.

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                                                                                                                                                                              • Sauerland, Uli. 2004. Scalar implicatures in complex sentences. Linguistics and Philosophy 27:367–391.

                                                                                                                                                                                DOI: 10.1023/B:LING.0000023378.71748.dbSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                Develops a Gricean account of apparent embedded scalar implicature, focusing on the case of exclusive uses of disjunction that motivate a new approach to competition between scalar alternatives taking account of the epistemic status of potential implicatures. Distinguishes implicatures as primary (“some” +> ~K“all”) versus secondary (“some” +> K~“all”).

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                                                                                                                                                                                Further Implications and Extensions of CP and the Gricean Model

                                                                                                                                                                                While the CP is initially motivated by the properties of “conversation,” Grice’s own examples extend the application of CP to a wide range of linguistic (and nonlinguistic) communicative contexts and phenomena. Among the most important of these in the last third of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st have been the study of pragmatic presupposition (which invokes the notion of pragmatic exploitation at the heart of Grice’s model), speaker reference (where the CP allows us to preserve a conservative Russellian semantics for descriptions), and figurative utterances (including indirect speech acts, in which the literal force of the utterance belies its intended force, and tautologies, in which an apparently uninformative utterance conveys something beyond its minimal content). Another application of CP is the interaction between the desiderata of clarity (as dictated by the maxims) and those of politeness, where social dictates may override or constrain the operation of Grice’s principles or motivate an extension of those principles. In this case pragmatics interfaces with sociolinguistics; elsewhere, CP has led to significant developments in formal theories of communication (including game-theoretic and optimality-theoretic models), in developmental psycholinguistics, and the study of language in forensic contexts.

                                                                                                                                                                                Presupposition as Pragmatic Exploitation

                                                                                                                                                                                Grice 1981, a revised version of a paper first presented orally at the University of Illinois in 1970, attempts to dissolve apparent presuppositional effects into conversational implicature, ordinary entailment, and scope reanalysis and also prefigures later work by Stalnaker, Lewis, and others on accommodation. This notion, a particular instance of pragmatic exploitation, is best known for its application to presupposition, as seen in papers from the early 1970s collected in Stalnaker 1999 and in Lewis 1979, where accommodation is exemplified by the rule for presupposition—“If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then, ceteris paribus and within certain limits, presupposition P comes into existence at t”—and extended to problems in the characterization of permission, descriptions, vagueness, modality, and performatives.

                                                                                                                                                                                • Grice, H. P. 1981. Presupposition and conversational implicature. In Radical pragmatics. Edited by Peter Cole, 183–198. New York: Academic.

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                                                                                                                                                                                  After his earlier acceptance of Strawson’s semantic conception of presupposition, Grice here reanalyzes presuppositional effects in definite descriptions and factives as resulting from entailment and implicature, rehabilitating a Russellian semantics for the. Proposes a bracketing device as a “conventional regimentation” of a pragmatic distinction to allow for elements to outscope presupposition-inducing operators.

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                                                                                                                                                                                  • Lewis, David. 1979. Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8:339–359.

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                                                                                                                                                                                    Develops a formal dynamic model for how context can be incremented. The first explicit formulation of the process of accommodation, whereby the hearer shifts his or her contextual model to conform to the requirements of the speaker’s utterance, in cases ranging from presupposition to permission statements to vagueness.

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                                                                                                                                                                                    • Stalnaker, Robert. 1999. Context and content. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

                                                                                                                                                                                      DOI: 10.1093/0198237073.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                      This collection of work by a major philosopher includes several foundational papers for pragmatic theory on assertion, conditionals, the representation of belief, and the role of context and common ground. Early work on pragmatic presupposition is based partly on an application of Grice’s notion of pragmatic exploitation.

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                                                                                                                                                                                      Referring Expressions

                                                                                                                                                                                      Gricean explanation has been periodically invoked to explain the form–function mismatches involving ways in which speakers and linguistic expressions refer. For Ludlow and Neale 1991, indefinites are semantically univocal quantificational expressions that are systematically used to refer. Hawkins 1991 and Horn and Abbott 2012 offer two related but distinct treatments of the speaker’s choice between indefinite and definite descriptions as scalar competitors, while Abbott 2010 provides a valuable overview of the semantic and pragmatic issues, including useful evaluations of the givenness hierarchy of Gundel, et al. 1993 (pp. 254–257); Ludlow and Neale 1991’s theory of indefinites (pp. 271–274); and other earlier treatments of referring expressions by Ariel, Bach, Karttunen, and others.

                                                                                                                                                                                      • Abbott, Barbara. 2010. Reference. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                                        Overview of the semantics and pragmatics of reference within linguistics and philosophy of language. Chapter 4 explores the application of Grice’s ideas on implicature and Montague’s on compositional semantics in accounting for the apparent differences between the behavior of quantifiers and referring expressions in natural language versus formal languages.

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                                                                                                                                                                                        • Gundel, Jeanette, Nancy Hedberg, and Ron Zacharski. 1993. Cognitive status and the form of referring expressions in discourse. Language 69:274–307.

                                                                                                                                                                                          DOI: 10.2307/416535Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                          Proposes a “givenness hierarchy” relating cognitive status (activated, familiar, uniquely identifiable, etc.) to type of referring expression (pronouns, definite nominals, indefinites, etc.). The statuses are determined by positions on a scale defined by Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, with the general condition being that a speaker’s usage is restricted by his or her assumption of the scalar position of the entity to which he or she is referring or alluding.

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                                                                                                                                                                                          • Hawkins, John. 1991. On (in)definite articles: Implicatures and (un)grammaticality prediction. Journal of Linguistics 27:405–442.

                                                                                                                                                                                            DOI: 10.1017/S0022226700012731Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                            Invokes the CP and Maxim of Quantity (along with Levinson’s Q and I principles) to motivate the distribution of indefinite and definite articles. Combines Russellian semantics with Gricean pragmatics to allow for a full explanatory account of the articles and in particular the positing of <the, a> as a “Horn scale” of equally lexicalized items differing in their informativeness potential.

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                                                                                                                                                                                            • Horn, Laurence, and Barbara Abbott. 2012. <the, a>: (In)definiteness and implicature. In Reference and referring. Edited by William Kabasenche, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew Slater, 325–355. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy 10. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                                              Follows Hawkins in taking the relation between a and the to constitute scalar competitors but differs from Hawkins (and Russell) in taking definites not to entail but to conventionally implicate uniqueness/maximality, while indefinites are unspecified for this property, so that a speaker’s use of a implicates that he or she wasn’t in a position to have felicitously used the more informative the.

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                                                                                                                                                                                              • Ludlow, Peter, and Stephen Neale. 1991. Indefinite descriptions: In defense of Russell. Linguistics and Philosophy 14:171–202.

                                                                                                                                                                                                DOI: 10.1007/BF00627402Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                Argues that Russell was correct in treating indefinites (even in Look, a man is uprooting your turnips!) as unambiguously quantificational, rejecting referential accounts. The appearance of referential use in such cases is a pragmatic effect derived by Gricean reasoning, accounted for in terms of a proposition the speaker intends to convey but does not actually express.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                Nonliteral Meaning

                                                                                                                                                                                                One of the most promising applications of Grice’s notions on what is said and what is meant is in the area of nonliteral meaning, including the classical figures of speech of the rhetoricians. In some cases, a specific form is associated with a nonliteral use of a sentence or group of words. (Bach and Harnish 1979, pp. 224–232) invokes the notion of standardized nonliterality; related constructs are conventions of usage (Searle 1975) and short-circuited conversational implicature (Morgan 1978). Another application of CP to nonliteral meaning involves the use of apparently noninformative tautologies to convey information; Grice’s Quantity-based explanation (if an utterance is prima facie uninformative, the speaker must have been using it to communicate something distinct from what he or she said, or “made as if to say”) is rejected in Wierzbicka 1987 in favor of the author’s own “radical semantic” analysis and supported and extended in Ward and Hirschberg 1991. An analogous case is that of irony and sarcasm. While Grice depicts ironic meanings as arising from an exploitation of the Maxim of Quality, others have found this approach insufficient; see the separate Oxford Bibliographies article on Maxims of Conversation for relevant references.

                                                                                                                                                                                                • Bach, Kent, and Robert M. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic communication and speech acts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                  Unified account of communication and speech acts, combining Austin’s and Searle’s illocutionary theories with Grice’s key concept of the speaker’s communicative intentions in determining the locutionary act. Within the speech act schema, nonliteral acts receive an essentially Gricean explanation, generated by the hearer’s recognition that the speaker must have meant something beyond the obviously false or noninformative statement literally expressed.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Morgan, Jerry. 1978. Two types of convention in indirect speech acts. In Pragmatics. Vol. 9 of Syntax and semantics. Edited by Peter Cole, 261–280. New York: Academic.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                    Searle’s nonmeaning conventions reconstructed as “short-circuited” conversational implicatures: Not all implicatures are normally calculated (although they are calculable if necessary). Short-circuited implicatures extend to indirect speech acts and other instances of speaking idiomatically: Break a leg! but not Fracture a tibia!; You can say that again! but not You can repeat that!

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                                                                                                                                                                                                    • Searle, John. 1975. Indirect speech acts. In Speech acts. Vol. 3 of Syntax and semantics. Edited by Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan, 59–82. New York: Academic.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                      Derives indirect speech acts, such as the function of questions such as Can you open the window? to issue requests, as relevance implicatures based on CP but takes the difficulty in using synonymous expressions such as Are you able to open the window? for the same end to signal the presence of a “convention of usage” and the operation of a maxim “Speak idiomatically unless there is some special reason not to” (p. 76).

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                                                                                                                                                                                                      • Ward, Gregory, and Julia Hirschberg. 1991. A pragmatic analysis of tautological utterances. Journal of Pragmatics 15:507–520.

                                                                                                                                                                                                        DOI: 10.1016/0378-2166(91)90109-BSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                        Argues that Wierzbicka’s anti-Gricean account of tautologies to be empirically flawed, as is the expectation that literal translation should preserve nonliteral understandings. The conveyed meanings associated with utterances of if p then p, either p or ~p, A is A, Bs are Bs, and other tautological formulas are argued to represent generalized conversational implicatures.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                        • Wierzbicka, Anna. 1987. Boys will be boys: “Radical semantics” vs. “radical pragmatics.” Language 63:95–114.

                                                                                                                                                                                                          DOI: 10.2307/415385Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                          Rejects Grice’s (and Levinson’s) Maxim of Quantity-based account of informative tautologies in favor of a language- and culture-specific “radical semantic” analysis. Evidence for this position includes the fact that the informative effects of tautological utterances often fails to translate exactly from one language to another.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                          Politeness and Impoliteness

                                                                                                                                                                                                          Grice’s taxonomy of what is meant (and not said) allows for a category of nonconventional but nonconversational maxims and implicatures about which he has virtually nothing to say. Others have suggested this category might subsume (inter alia) politeness phenomena, which clearly have the potential to clash with and often override the dictates of CP; being polite may be rational, but it can also lead to breakdowns of “cooperation” in the strict sense. The first systematic treatment of politeness is Goffman’s work on the concept of face, beginning with the classic 1955 essay reprinted in Goffman 1967. The most important study of face and face-threatening acts in a Gricean framework is that of Brown and Levinson 1987, although Robin Lakoff independently arrived at some of the same points in an historically significant short paper on the interaction of “Be polite” with CP and the Gricean maxims (Lakoff 1973). Leech 1983 proposes a somewhat inflated inventory of rhetorical maxims (tact, generosity, modesty, etc.) to deal with politeness phenomena and their interaction, while Attardo 1997 develops a perlocutionary CP to incorporate politeness goals into speaker/hearer interaction. Generalizing Goffman’s and Brown and Levinson’s trailblazing work and on the biology of approach/avoidance, Terkourafi 2007 develops a higher-level notion of Face2 as a human universal that interacts with CP to generate implicata. A later handbook entry, Terkourafi 2012, offers a masterful review of work on politeness and impoliteness phenomena across different frameworks and methodologies.

                                                                                                                                                                                                          • Attardo, Salvatore. 1997. Locutionary and perlocutionary co-operation: The perlocutionary principle. Journal of Pragmatics 27:753–779.

                                                                                                                                                                                                            DOI: 10.1016/S0378-2166(96)00063-XSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                            Makes the case for distinguishing two kinds of cooperative behavior within CP: locutionary cooperation (for linguistic goals) and perlocutionary cooperation (for extralinguistic goals, “maximizing the participants’ effectiveness in the world”). The perlocutionary CP enjoins the hearer to cooperate in the goals of the speaker, including nonlinguistic (practical) goals.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                            • Brown, Penelope, and Stephen Levinson. 1987. Politeness: Some universals in language. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                              Expansion of classic 1978 essay, an influential ethnographically and philosophically informed application of Gricean theory to manifestations of politeness phenomena across languages and cultures. Distinguishes negative politeness as avoiding or mitigating face-threatening acts from positive politeness (typically supporting a familiar interlocutor’s positive face).

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                                                                                                                                                                                                              • Goffman, Erving. 1967. On face-work. In Interaction ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior. By Erving Goffman. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                Influential paper from 1955 by a major figure in sociology that posits and develops the notion of face as the positive self-image that an individual holds when interacting with others and is taken to be “a sociological construct of interaction, . . . neither inherent in nor a permanent aspect of the person” (p. 7).

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                • Lakoff, Robin. 1973. The logic of politeness, or minding your p’s and q’s. CLS 9:292–305.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Proposes a Politeness supermaxim “Be polite” encompassing three partially overlapping and partially opposed rules: “Don’t impose”; “Give options”; and “Make addressee feel good; be friendly,” whose operation and resolution is illustrated with numerous examples. “Be polite” frequently conflicts with “Be clear,” Lakoff’s rendering of a Gricean supermaxim.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Leech, Geoffrey. 1983. Principles of pragmatics. London: Longman.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Treatment of pragmatics and CP as corollaries of rhetoric, with particular attention to the properties of interpersonal rhetoric as reflected in language use and figures of speech. Relates CP to the Politeness Principle and develops a set of subsidiary maxims including those of Tact, Generosity, Approbation, and Modesty.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                    • Terkourafi, Marina. 2007. Toward a universal notion of face for a notion of cooperation. In Explorations in pragmatics: Linguistic, cognitive and intercultural pragmatics. Edited by Istvan Kecskes and Laurence Horn, 313–344. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Developing ideas of Goffman and Brown and Levinson, Terkourafi—taking face as an aspect of “the accepted purpose of the talk exchange” within CP (p. 313)—distinguishes a second-order notion of Face2 grounded biologically in the universal dichotomy of approach versus withdrawal and phenomenologically in intentionality. Implicatures derive from the interaction of CP and Face2.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                      • Terkourafi, Marina. 2012. Politeness and pragmatics. In The Cambridge handbook of pragmatics. Edited by Keith Allan and Kasia Jaszczolt, 617–637. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139022453Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        A useful overview of different approaches to politeness and impoliteness phenomena in sociopragmatics and their cross-linguistic and cross-cultural realizations, with particular attention to the treatment of face and face loss, speaker intention, implicatures, contexts of interaction, and varieties of rudeness in cooperative and adversarial exchanges.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Formal Models of Communication

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Over the past two decades there has been considerable work on ways of formalizing the mechanisms by which nonlogical inferences are generated through the interactions between the communicative goals of speaker and hearer as rational agents, as first outlined by Zipf and especially Grice and later sharpened in Horn’s Division of Pragmatic Labor and Levinson’s heuristics. These formalizations utilize approaches from economic theory, phonology, and semantics (i.e., game theory [bidirectional], optimality theory, and situation semantics, respectively). One important strain of work in this domain is represented by the notion of strategic inference (Parikh 1991) and equilibrium of forces (Parikh 2010). Benz, et al. 2005 is a useful anthology of papers proposing and comparing formal models of Gricean communication, while the encyclopedic overviews van Rooij 2011 and Franke 2013, both coming out of the center of such work at Amsterdam, provide excellent reviews of the literature on game-theoretic and optimality-theoretic approaches to formal pragmatics. The tendency for unmarked forms to convey unmarked messages while marked (complex or unexpected) forms are interpreted as signaling marked messages, as predicted in Horn 1984, based in part on McCawley 1978 (cited under Neo-Gricean Extensions and Cooperation and Least Effort), has been treated rigorously by extending Lewis’s work on signaling games; important programs to model this interaction are presented and evaluated in van Rooij 2004, van Rooij 2008, De Jaegher 2008, and the especially ambitious Franke 2011, which extends the game-theoretic analysis to a wider range of linguistic phenomena.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                        • Benz, Anton, Gerhard Jäger, and Robert van Rooij, eds. 2005. Game theory and pragmatics. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          DOI: 10.1057/9780230285897Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Leading scholars, including Stalnaker, Parikh, and the editors, employ (evolutionary) game theory to explore the factors that prompt emergence of linguistic rules and the use of rationality principles to infer what is communicated in actual conversation. Volume introduction provides useful general background in game theory.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                          • De Jaegher, K. 2008. The evolution of Horn’s rule. Journal of Economic Methodology 15:275–284.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            DOI: 10.1080/13501780802321400Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Argues that evolutionary game theory fares better than standard (noncooperative) game theory in modeling the interaction of speaker and hearer in unmarked and marked settings. Extends the model to deal with the role of disambiguation and of context-dependent inferences of (im)plausibility.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                            • Franke, Michael. 2011. Quantity implicatures, exhaustive interpretation, and rational conversation. Semantics and Pragmatics 4.1: 1–82.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                              A comprehensive attempt to demonstrate the utility of game-theoretic approaches to the derivation of the Quantity maxim from rationality in Grice’s spirit. Extends the model to subsume exhaustivity-based approaches and provides an intuitive treatment of free-choice disjunction.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                              • Franke, Michael. 2013. Game theoretic pragmatics. Philosophy Compass 8:269–284.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                DOI: 10.1111/phc3.12015Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Complementary survey to that of van Rooij 2008 that offers an extensive review of earlier literature and focuses on evolutionary and nonevolutionary game theory for modeling speaker/hearer interaction. Argues that game theory can be seen as playing the same role in modeling language use, viewed as a complex adaptive system, that logic plays for natural language meaning.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                • Parikh, Prashant. 1991. Communication and strategic inference. Linguistics and Philosophy 14:473–514.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  DOI: 10.1007/BF00632595Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  A formal account of meaning and communication between rational agents in general Gricean terms incorporating insights from game theory and situation semantics into the strategic discourse model, building in concepts of partial information, strategic interaction, and situated communication.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Parikh, Prashant. 2010. Language and equilibrium. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013451.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Presents an ambitious unified semantic/pragmatic theory for both literal and implicated meaning based on equilibrium, the balance of several interacting forces relating to syntax, conventional meaning, information, and flow. The theory, drawing on linguistics, game theory, computer science, and philosophy of language, is applied to the analysis of definite descriptions.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    • van Rooij, Robert. 2004. Signaling games select Horn strategies. Linguistics and Philosophy 27:493–527.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      DOI: 10.1023/B:LING.0000024403.88733.3fSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Extends Lewis’s work on sender/receiver signaling game strategy to predict the functioning of the Division of Pragmatic Labor (Horn 1984, cited under Neo-Gricean Extensions) whereby an (un)marked expression gets an (un)marked interpretation as a default. Compares evolutionary game-theoretic account of this correlation (taken to be a conventionalized rule of language) with alternative treatments.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      • van Rooij, Robert. 2008. Games and quantity implicatures. Journal of Economic Methodology 15:261–274.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        DOI: 10.1080/13501780802321376Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        An application of signaling games and work by Farrell and Cho and Kreps on equilibria to the formalization of scalar implicature and Horn’s Division of Pragmatic Labor relating speaker’s and hearer’s roles in communication. Shows that a receiver will interpret a signaler’s deviation from the equilibrium the receiver as indicating an infrequent event.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        • van Rooij, Robert. 2011. Optimality-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches to implicature. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Edited by Ed Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Overview of formal work on implicature from the perspectives of bidirectional optimality theory and game theory as applied to the reciprocally interactive reasoning of speaker and hearer as described informally in Horn’s Division of Pragmatic Labor and elaborated in formal theories. Similarities and differences between frameworks are sketched, and several key examples discussed.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          The Psychology of Language

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Studies of word learning and the psychology of communication have incorporated aspects of the Gricean program. The principles of contrast formulated by Eve Clark (Clark 1987) and mutual exclusivity formulated by Ellen Markman and her colleagues (e.g., in Markman and Wachtel 1988) both invoke children’s working assumption that a unfamiliar form will correspond to an unassigned meaning or reference and vice versa. That is, both synonymy (two meanings for the same form) and homonymy (two forms assigned the same meaning) tend to be ruled out or at least highly marked. Experimental studies show that if a child knows the label for a given object, an unfamiliar label must pick out an unfamiliar object or a subpart or property of a familiar one. Bloom 2000 presents the evidence for these principles in acquisition and demonstrates the role of theory of mind, which is motivated by the same sociopragmatic principles governing speaker and hearer interaction developed in by Grice and others working in his tradition. Bontly 2005 argues that the Modified Occam’s Razor principle is motivated by children’s homonymy avoidance more clearly than by the properties of adult language cited by Grice. Herb Clark’s work on the interactive construction of communication as coordinated action, in Clark 1996 and other work, is a good illustration of the applicability of the Gricean project beyond its original boundaries.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          • Bloom, Paul. 2000. How children learn the meanings of words. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Masterful study and comprehensive review of the empirical literature on word learning. Emphasizes the role played by the learner’s “Theory of Mind,” a sociopragmatic sensitivity to the referential intentions of others as signaled by nonverbal cues and knowledge of others’ mental states.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            • Bontly, Thomas. 2005. Modified Occam’s Razor: Parsimony arguments and pragmatic explanations. Mind & Language 20:288–312.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              DOI: 10.1111/j.0268-1064.2005.00286.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              Argues that the strongest support for a generalized notion of parsimony in the theory of meaning along the lines of Grice’s Modified Occam’s Razor principle (“Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”) can be provided by findings on children’s resistance to homonymy in the acquisition of language.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              • Clark, Eve. 1987. The principle of contrast: A constraint on language acquisition. In Mechanisms of language acquisition. Edited by Brian MacWhinney, 1–33. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                In the tradition of Dwight Bolinger, Clark proposes Contrast, the principle that any two distinct forms (words, constructions) contrast in meaning. This is shown to be a robust heuristic for acquisition of word meaning as well as a factor in word choice for adults and (in combination with the principle of conventionality) in linguistic innovation and meaning change.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                • Clark, Herbert. 1996. Using language. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511620539Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Culminating Clark’s extensive work on the psychology of communication, this major book expounds a view of language use as joint or coordination action. Grice’s theories of meaning, speaker intention, CP, and conversational implicature are summarized, critiqued, and developed in chapter 5 (pp. 125–154) on “Meaning and Understanding.”

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Markman, Ellen, and Gwyn Wachtel. 1988. Children’s use of mutual exclusivity to constrain the meanings of words. Cognitive Psychology 20:121–157.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    DOI: 10.1016/0010-0285(88)90017-5Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Characterizes and exemplifies the principle of mutual exclusivity, children’s predisposition to reject lexical overlap, in which an unfamiliar label is applied to a familiar object with a known name. This implicitly Gricean principle has been shown here and in much other work to guide word learning by children and arguably by some nonhumans as well.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Pragmatic Principles and Legal Consequences

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    The domain of legal language is one that offers particular challenges and opportunities for pragmatic theory. A good starting point on the interface between Gricean pragmatics and the law is Kaplan and Green 1995, a contribution to a special issue of the Washington University Law Quarterly on the intersection of linguistics and law; contributions to the symposium by such pragmaticists as Fillmore, Geis, Horn, and Levi are also worth perusing. While Frade 2002 demonstrates the problems in trying to apply CP and the usual maxims directly to legal discourse, the author argues that a suitably relativized “legal cooperative principle” can be fruitfully applied to contractual exchanges; Marmor 2008 is a complementary study of related phenomena. Much of what goes on in the courtroom—and in judges’ chambers—involves interpretive issues that hinge on the distinction between what is said and what is (merely) implicated. Several such cases are discussed insightfully in Solan and Tiersma 2005, a classic book on language in the criminal justice system. The suggestion that the pragmatic distinction between what is said and what is meant but not said (encompassing implicatures the speaker intends the hearer to recover along with those he or she hopes the hearer won’t) maps onto the legal distinction between lying and (mere) misleading is treated anecdotally in Horn 2009 and more substantively in Saul 2012, with morals drawn in both cases for the status of what is said as a category in the philosophy of language.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    • Frade, Celina. 2002. The legal cooperative principle: An essay on the cooperative nature of contractual transactions. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 15:337–343.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      DOI: 10.1023/A:1021299328242Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      CP does not directly characterize legal discourse, given “the complexity and obscurity of legal English” (p. 337), prompting Frade’s formulation of the legal CP: “Make your legal contribution such as is required, during the course of contractual exchange, by the agreed purpose to which you are committed” (p. 340). Correspondingly relativized versions of the maxims are generated from this legal cooperative principle.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      • Horn, Laurence. 2009. WJ-40: Implicature, truth, and meaning. International Review of Pragmatics 1:3–34.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        DOI: 10.1163/187731009X455820Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Defends what Saul calls an “austere conception of what is said” (p. 23) as against the inflationary view of contextualists (Recanati, relevance theorists), citing a variety of cases (from Tristan to Clinton to televised medical dramas) in which no perjury or lying is recognized despite the clear falsity of intentionally (but indirectly) communicated aspects of meaning.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        • Kaplan, Jeffrey, and Georgia M. Green. 1995. Grammar and inferences of rationality in interpreting the child pornography statute. Washington University Law Quarterly 73:1223–1252.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Application of Gricean pragmatics—CP and rationality expectations—to an issue of statutory law, a write-up of the amicus curiae brief filed by the Law and Linguistics Consortium. This law journal issue (73.3, pp. 769–1310) is devoted to the relation between linguistic analysis and the law, much of it involving applications of pragmatic theory.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          • Marmor, Andrei. 2008. The pragmatics of legal language. Ratio Juris 21:423–452.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2008.00400.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Focuses on the particular aspects of legal contexts that distinguish them from ordinary conversational settings and constrain the reliable recovery of conversational implicatures in the typical absence of “clear and uncontroversial norms that determine what counts as relevant contribution to the communicative situation” (p. 451).

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            • Saul, Jennifer. 2012. Lying, misleading, and what is said: An exploration in philosophy of language and in ethics. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603688.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              A prominent philosopher of language examines the distinction between misleading and lying, along with their variants inside the courtroom (perjury) and outside (misspeaking, fibbing, bullshit). Evaluation, with reference to actual usage and legal precedents, of the extent to which the lying/misleading distinction maps onto that between what is said and what is implicated.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              • Solan, Lawrence, and Peter Tiersma. 2005. Speaking of crime: The language of criminal justice. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                Classic study by two prominent linguists-turned-lawyers on the legal applications of linguistic semantics and pragmatics. Chapter 11 on perjury is particularly relevant to questions relating to the applications of CP; the maxims; and the role of “literal truth” in forensic, judicial, and presidential contexts.

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