Bernard Law Montgomery

by

Colin F. Baxter

Introduction

One of the most colorful and controversial commanders of World War II, Bernard Law Montgomery commanded Allied armies in two of the decisive battles of the war: El Alamein and Normandy. In 1942 few people outside the British Army had heard of him. His victory at El Alamein against German and Italian forces commanded by the legendary Field Marshal Erwin Rommel made his name a household word among millions, and a public figure approaching the wartime popularity of Churchill in Britain, Roosevelt in America, and Stalin in Russia. Two years later, he commanded Allied ground forces in the battle of Normandy. In between these two decisive battles, the British general fought in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. In 1946 the field marshal was raised to the peerage as Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. Opinions on Montgomery, among contemporaries and historians alike, have differed widely. A maverick and outspoken to a fault, he did not conform to the stereotype of a British general: physically large, “a nice chap,” and modest. At his most casual, he wore baggy corduroy trousers, a grey turtleneck sweater, and the famous nonregulation black beret with two badges. When asked to name the three greatest generals in history, Montgomery replied, quite seriously, “The other two were Alexander the Great and Napoleon.” His critics have been legion: American historian Martin Blumenson once called him “the most overrated general of World War II.” His official British biographer, Nigel Hamilton, however, considered him a “Master of the Battlefield.” In a new century, the American military historian Carlo D’Este would write “Monty: World War II’s Most Misunderstood General.” German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt believed that generals were like race horses—that they were supposed to win—and Montgomery won most of the time. But in a 2011 poll conducted by Britain’s National Army Museum to determine “Britain’s Greatest General,” Montgomery’s name was not among the finalists! This bibliography makes no claim to be exhaustive or definitive, and consists of printed English-language sources.

General Overviews

Chester Wilmot, an Australian war correspondent for the BBC, wrote the first outstanding military narrative of Allied operations in northwest Europe, Wilmot 1952. Wilmot had seen Montgomery close-up, and he was later given access to some of Monty’s papers. The “desert war” fought in Libya and Egypt, in which Montgomery won his world fame, is dismissed by John Ellis, one of Britain’s most provocative historians on World War II, as not worthy of a footnote (see Ellis 1990). Ellis argues that Allied victory in World War II was inevitable, given their industrial superiority. Overy 1996 provides an important corrective to the view that the Allies won primarily because of their larger population and production resources. Many of the debates over military operations that have dominated the writings of World War II military historians are superbly reappraised in Murray and Millett 2000. Weinberg 1994 is a breathtaking global history of World War II, based on exhaustive archival research. A new view of the global history of World War II is provided by Mawdsley 2009. Concisely written and offering a unique assessment of the war’s multiple theaters and fronts, it is especially useful for undergraduate students studying World War II. A printed primary source from which to examine Montgomery views as commander of the British Eighth Army are the papers edited by Stephen Brooks (Brooks 1991), and those for the battle of Normandy edited by the same author (Brooks 2008, cited under Battle of Normandy). Another essential source is the Eisenhower papers (see Chandler 1970).

• Brooks, Stephen, ed. Montgomery and the Eighth Army: A Selection from the Diaries, Correspondence and Other Papers of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, August 1942 to December 1943. London: Bodley Head, 1991.

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  Brooks spent four years cataloguing the Montgomery papers at the Imperial War Museum, London, and this work was published for the Army Records Society. Students and researchers will find correspondence relating to Montgomery in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, London (the depository for the Alanbrooke and de Guingand papers; General Sir Francis de Guingand had been Monty’s chief of staff), among others, and the Churchill College Archives Centre, Cambridge, England. Government records are deposited in the National Archives (for Public Records Office), Kew, England.

• Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., ed. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The War Years. 5 vols. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.

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  On the great debatable issues, such as the single-thrust versus the broad front approach, or whether the Allies should have tried to beat the Russians to Berlin, there are ample details in these papers.

• Ellis, John. Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War. New York: Viking, 1990.

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  Ellis argues that because Allied victory was the inevitable result of industrial superiority, Allied commanders were vastly overrated. Ellis rates Montgomery’s incompetence the highest.

• Mawdsley, Evan. World War II: A New History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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  In his references to Montgomery, the author presents a fair and balanced treatment of the field marshal.

• Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2000.

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  This is a serious analytical study full of fresh insights and a good read. Montgomery is fairly assessed militarily and not on the basis of his personality.

• Overy, David. Why the Allies Won. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996.

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  In retrospect, writes Overy, Allied victory looks almost predetermined, but the overriding theme in his book is that Allied manpower and industrial superiority did not make victory a foregone conclusion. While not denying the importance of those factors, he includes the elements of combat prowess and leadership in explaining Allied victory. In that context, he gives Monty high marks for generalship in the battle of Normandy.

• Weinberg, Gerhard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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  Weinberg is on firmer ground when dealing with grand strategy, but less so on operational history. Beginning with the Normandy campaign, he begins a series of attacks on Montgomery’s generalship.

• Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle for Europe. London: Collins, 1952.

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  Though many of his judgments have been challenged and others demolished, Wilmot’s book remains a thought-provoking read.