Philosophy Other Minds
by
Anita Avramides
  • LAST REVIEWED: 01 December 2022
  • LAST MODIFIED: 27 June 2017
  • DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0083

Introduction

The problem of other minds has been a curiously neglected one in contemporary philosophy. The reasons for this are themselves a subject for investigation. It is certainly the case that the problem of other minds was at one time a standard topic in undergraduate textbooks. But in which textbooks one should look to find a discussion of this issue is an interesting question. This reflects the fact that philosophers disagree about just how to characterize the problem. There are those who characterize it as an epistemological or skeptical one: How does one know that anyone other than oneself has a mind? Others insist that the problem is a conceptual one: How does one understand the concept of mind such that it applies to oneself as well as to others? Thus one sometimes finds the problem discussed in books concerned with epistemology and sometimes in books concerned with metaphysics. Sometimes one will find a discussion of this issue in books concerned more generally with the philosophy of mind. The heyday for this topic could be said to have been the mid- to late 20th century. However, a resurgence of interest in the topic seems to have occurred in the early 21st century. The literature on this topic is not vast, and sometimes one must find references to it in discussions largely devoted to other issues (e.g., our knowledge of the external world or self-knowledge).

Foundational Texts

Few book-length treatments of this topic are available. Wisdom 1966, Locke 1969, and Plantinga 1967 were written at a time when it was essential to engage with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s critique of the arguments from analogy and induction. Hyslop 1995 provides a modern reworking of the argument from analogy in response to an epistemological problem, while Avramides 2001 argues that the problem here is fundamentally a conceptual one.

Overview Articles

These articles are particularly useful for providing a summary of the topic at a particular time and often reflect the time in which they are written. Aune 1987 gives a good idea of the state of play several decades after the main writing on this topic, while Hyslop 2014 looks at things some twenty-five years after this. Bilgrami 1992 and Avramides 2001 (cited under Foundational Texts) give priority to an overview of the conceptual problem.

  • Aune, Bruce. “Other Minds after Twenty Years.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10.1 (1987): 559–574.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00555.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Aune sets out to reconsider the problem of other minds some twenty years after it was a “fashionable” topic and at a time when the Wittgensteinian critique of certain arguments was on the wane. Aune looks at the problem in the light of developments in the philosophy of mind and language in the mid-1980s. Available online by subscription.

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  • Avramides, Anita. “Other Minds.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Edited by Brian P. McLauchlin, Angsaar Beckermann, and Sven Walter, 727–740. Oxford: Clarendon, 2009.

    DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Avramides outlines a history stretching back to the work of René Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche, and Thomas Reid. She looks at the introduction of the argument from best explanation, as it was introduced in the influential paper Chihara and Fodor 1968 (cited under the Argument from Best Explanation) and suggests that the problem here is a conceptual one.

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  • Bilgrami, Akeel. “Other Minds.” In A Companion to Epistemology. Edited by Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, 317–323. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

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    Bilgrami takes the “distinctive” problem here to be the conceptual one and outlines a history of this problem from, roughly, Ludwig Wittgenstein to John McDowell.

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  • Hyslop, Alec. “Other Minds.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2014.

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    Hyslop outlines the problem and reviews the various solutions to it. He mostly looks at the development of this topic in the work of analytic philosophers, but he does include a section on its treatment in the phenomenological tradition.

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Analytic Versus Continental Philosophy

This article approaches this issue largely from the analytic tradition. However, the continental tradition is a rich seam to mine. A few classic sources in the continental tradition are indicated here along with some articles written in such a way as to transcend the analytic-continental divide. It should be noted that the issue in this literature tends to focus less on a problem about other minds than on what is required for (inter)subjectivity. This literature is also important when it comes to understanding more recent work cited under Understanding Others and Mirror Neurons.

Classic Texts

The phenomenological tradition in philosophy has much to say about our relation to others. Heidegger 1962 and Husserl 1960 both engage in a radical critique of René Descartes’s philosophy, thereby setting themselves up for a radically anti-Cartesian discussion of the self in relation to others. Merleau-Ponty 1962 develops Martin Heidegger’s work in connection with the idea of embodiment. Sartre 1956 contains an important discussion of the self in relation to others in connection with certain emotions, while Scheler 1954 and Stein 1989 examine the role of sympathy and empathy in connection with others.

  • Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and E. S. Robinson. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1962.

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    This work was originally published in 1927. One does not find a section in Heidegger’s work devoted to other minds; rather, what one finds is a radical critique of Cartesian philosophy, which has profound implications for what is labeled “the problem of other minds.” Glendinning 1998 (cited under Contemporary Discussions) is a good place to start to understand the bearing of Heidegger’s work in relation to this “problem.”

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  • Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.

    DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-4952-7Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This work was originally published in 1931. Husserl here counters what he sees as a solipsistic Cartesian philosophy with one that has at its heart the idea of intersubjectivity.

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  • Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated by Colin Smith. New York: Routledge, 1962.

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    This work was originally published in 1945. Merleau-Ponty follows Martin Heidegger’s idea of a human being as a being-in-the-world and develops alongside it the idea of human subjectivity as necessarily embodied.

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  • Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.

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    This work was originally published in 1943. Sartre argues that our daily activities are intrinsically social and reveal our participation in a community of subjects. He develops the point in relation to feelings of, for example, shame.

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  • Scheler, Max. The Nature of Sympathy. Translated by Peter Heath. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954.

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    This work was originally published in 1913. Scheler offers a critique of the argument from analogy from a phenomenological perspective. In the place of analogy, he argues that we have direct, immediate, and primary access to the minds of others.

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  • Stein, Edith. On the Problem of Empathy. Translated by Waltraut Stein. 3d rev. ed. Washington, DC: Institute of Carmelite Studies, 1989.

    DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1051-5Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This work was originally published in 1916. This is Stein’s doctoral dissertation, written under Edmund Husserl’s supervision. In it Stein criticizes inferential accounts of others and aims to develop a position based on the experience, through empathy, of the other as a unified whole.

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Contemporary Discussions

This literature represents attempts by various philosophers to work across the analytic-phenomenological divide. Glendinning 1998 looks at attempts from both the analytic and the phenomenological traditions to affirm our being with others in the face of skepticism. Reynolds 2010 gives a good overview of trends in both traditions. McGinn 1998 and Overgaard 2006 both relate Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view on others to work by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Gardner 1994 relates the work of Merleau-Ponty on this topic to that of Jean-Paul Sartre, while McCulloch 1994, Hyslop 2000, and Sacks 2005 largely concentrate on Sartre’s writings on this topic. Zahavi 2001 presents an overview of work in the phenomenological tradition on the topic of intersubjectivity.

Contemporary Discussions of the Perceptual Model in the Phenomenological Tradition

There has been a surge of interest recently in both the Analytic and the Phenomenological Traditions in the idea that we know the mind of another by perceiving it. The latter tradition takes its inspiration from the work of Max Scheler, Edith Stein, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Pierre Jacob offers a critique of this perceptual model.

  • Gallagher, Shaun. “Direct Perception in the Intersubjectivity Context.” Consciousness and Cognition 17.2 (2008): 535–543.

    DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.03.003Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Gallagher offers a critique of both theory and simulation theory, and argues in favor of a direct perception account of our understanding of others. He relates this perceptual account to the understanding of the work of mirror neurons.

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  • Jacob, Pierre. “Direct Perception Models of Empathy: A Critique.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2.3 (2011): 519–540.

    DOI: 10.1007/s13164-011-0065-0Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Jacob argues against the direct perception model advocated by the likes of Gallagher, Kreuger, Smith, and Overgaard. He argues that the model is either open to the charge of behaviorism or requires supplementation by contextual assumptions.

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  • Kreuger, Joel, and Sǿren Overgaard. “Seeing Subjectivity: Defending a Perceptual Account of Other Minds.” ProtoSociology 47 (2012): 239–262.

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    Kreuger and Overgaard defend the perceptual account against the charge (due to Pierre Jacob) that it amounts to little more than behaviorism.

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  • Overgaard, Sǿren. “Other People.” In the Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology. Edited by Dan Zahavi, 460–479. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

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    Overgaard defends a perceptual solution to the epistemological problem of other minds, drawing on central ideas from the work of Merleau-Ponty.

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  • Smith, Joel. “Seeing Other People.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81.3 (2010): 731–748.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00392.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    In this paper Smith aims to “combine a functionalist account of mental properties with an Husserlian insight concerning perception.” He defends the idea that some knowledge of another’s mental states is grounded perceptually, with particular reference to the idea of co-presentation from the work of Husserl.

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  • Smith, Joel. “The Phenomenology of Face-to-Face Mindreading.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90.2 (2015): 274–293.

    DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12063Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This paper offers a looks-based perceptual account of face-to-face mind reading. Smith discusses what he calls “degrees of perceptual presence.” Although informed by the phenomenological literature, Smith here discusses arguments due to, inter alia, Mike Martin, Bill Brewer, Alan Millar.

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Precursors to the Contemporary Debate

On the whole, students have to comb through the history of philosophy to find reference to the problem of other minds—and they will encounter several different accounts of what the problem is. Avramides 2001 (cited under Foundational Texts) provides a good survey of this history. McNulty 1970 and Matthews 1986 discuss whether this issue can be found in Descartes 1984 (especially in René Descartes’s Meditations of 1647) or whether one must go back further to Augustine’s De trinitate. Henze 1972 makes a case for finding the issue in Descartes’s work. Falkenstein 1990 and Frankel 2009 look at a few issues that arise in the work of George Berkeley (especially in his A Treatise concerning the Principles of Knowledge [1710]) involving the mind of others, while Waldow 2009 extracts an interesting discussion of others in David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature (1739). Thomas 2001 makes a case for a reinterpretation of Mill’s argument.

  • Descartes, René. “Meditations on First Philosophy.” In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 2. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 1–62. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

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    It is generally acknowledged that Descartes bequeathed to philosophy a problem concerning other minds. Although he nowhere specifically refers to the problem, he does write—in the “Second Meditation”—of looking from his window and seeing hats and coats “which could conceal automatic machines.” Originally published in 1647.

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  • Falkenstein, Lorne. “Berkeley and Other Minds.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 7.4 (1990): 431–444.

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    Some philosophers have argued that Berkeley cannot avoid solipsism. Falkenstein suggests that Berkeley does avoid solipsism by successfully employing a causal argument to the existence of other finite spirits.

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  • Frankel, M. “Something-We-Know-Not-What, Something-We-Know-Not-Why: Berkeley, Meaning, and Minds.” Philosophia 37.3 (2009): 381–402.

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    Frankel compares and contrasts what Berkeley has to say concerning the meaningfulness of our talk about matter and that of our talk about other minds. She argues that there is an important asymmetry here.

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  • Henze, Donald F. “Descartes on Other Minds.” In Studies in the Philosophy of Mind. Edited by Harold I. Brown, 41–57. American Philosophical Monograph Series 6. Oxford: Blackwell, 1972.

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    Henze examines several of Descartes’s writings and argues that Descartes argues in a manner “somewhat like” the argument from analogy for the existence of other human minds.

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  • Matthews, Gareth. “Descartes and the Problem of Other Minds.” In Essays on Descartes’ Meditations. Edited by Amélie Rorty, 141–153. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.

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    Matthews argues that the problem of other minds is not to be found in Descartes’s writing and that Descartes did not offer the argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. Matthew does, however, find both the problem and the argument from analogy in Augustine’s De trinitate.

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  • McNulty, T. Michael. “Augustine’s Argument for the Existence of Other Souls.” Modern Schoolman 48.1 (1970): 19–24.

    DOI: 10.5840/schoolman197048151Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    As Augustine is often taken to be a precursor of Descartes, it is hardly surprising to find attention to the issue of others in his writing. In De trinitate Augustine presents an argument for the existence of other souls that some have interpreted as proceeding by analogy. McNulty examines the work to see how it stands up to modern critiques of that argument.

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  • Thomas, Janice. “Mill’s Argument for Other Minds.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9.3 (2001): 507–523.

    DOI: 10.1080/09608780110072498Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Thomas argues against the classic interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s work. Rather than taking him to be offering an argument from analogy, Thomas makes a case for reading him as putting forward an argument that “comes close to” the argument from scientific inference. Available online by subscription.

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  • Waldow, Anik. David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds. Continuum Studies in British Philosophy. New York: Continuum, 2009.

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    Although the problem of other minds does not feature directly in Hume’s writing, Waldow provides a look at Hume’s attitude toward others (especially in his discussion of the passions and sentiments in A Treatise of Human Nature [1739]) and uses this to shed light on his attitude toward skeptical problems more generally.

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What is the Problem of Other Minds?

Philosophers disagree about both whether there is any problem concerning the minds of others and what precisely the problem is. Some take it to be an epistemological problem, while others take it as primarily a conceptual one. Further to this, we can identify a knowledge that question (How do I know that another has a mind?) as well as a knowledge what problem (How do I know what another is thinking, feeling, etc.?). Philosophers are often unclear about which epistemological problem they are addressing. Much of the standard writing on the topic for many years concentrated on a variety of proposals—analogy, induction, abduction, or best explanation—for knowing that another has a mind. Most recently, there has been growing attention to the possibility that my knowledge of another mind is gained through perception. (an idea that has adherents in both the Analytic and in the Phenomenological tradition). It has been suggested by one philosopher that we know other minds through testimony. A different perspective on the issue is gained from reading certain passages in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books (Wittgenstein 1958) and Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1968) (both cited under Original Sources and Commentaries). It is here that a conceptual problem is clearly identified.

The Epistemological Problem

The problem here is really twofold: How do I know that another has a mind? and How do I know what another is thinking or feeling? Several responses have been given to this problem. One approach is the inferential approach, and it includes the arguments from analogy, induction, and best explanation. More recently an attempt has been made to defend the idea that one can perceive the mind of another. One interesting attempt defends the idea that our evidence for the mind of another comes from our understanding of language.

The Argument from Analogy

This argument has a long history. It was once the standard form of reply to the epistemological problem, and one can find an early statement of it in Mill 2009 (originally published in 1872). The argument came under fire from those who were influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books (Wittgenstein 1958) and Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein 1968) (both cited under Original Sources and Commentaries). Aune 1961 and Malcolm 1968 offer critiques of the argument from analogy, while Hyslop and Jackson 1972 attempts to revive the argument. Heal 2000 defends the simulation theory, which the author takes to be a version of the old argument from analogy.

The Inductive Argument

The inductive argument is sometimes run together with the argument from analogy. Mill 2009 (originally published 1872) insists that his is not a (weak) argument from analogy but a (strong) inductive argument. The inductive argument had many champions. Ayer 1954 sets out a clear statement of the argument, while Hampshire 1952 defends it. Plantinga 1966 takes issue with the argument.

  • Ayer, Alfred J. “One’s Knowledge of Other Minds.” In Philosophical Essays. By Alfred J. Ayer, 191–215. London: St. Martin’s, 1954.

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    Ayer argues that the inference involved in the inductive argument to the conclusion that there are other minds is not from my experience as such to his experience as such but from the fact that certain properties have been found to be conjoined in various contexts to the conclusion that in a further context the conjunction will still hold.

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  • Hampshire, Stuart. “The Analogy of Feeling.” Mind 61.241 (1952): 1–12.

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    Hampshire defends an inductive argument that is built on the observation that “each of us is sometimes the designated subject of an autobiographical statement and sometimes the designated subject of heterobiographical statements.”

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  • Mill, John Stuart. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. Rev. 4th ed. London: Routledge, 2009.

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    Originally published in 1872. Although Mill’s argument here is most often taken to be an argument from analogy, Mill writes that he is putting forward a stronger argument than this. He claims to “have proved it inductively” that there are minds beyond one’s own. (See The Argument from Analogy.)

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  • Plantinga, Alvin. “Induction and Other Minds.” Review of Metaphysics 19.3 (1966): 441–461.

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    Plantinga here argues against the inductive argument—especially as it is found in Ayer 1954. There is a defense of the inductive argument by Michael Slote in the same volume, followed by a further defense of his position by Plantinga in “Induction and Other Minds II,” Review of Metaphysics 21.3 (1968): 524–533.

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The Argument from Best Explanation

Early statements of this argument can be found in Ziff 1965 and Chihara and Fodor 1968. Putnam 1975 argues against the argument put forward in Ziff 1965 and others. The argument was not much discussed for a while, but it receives a strong defense in Pargetter 1984. Stemmer 1987 and Melnyk 1994 both consider and expand on Pargetter 1984.

  • Chihara, Charles S., and J. Fodor. “Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein.” In Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations. Edited by George Pitcher, 384–419. London: Macmillan, 1968.

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    This important paper aims to diminish the impact of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work on the problem of other minds and at the same time to promote a more scientific approach.

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  • Melnyk, Andrew. “Inference to Best Explanation and Other Minds.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72.4 (1994): 482–491.

    DOI: 10.1080/00048409412346281Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Melnyk considers the Pargetter 1984 defense of the argument from best explanation and argues that it is crucially incomplete. He argues that what is required to complete it is reference to one’s own case. Once this reference to one’s own case is added, however, it is evident that there is an important asymmetry between justification of belief in other minds and theoretical entities in science.

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  • Pargetter, Robert. “The Scientific Inference to Other Minds.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62.2 (1984): 158–163.

    DOI: 10.1080/00048408412341341Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Pargetter defends the argument from best explanation and argues that it can avoid some of the most damaging arguments that have been lodged against arguments from analogy.

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  • Putnam, Hilary. “Other Minds.” In Mind, Language, and Reality. By Hilary Putnam, 342–361. Philosophical Papers 2. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511625251.019Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Putnam here discusses the argument put forward in Ziff 1965 and others. Putnam dismisses the idea that there is any inference to best explanation in the case of other minds, as “no alternative is or ever has been in the field.”

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  • Stemmer, Nathan. “The Hypothesis of Other Minds: Is It the Best Explanation?” Philosophical Studies 51 (1987): 109–121.

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    Stemmer considers the Pargetter 1984 challenge to the argument from analogy and in turn proposes a challenge to his proposed argument from best explanation. According to Stemmer, there is an alternative explanation that is better here.

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  • Ziff, Paul. “The Simplicity of Other Minds.” Journal of Philosophy 62.20 (1965): 575–584.

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    Ziff argues that our belief in other minds can be justified as the most complete, simple, and coherent explanation of certain facts about bodies other than our own. In the same volume there is a reply by Alvin Plantinga (pp. 585–587) and Sydney Shoemaker (pp. 587–589). Available online by subscription.

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The Argument from the Understanding of Language

Price 1938 defends an idea that was—and still is—commonplace: that our evidence of others comes from the understanding of language. Curiously, there is no follow-up literature on this.

  • Price, H. H. “Our Evidence for the Existence of Other Minds.” Philosophy 13.52 (1938): 425–456.

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    Price first considers and rejects a theory proposed at the time called the intuitive theory, according to which we each have direct and intuitive appreciation of the minds of others. In place of the intuitive theory, Price proposes that our evidence for the existence of other minds comes primarily from the understanding of language.

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Perception of Other Minds: Work in the Analytic Tradition

version of the suggestion that one literally perceives the mind of another can be found in Dretske 1969 and McDowell 1998. Dretske 1973 contains a development of Dretske 1969. Cassam 2007 proposes a perceptual model of our knowledge of another mind, drawing on both McDowell 1998 and Dretske 1969. Wikforss 2004 argues that our knowledge of another mind can be direct without being perceptual, while Gomes 2011 examines how McDowell’s disjunctivism fits with the idea that one perceives another mind. Peacocke 2005 approaches issues here by asking: What is it to possess the concept of (another’s) perception?

  • Cassam, Quassim. “Other Minds.” In The Possibility of Knowledge. By Quassim Cassam, 155–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

    DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199208319.003.0005Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This is a chapter-length discussion of the suggestion that one perceives the mind of another. Cassam’s work draws on the work of both John McDowell and Fred Dretske.

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  • Dretske, Fred. Seeing and Knowing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

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    This book contains one of the earliest discussions of the suggestion that we perceive the mind of another. The suggestion received little attention—perhaps because it was buried in a book that defended an account of knowledge that was highly controversial at the time that it was written.

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  • Dretske, Fred. “Perception and Other Minds.” Noûs 7.1 (1973): 34–44.

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    Dretske here defends the distinction between seeing another’s anger and seeing that he or she is angry and argues that, in the case of other minds, one can see that another is angry without seeing another’s anger.

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  • Gomes, Anil. “McDowell’s Disjunctivism and Other Minds.” Inquiry 54.3 (2011): 277–292.

    DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2011.575001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Gomes looks at the literature that separates kinds of disjunctivism: metaphysical (attributed to J. M. Hinton, Paul Snowdon, and Mike Martin) and epistemological (attributed to McDowell). Gomes looks at the application of disjunctivism to other minds and suggests that McDowell’s disjunctivism be understood as having both an epistemological and a metaphysical dimension.

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  • McDowell, John. “On ‘The Reality of the Past.’” In Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. By John McDowell, 295–314. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.

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    McDowell here first suggests that “we should not jib at, or interpret away, the commonsense thought that . . . one can literally perceive, in another person’s facial expression or his behaviour, that he is [for instance] in pain.” The suggestion is developed somewhat in McDowell’s “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge” (McDowell 1998, cited under More Recent Discussions of Criteria).

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  • McNeill, William E. S. “On Seeing That Someone Is Angry.” European Journal of Philosophy 20.4 (2012): 575–597.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0378.2010.00421.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    McNeill observes that there are two ways that the perceptual hypothesis can be true: either one sees that, for example, James is angry or one sees James’s anger. McNeill claims that it is only if it can be shown that one sees James’s anger that one’s knowledge here can be said to be noninferential.

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  • Peacocke, Christopher. “Another ‘I’: Representing Conscious States, Perception, and Others.” In Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Edited by José L. Bermúdez, 220–258. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

    DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.003.0008Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Peacocke considers the question: what is it to possess the concept of perception? He then uses the answer to this as a model for the possession of the concept of another’s perception.

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  • Stout, Roland. “Seeing the Anger in Someone’s Face.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84.1 (2010): 29–43.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00184.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Stout examines how it is that we must construe facial expressions and behavior if it is to be the case that we see mental states. He suggests that we must construe these as processes rather than products (an expressing rather than the result of an expressing), and that these processes involve the engagement of another.

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  • Wikforss, Åsa M. “Direct Knowledge and Other Minds.” Theoria 70.2–3 (2004): 271–293.

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    Wikforss argues that our knowledge of other minds can be direct (i.e., noninferential) without being perceptual.

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The Conceptual Problem

Although historians of philosophy claim to find hints of awareness of the conceptual problem of other minds in various texts, there is no doubt that the deepest and most extensive consideration of this issue is to be found in Wittgenstein 1958, Wittgenstein 1968, and Wittgenstein 1992 (all cited under Original Sources and Commentaries). Some philosophers insist that the conceptual problem is the more distinctive or interesting problem here. Others argue that once one identifies and solves the conceptual problem, no epistemological problem remains. The conceptual problem is that of understanding how I come to have a concept of mind such that it can apply to both myself and others. A problem arises if we think we understand the meaning of mental terms in the first instance by application to ourselves and then extend them out to others. Yet this is the most natural way of thinking of our understanding, which is encouraged by the distinctive first-person way we are able to think about mind.

Original Sources and Commentaries

References to the problem of other minds are doted throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later writing. Some of the more concentrated discussions can be found in Wittgenstein 1958, Wittgenstein 1968, and Wittgenstein 1992. Hacker 1986 is a standard commentary on Wittgenstein’s work; the revised edition represents Peter Hacker’s more considered views and contains a more extended discussion of issues related to other minds. Ter Hark 1991, Ter Hark 2001, and Addis 1999 are further scholarly discussions of Wittgenstein specifically in relation to the problem of other minds. Malcolm 1968 provides an important early interpretation of Wittgenstein 1968.

  • Addis, Mark. Wittgenstein: Making Sense of Other Minds. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999.

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    A scholarly approach to the notion of criteria as it is found throughout Wittgenstein’s writing. Addis concludes that Wittgenstein did not have a “theory” of criteria and did not introduce this notion as a way of overcoming skepticism concerning other minds.

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  • Hacker, Peter. Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Rev. ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

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    In this revised edition of Insight and Illusion, Hacker corrects what he identifies as a “serious misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s conception of a criterion” in the first edition of this work. In the earlier edition Hacker argues that the notion of a criterion is central to an antirealist theory of meaning expounded in Wittgenstein’s later writing. In this revised edition Hacker claims that we need to rethink the realist-antirealist division as applied to Wittgenstein’s work.

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  • Malcolm, Norman. “Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.” In Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations. Edited by George Pitcher, 65–104. London: Macmillan, 1968.

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    An important early interpretation of Wittgenstein 1968. It contains a discussion of what Malcolm calls Wittgenstein’s “external attack” on the idea of a private language that focuses on our use of sensation terms. It also contains a discussion of Wittgenstein on criteria.

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  • Ter Hark, R. M. R. “The Development of Wittgenstein’s Views about the Other Minds Problem.” Synthese 87.2 (1991): 227–253.

    DOI: 10.1007/BF00485401Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This is a scholarly work that looks at Wittgenstein’s remarks on other minds during the period 1929 to 1952. Ter Hark is particularly interested in considering Wittgenstein’s work in relationship to behaviorism.

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  • Ter Hark, R. M. R. “The Inner and the Outer.” In Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader. Edited by Hans-Johan Glock, 199–224. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001.

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    Ter Hark looks at Wittgenstein’s work in relation to the inner-outer divide that he takes to “lie at the bottom” of the other minds problem.

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  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Harper, 1958.

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    In this work Wittgenstein introduces the distinction between a criterion and a symptom with reference to the medical condition of angina.

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  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968.

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    Originally published in 1953. There are many references to other minds scattered throughout this work. Two passages in particular (paragraphs 302 and 350) have been the subject of much attention in connection with the conceptual problem of other minds.

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  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: The Inner and the Outer. Vol. 2. Edited by G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman. Translated by C. G. Luckhardt. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.

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    Wittgenstein’s work is densely worked, and he weaves discussions of various topics throughout all his writings. This work is worth highlighting, as it contains a sustained treatment of the topic of criteria. Reprinted in 1994.

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Survey Articles on Criteria

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books (Wittgenstein 1958, cited under Original Sources and Commentaries) introduces a distinction between criteria and symptoms. It is thought that criteria are designed to provide noninductive evidence for the existence of other minds. There are many interpretations of this notion and much discussion of its effectiveness in helping with the problem of other minds. The encyclopedia entry Kenny 1967 is a good place to begin. McGinn 2004 explains the difference between thinking of the notion of criteria as operating in Wittgenstein’s work as “a theoretical term of art” and linking it “in important ways with [the] idea of a grammatical investigation.” Lycan 1971 provides an overview of work written largely in the 1960s, while Addis 1995 provides an overview of the literature stretching over a longer period.

  • Addis, Mark. “Criteria: The State of the Debate.” Journal of Philosophical Research 20 (1995): 140–174.

    DOI: 10.5840/jpr_1995_26Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This survey article takes up developments in the literature since the publication of Lycan 1971 (i.e., between 1971 and 1995).

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  • Kenny, Anthony. “Criterion.” In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 1. Edited by Paul Edwards, 258–261. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

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    A good place to start to understand some very early discussions of the notion of a “criterion.” This entry also contains a list of useful paragraph references in its bibliography to Wittgenstein 1958 and Wittgenstein 1968 (both cited under Original Sources and Commentaries).

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  • Lycan, William Gregory. “Noninductive Evidence: Recent Work on Wittgenstein’s ‘Criteria.’” American Philosophical Quarterly 8.2 (1971): 109–125.

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    Lycan provides a good survey of the literature on this topic that spanned the first decade of its discussion.

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  • McGinn, Marie. “Criteria.” In The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 6. Edited by Edward Craig. London: Routledge, 2004.

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    McGinn suggests that the attempt to use the notion of a criterion as part of a rebuttal of skepticism fails. In its place (and as a better interpretation of Wittgenstein), she suggests that we see criteria as part of Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation. The grammar of sensation words is particularly complex and should not be taken to indicate some inner, hidden facts. Available online by subscription.

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Early Discussions of Criteria

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas on criteria formed a part of many important discussions of others throughout the period, roughly 1959 to the late 1990s. Albritton 1966 is considered a standard source and important early discussion of this topic. Shoemaker 1963 incorporates Wittgenstein’s ideas into an important critique of the Cartesian picture of the self. Cavell 1979 develops the idea in a discussion of issues relating to others. Hanfling 2003 considers the all-important question of relativism, while Wright 1993a and Wright 1993b bring together Wittgenstein’s idea of a criterion with Michael Dummett’s work in the philosophy of language (Dummett 1978a and Dummett 1978b, cited under Realism and Antirealism).

  • Albritton, Rogers. “On Wittgenstein’s Use of the Term ‘Criterion.’” In Wittgenstein: The Philosophical. Edited by George Pitcher, 231–251. London: Macmillan, 1966.

    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15269-8_8Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    In the body of this paper Albritton claims that a kind of behavior is a criterion in Wittgenstein’s sense and that, as such, some necessary connection exists between the behavior and that of which it is a criterion. Do not miss the all-important postscript.

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  • Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

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    Cavell argues against the interpretation of criteria offered in Malcolm 1968 (cited under the Argument from Analogy) and Albritton 1966 and then proceeds to offer an alternative interpretation. Cavell argues that there is an asymmetry between the skeptical argument in connection with the external world and in connection with other minds. In our relations with others, he accepts (and argues that Wittgenstein accepts) a fundamental uncertainty.

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  • Hanfling, Oswald. “Criteria, Conventions, and Other Minds.” In Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life. By Oswald Hanfling, 38–51. London: Routledge, 2003.

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    Hanfling looks at the notion of a criterion as presented in Wittgenstein 1968 (cited under Original Sources and Commentaries). Hanfling opposes those who suggest that criteria owe their status to rules or conventions of our making.

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  • Shoemaker, Sydney. “Mind, Body, and Personal Identity.” In Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. By Sydney Shoemaker, 165–211. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963.

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    Shoemaker makes a sustained attack on the Cartesian picture of self and self-knowledge. In chapter 5 he examines the consequences of this picture for our knowledge of others. In place of this picture Shoemaker argues that psychological facts are not logically independent of facts about human bodies. He argues in a Wittgensteinian spirit that bodily and behavioral facts can be criterial evidence for the truth of psychological statements.

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  • Wright, Crispin. “Anti-realist Semantics: The Role of Criteria.” In Realism, Meaning, and Truth. 2d ed. By Crispin Wright, 257–382. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993a.

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    Wright brings together Michael Dummett’s assertability conditions theory of meaning and the Wittgensteinian notion of a criterion. This paper should be read in conjunction with Wright 1993b.

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  • Wright, Crispin. “Second Thoughts about Criteria.” In Realism, Meaning, and Truth. 2d ed. By Crispin Wright, 383–403. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993b.

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    This paper continues Wright’s thoughts about Wittgenstein’s notion of a criterion begun in Wright 1993a. Wright considers whether the views put forward in Wright 1993a are a correct reflection of Wittgenstein’s own views.

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More Recent Discussions of Criteria

McDowell 1998 gives an important boost to the discussion of criteria that might otherwise have faded somewhat from the philosophical front line. The author uses his critique of how others have interpreted this notion to put forward his own disjunctive account of our knowledge of another mind. Robinson 1991 raises some problems for John McDowell. McGinn 2004 and Minar 2004 both examine in a critical light the interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed in Cavell’s The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Cavell 1979, cited under Early Discussions of Criteria). Witherspoon discusses the Albritton and McDowell interpretations of Wittgenstein on criteria, and he puts forwards his own interpretation.

  • McDowell, John. “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge.” In Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. By John McDowell, 369–394. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.

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    McDowell argues against the criterial view as it is found in Wright 1993a, Wright 1993b (both cited under Early Discussions of Criteria), and others. He focuses on the idea that, for these philosophers, criteria are defeasible. In the place of defeasible criteria McDowell proposes a disjunctive account of our knowledge of another mind.

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  • McGinn, Marie. “The Everyday Alternative to Skepticism: Cavell and Wittgenstein on Other Minds.” In Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Edited by Denis McManus, 240–260. New York: Routledge, 2004.

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    McGinn examines (and ultimately disagrees with) Stanley Cavell’s claim that Wittgenstein accepts that something “akin to skeptical doubt haunts our ordinary language-game” in connection with other minds.

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  • Minar, Edward. “Living with the Problem of the Other: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Other Minds Skepticism.” In Wittgenstein and Scepticism. Edited by Denis McManus, 218–240. New York: Routledge, 2004.

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    Minar, like McGinn 2004, examines Stanley Cavell’s discussion of other minds skepticism. He distinguishes the truth of skepticism from what Cavell calls “living our skepticism” and examines the connection that Cavell proposes between skepticism and tragedy.

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  • Robinson, Paul E. “McDowell against Criterial Knowledge.” Ratio, n.s., 4 (June 1991): 59–74.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9329.1991.tb00029.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Robinson argues that John McDowell’s rejection of criterial knowledge is unconvincing.

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  • Witherspoon, Edward. “Wittgenstein on Criteria and the Problem of Other Minds”. In The Oxford Handbook on Wittgenstein. Edited by Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn, 472–498. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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    Witherspoon looks back at the interpretations of Wittgenstein on criteria due to Albritton and McDowell and assesses their effectiveness vis-à-vis the skeptic. He then proposes his own interpretation.

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Further Work Related to the Conceptual Problem

Nany discussions of the conceptual problem do not explicitly make reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work, although it is fair to say that Wittgenstein’s ideas were “in the air” at the time when these discussions took place. Austin 1979 is often cited in the early 21st century as a precursor to the work of externalists in epistemology. Strawson 1959 remains a classic text in connection with the topic of persons; Ayer 1963 attempts to refute Strawson 1959. Cook 1969 is an influential article, explicitly so in the case of McDowell 1998 (cited under More Recent Discussions of Criteria). McGinn 1984 did much to revive the issue by clarifying what the author sees as the problem. Peacocke 1984 is the paper to which McGinn 1984 responds. Nagel 1986 is responsible for the much-quoted line that the conceptual problem is the “interesting” problem here, while Avramides 2001 gives an overview of the conceptual problem from Wittgenstein to Donald Davidson. Gomes 2009 discusses Cassam 2007 (cited under Perception of Other Minds: Work in the Analytic Tradition) and claims that the problem raised by consideration of others may be yet more complex than Cassam 2007 appreciates.

  • Austin, J. L. “Other Minds.” In Philosophical Papers. 3d ed. Edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, 44–84. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

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    Austin refuses to engage with the problem of other minds as it is traditionally formulated—as a problem arising from the skeptic’s challenge. In the face of skepticism Austin reasserts our ordinary convictions as reflected in ordinary language. He situates many of his remarks in opposition to Wisdom 1966 (cited under Foundational Texts). Originally published in 1949, Austin’s work is very relevant to what is being written in the early 21st century both on the topic of knowledge and on that of other minds.

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  • Avramides, Anita. Other Minds. London: Routledge, 2001.

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    Avramides explains and defends the conceptual approach. The book contains a detailed discussion of the work of Wittgenstein, Davidson, and others.

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  • Ayer, A. J. “The Concept of a Person.” In The Concept of a Person and Other Essays. By A. J. Ayer, 82–128. New York: St. Martin’s, 1963.

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    Ayer here challenges the idea in Strawson 1959 that the concept of a person is a primitive.

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  • Cook, J. W. “Human Beings.” In Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Edited by Peter Winch, 117–151. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969.

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    The distinction between a human being and a human body is discussed here. This should be read in conjunction with Strawson 1959. John McDowell (McDowell 1998, cited under More Recent Discussions of Criteria) cites this paper as one to which he is indebted.

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  • Gomes, Anil. “Other Minds and Perceived Identities.” Dialectica 63.2 (2009): 219–230.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2009.01186.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Gomes here discusses Cassam 2007 (cited under Perception of Other Minds: Work in the Analytic Condition) with particular attention to what Quassim Cassam calls the enabling conditions for the epistemic perception that serves as a source of our knowledge of other minds.

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  • McGinn, Colin. “What Is the Problem of Other Minds?” Aristotelian Society Proceedings 58 (1984): 119–137.

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    This paper is a reply to Peacocke 1984. In the paper McGinn explores what the problem of other minds could be. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein (especially Wittgenstein 1968 [cited under Original Sources and Commentaries], paragraph 302), McGinn takes the problem to be this: to understand how several distinguishable individuals can fall under a mental concept in such a way that we can understand the unity of that concept.

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  • Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

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    Nagel here argues that the “interesting” problem of other minds is not the epistemological one, how do I know that others have minds? but the conceptual one, how can I understand the attribution of mental states to others?

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  • Peacocke, Christopher. “Consciousness and Other Minds.” Aristotelian Society Proceedings 58 (1984): 97–117, 119–137.

    DOI: 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/58.1.97Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Peacocke explores the question, what is it to have the concept of a type of experience that can be enjoyed by oneself and by others?

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  • Strawson, P. F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: Methuen, 1959.

    DOI: 10.4324/9780203221303Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    In Part 2 of this essay Strawson puts forward the thesis that the concept of a person is a primitive concept and is not to be analyzed into the concept of a mind and the concept of a body.

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Realism and Antirealism

This is an interesting debate, but most of it takes place in papers devoted to the realism-antirealism debate. The question of semantics of statements about other minds is considered in conjunction with that of statements about the past. Dummett 1978a and Dummett 1978b claim that a realist semantics in connection with statements about the past and other minds is problematic. McDowell 1998 defends the realist. Wright 1995 challenges McDowell 1998. Bilgrami 1994 sides with McDowell 1998 in a defense of realist semantics.

  • Bilgrami, Akeel. “Dummett, Realism, and Other Minds.” In The Philosophy of Michael Dummett. Edited by Brian McGuinness and Gianluigi Olivieri, 339–349. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, 1994.

    DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8336-7_22Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Bilgrami considers the claim in Dummett 1978a that ascribing mental states to others is one of the clearest and best examples of sentences that support the antirealist against the realist on the nature of linguistic meaning. Bilgrami argues that Michael Dummett can make this claim only because he restricts his understanding of realism here.

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  • Dummett, Michael. “Preface.” In Truth and Other Enigmas. By Michael Dummett, xxxii–xxxiii. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978a.

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    Dummett here claims that ascribing mental states to others is one of the clearest and best examples of sentences that support the antirealist against the realist on the nature of linguistic meaning.

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  • Dummett, Michael. “The Reality of the Past.” In Truth and Other Enigmas. By Michael Dummett, 295–395. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978b.

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    Dummett argues that a realist semantics in connection with statements about the past and about other minds is committed to a problematic conception of truth conditions on the grounds that they transcend possible verification.

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  • McDowell, John. “On ‘On the Reality of the Past.’” In Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. By John McDowell, 295–395. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.

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    Originally published in 1978, this paper is a discussion of Dummett 1978a and Dummett 1978b. In opposition to Dummett, McDowell argues for an alternative understanding of a realist truth condition.

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  • Wright, Crispin. “Realism, Truth-Value Links, Other Minds, and the Past.” In Realism, Meaning, and Truth. 2d ed. By Crispin Wright, 85–107. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

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    Originally published in 1980, Wright here argues against John McDowell’s arguments against truth-value link realism in connection with statements about other minds. In this debate between Wright and McDowell one can find some early discussion of McDowell’s idea that we, sometimes at least, can observe that another is in pain.

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Ascribing Mental States to Others

This work is of an interdisciplinary nature and concerns the question: how is it that one attributes the mental states to another that explains and predicts the other’s behavior? Discussion here has been stimulated by some interesting work in primatology (David Primack and Guy Woodruff’s “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?” [Primack and Woodruff 1978, cited under Survey Articles and Seminal Works]) and in psychology (Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner’s “Beliefs about Beliefs” [Wimmer and Perner 1983, cited under Survey Articles and Seminal Works]). It is also fueled from the philosophical side by the rise of functionalism and its theoretical approach to the mind (David Lewis’s “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications” [Lewis 1972, cited under Survey Articles and Seminal Works]). The main debate for many years was between the theory theorists and the simulation theorists. However, another approach has evolved that rejects both sides of the traditional debate. This third approach has roots in the phenomenological tradition and is influenced, in part, by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This approach emphasizes the interaction between persons. Insofar as issues here are intended to link up with more traditional philosophical concerns about other minds, one might think of it as more suited to the knowledge what question (How do I know what another is thinking or feeling?) rather than the knowledge that question (How do I know that anyone other than myself thinks and feels?).

Collections

These collections contain many of the seminal articles in this interdisciplinary debate. The articles are divided between those influenced by the results of the false belief test experiment in Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner’s “Beliefs about Beliefs” (Wimmer and Perner 1983, cited under Survey Articles and Seminal Works), who hold that what underlies our ability to explain and predict another’s behavior is the possession of a theory, and those, beginning with Robert Gordon’s “Folk Psychology as Simulation” (Gordon 1995, cited under Simulation Theory) and Jane Heal’s “Replication and Functionalism” (Heal 1995, cited under Simulation Theory), who insist that what underlies this ability is our capacity to simulate, that is, to imagine oneself in the situation of the other and thereby come to understand what the other will do. Davies and Stone 1995a, Davies and Stone 1995b, and Carruthers and Smith 1996 contain important papers gathered in the early years of this debate. Peacocke 1994 contains a section of papers devoted to this debate.

  • Carruthers, Peter, and Peter K. Smith, eds. Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511597985Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This collection brings together papers from a series of workshops and conferences held between 1992 and 1994. Although published only a year after Davies and Stone 1995a and Davies and Stone 1995b, papers in this volume may be thought to reflect a “second wave” of thought concerning this debate.

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  • Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, eds. Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995a.

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    This volume contains papers by Robert Gorden, Jane Heal, Alvin Goldman, Stephen Stich, Shaun Nichol, and Simon Blackburn in philosophy and by Josef Perner, Deborah Howes, Paul Harris, Alison Gopnik, Henry Wellman, Simon Baron-Cohen, and Pippa Cross in psychology. Many of the contributions here were previously published over the preceding decade.

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  • Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone, eds. Mental Simulation: Evaluations and Applications. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995b.

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    This volume contains papers by Gregory Currie, Gary Fuller, Alvin Goldman, Robert Gordon, Jane Heal, Adam Morton, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich in philosophy; Derek Bolton, Tim German, Norman Freeman, and Paul Harris in psychology; John Barnden in computer science; Tony Stone in science, technology, and design; and Jerry Fodor and Alan Leslie in cognitive science.

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  • Peacocke, Christopher, ed. Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

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    This book includes a paper devoted to the simulation theory by Martin Davies followed by commentaries on this paper by Jane Heal and Josef Perner.

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Survey Articles and Seminal Works

Primack and Woodruff 1978, Lewis 1972, and Wimmer and Perner 1983 provide the foundational work in primatology, philosophy, and psychology for this interdisciplinary debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists. Davies 1994 and Heal 1994 provide a good update on a discussion that developed rapidly in the preceding eight years. Gordon 2009 and Ravenscroft 2010 provide updates from either side of the debate.

  • Davies, Martin. “The Mental Simulation Debate.” In Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Edited by Christopher Peacocke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

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    A good survey paper, written a decade or so after the debate took off. Stone and Davies helpfully separate out nine different questions to address in the course of this debate.

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  • Gordon, Robert. “Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2009.

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    An excellent and up-to-date survey article written by one of the early—and most prominent—supporters of the simulation side of this debate. Available by subscription.

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  • Heal, Jane. “Simulation vs. Theory: What Is at Stake?” In Objectivity, Simulation, and the Unity of Consciousness. Edited by Christopher Peacocke, 119–141. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

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    This paper is a reply to Davies 1994.

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  • Lewis, David. “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50.3 (1972): 249–258.

    DOI: 10.1080/00048407212341301Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    An important paper in its own right in philosophy but also important as part of the theoretical foundations of this interdisciplinary debate. Available online by subscription.

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  • Primack, David, and Guy Woodruff. “Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1.4 (1978): 515–526.

    DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This paper is cited by all who participate in this debate as having raised the question: how it is that the chimpanzee in the study predicts what another will do?

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  • Ravenscroft, Ian. “Folk Psychology as a Theory.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2010.

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    An up-to-date survey of the debate from the perspective of the theory theory side. Available by subscription.

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  • Wimmer, Heinz, and Josef Perner. “Beliefs about Beliefs: Representation and Constraining Function of Wrong Beliefs in Young Children’s Understanding of Deception.” Cognition 13.1 (1983): 103–128.

    DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Wimmer and Perner are psychologists working at the University of Salzburg and are responsible for the now classic experiment with children three and a half and five years old, in which they were asked the question: Where will the puppet Sally look for her marble? The experiment is taken to show when the child is in a position to attribute a false belief to another. Available for purchase online.

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Theory Theory

The idea of folk psychology gained currency in the later decades of the 20th century and is used to refer to the process of attributing mental states and processes to others. The question then arises how folk psychologists proceed. The theory theorists insist that folk psychology proceeds via the tacit use of a theory. The literature here is vast, and this is only a representative sample of papers written by some of its most prominent advocates. Leslie 1987, Fodor 1992, and Gopnik and Wellman 1995 all consider the perspective of the child. Fodor 1992 looks at the relationship between the adult’s theory of mind and the child’s theory. Gopnik and Wellman 1995 is about the child’s understanding of mind, and the authors advocate the idea of the child as “a little scientist.” Baron-Cohen, et al. 1985 extends the debate to help explain a potential deficit in the autistic child.

  • Baron-Cohen, Simon, Uta Frith, and Alan Leslie. “Does the Autistic Child Have a ‘Theory of Mind’?” Cognition 21.1 (1985): 37–46.

    DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This is one of several papers that use the debate to talk about what might be going on in the case of the autistic child. Available for purchase online.

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  • Fodor, Jerry. “A Theory of the Child’s Theory of Mind.” Cognition 44.3 (1992): 283–296.

    DOI: 10.1016/0010-0277(92)90004-2Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Fodor argues that the child and the adult share a theory of mind in opposition to those who argue that there is a discontinuity in the child’s development with respect to this theory. Available for purchase online.

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  • Gopnik, Alison, and Henry M. Wellman. “Why the Child’s Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory.” In Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Edited by Martin Davies and Tony Stone, 232–258. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

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    Gopnik and Wellman argue in this paper and in many others that the child’s understanding of mind mirrors the adult’s understanding of science, that is, it proceeds by employing an implicit theory. They further argue that the developmental pattern of children’s errors and accuracies are not consistent with the idea that they attribute minds to others on the model of simulation.

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  • Leslie, Alan. “Pretense and Representation: The Origins of ‘Theory of Mind.’” Psychological Review 94.4 (1987): 412–426.

    DOI: 10.1037/0033-295X.94.4.412Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Leslie offers a theoretical analysis of the representational ability that is said to underlie the infant’s ability to pretend. He argues that this ability, suitably extended, also underlies the infant’s ability to understand pretense in others. Available for purchase online.

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Simulation Theory

The simulation theorists reject the claim of the theory theorists that it is a theory that underlies psychological competence. They hold instead that we represent the mental states of others by first simulating them in ourselves and then projecting them onto others. Many have seen this work as harkening back to an earlier tradition in philosophy known as Verstehen, which is associated with the work of R. G. Collingwood, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Max Weber. Gordon 1995 and Heal 1995 represent the founding parents here. Heal 1998, Heal 2000, Goldman 1995, and Goldman 2002 explore the role of rationality in regulating the activity of understanding others. Goldman 2006 provides an up-to-date discussion of the simulation theory.

  • Goldman, Alvin. “Interpretation Psychologized.” In Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Edited by Martin Davies and Tony Stone, 74–100. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

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    Goldman defends the simulation theory against theory and (what he calls) the charity/rationality theory associated with the work of Donald Davidson.

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  • Goldman, Alvin. “Simulation Theory and Mental Concepts.” In Simulation and Knowledge of Action. Edited by Jérȏme Dokic and Joölle Proust, 1–21. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2002.

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    Goldman asks how it is that children and adults acquire competence at making first- and third-person attributions of mental states and what the concept is that they deploy. This paper is followed in the same volume by a reply from William Child (pp. 21–33) that raises problems for Goldman’s essentially internalist account of our acquisition of mental concepts.

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  • Goldman, Alvin. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

    DOI: 10.1093/0195138929.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This is an excellent overview and update of the simulation approach by one of its most prominent exponents.

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  • Gordon, Robert. “Folk Psychology as Simulation.” In Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Edited by Martin Davies and Tony Stone, 60–74. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

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    Originally published in 1986, this paper, along with Heal 1995, is one of the seminal works to argue against the idea that our understanding of mind is theoretical and in favor of the idea that we understand mind through simulation.

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  • Heal, Jane. “Replication and Functionalism.” In Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate. Edited by Martin Davies and Tony Stone, 45–60. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

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    Originally published in 1986, this paper, along with Gordon 1995, is one of the seminal papers in simulation theory. The paper opposes the functional strategy (associated with the theory approach) with a replicative strategy that holds that I understand the mind of another by replicating the world from his or her point of view in myself and then reasoning from there to see what decision emerges.

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  • Heal, Jane. “Understanding Other Minds from the Inside.” In Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Edited by Anthony O’Hear, 83–99. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

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    Heal defends a version of the simulation theory that gives central importance to the idea of a shared rationality.

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  • Heal, Jane. “The Inaugural Address: Other Minds, Rationality, and Analogy.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 74.1 (2000): 1–19.

    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8349.t01-1-00060Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Heal develops the simulation theory (she prefers the label “co-cognitive approach”). She considers whether this approach should be seen as a version of the argument from analogy (see The Argument from Analogy). She rejects this idea and favors instead the idea that there is a link between the co-cognitive approach and rationality. Available online by subscription.

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Understanding Others

While the debate between theory theorists and simulation theorists has tended to dominate, an alternative way of thinking about our relationship to others has begun to come into focus. The work here is also interdisciplinary but draws on a wider range of literature in philosophy. This work ties together work in the phenomenological tradition (cited under Classic Texts) as well as work by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, P. F. Strawson, Donald Davidson, and others. Gallagher 2001 argues forcefully against both the theory theorists and the simulation theorists. Thompson 2001 is a good place to begin to understand this alternative approach.

  • Gallagher, Shaun. “The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation, or Primary Interaction?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8.5–7 (2001): 83–108.

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    Gallagher argues that neither theory nor simulation theory represents the primary way we relate to others. In the place of these “theories” Gallagher proposes that the understanding of others is a form of embodied practice.

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  • Thompson, Evan, ed. Between Ourselves: Second-Person Issues in the Study of Consciousness. Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2001.

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    This is an interesting collection of articles that brings together work in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and continental phenomenology. It takes as its starting point the idea of the living body or the embodied mind and founds the idea of intersubjectivity on this.

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The Emotions

The idea of bringing together philosophical work on the emotions and issues relating to other minds is limited but important. Goldie 2000 is a book-length treatment of issues here, while Goldie 2002 brings together many of the important articles that have been written on this topic. Smith 2002 considers the role of the emotions when understanding others. Brewer 2002 and Hutto 2002 relate issues concerning the emotions to more traditional questions in connection with the attribution of mental states to others. Pickard 2003 is the most explicit discussion of the emotions in connection with the conceptual problem of other minds.

  • Brewer, Bill. “Emotions and Other Minds.” In Understanding Emotions: Minds and Morals. Edited by Peter Goldie, 23–37. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002.

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    Brewer considers the question: what is the relation between emotional experience and its behavior expression? He aims to develop an answer by first developing a strategy for answering a parallel question about other minds and transferring this to the original problem.

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  • Goldie, Peter. “How We Think of Others’ Emotions.” In The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. By Peter Goldie, 176–220. Oxford: Clarendon, 2000.

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    In this chapter Goldie discusses understanding and explaining another’s emotions, emotional contagion, empathy, imagining oneself in another’s shoes, and sympathy. His discussion proceeds at the descriptive and phenomenological levels.

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  • Goldie, Peter. Understanding Emotions: Minds and Morals. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002.

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    This book is an excellent collection on a much neglected topic. Several of the papers connect the issue of the emotions with the attribution of mental states more generally to others.

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  • Hutto, Daniel. “The World Is Not Enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds.” In Understanding Emotions: Minds and Morals. Edited by Peter Goldie, 37–55. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002.

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    Hutto builds on the work in Brewer 2002 to address the issue of asymmetry, which lies at the heart of our concept of experience.

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  • Kreuger, Joel. “Emotions and Other Minds”. In Rethinking Emotions: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern and Contemporary Thought. Edited by Julia Weber and Rüdiger Campe. 324–350. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014.

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    Kreuger uses the emotions to make a case for a particular approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. He draws largely on the work of Merleau-Ponty in arguing that emotions encompass both a private and a public aspect and can be known directly.

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  • Pickard, Hannah. “Emotions and the Problem of Other Minds.” In Philosophy and the Emotions. Edited by Anthony Hatzimoysis, 87–103. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511550270Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Pickard uses the publicity of emotions to suggest a solution to the (conceptual) problem of other minds.

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  • Smith, B. C. “Keeping Emotions in Mind.” In Understanding Emotions: Minds and Morals. Edited by Peter Goldie, 111–123. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002.

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    Smith considers the role of the emotions, and not just beliefs and desires, in organizing our understanding of others.

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The Scientific Perspective

This section covers research that relates the philosophical work on other minds to the wider scientific perspective. One area where the philosophical work on other minds has proved fruitful is in the understanding of autism. Psychologists and psychiatrists, including Uta Frith, Peter R. Hobson, and Simon Baron-Cohen, and philosophers, such as Victoria McGeer, have joined forces to try to understand this condition. Another area of overlap between philosophical work on other minds and the scientific perspective arises when considering the evolution of various (human) traits—in this case the trait of detecting or ascribing mind to others. Finally, work in neuroscience has led to the discovery of mirror neurons—neurons that fire both when an animal acts and when the animal observes another to act. These neuroscientists have teamed up with philosophers to deepen our understanding of the self in relation to another.

Autism and the Problem of Others

Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger (see Frith 2003) were the first to describe and to try to explain the disorder that has come to be known as autism. The disorder affects an individual’s relationship with others. They observed a “fundamental aloneness” or a “disturbance” in the way these individuals relate to others. While Baron-Cohen, et al. 2000 and Baron-Cohen 1995 tie in with the theory approach to understanding others (see Theory Theory), Hobson 1993 and Hobson 2002 are influenced by the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein in philosophy and tie in more naturally with the work cited in Understanding Others. McGeer 2001 is by a philosopher who opposes the work of both the theory theorists and the simulation theorists. Goldman 2006 provides a discussion of some of the more scientific issues connected with the mind of others.

  • Baron-Cohen, Simon. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1995.

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    The idea of mindblindness is the idea that, while maintaining an awareness of physical things, one might be blind to the existence of the thoughts, beliefs, desires, and intentions that underlie behavior. Baron-Cohen suggests that human beings are born equipped with a “theory of mind” module that compels them to interpret the other in this way; children with autism are mindblind.

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  • Baron-Cohen, Simon, Helen Tager-Flusberg, and Donald J. Cohen. Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience. 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

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    An interesting collection of papers by leading psychologists in the field. Although not exclusively concerned with the problem of autism, the issue is central to many of the papers in this volume. The volume opens with an excellent survey paper by Simon Baron-Cohen, “Theory of Mind and Autism: A Fifteen-Year Review.”

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  • Frith, Uta. Autism: Explaining the Enigma. 2d ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

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    This is a good place to start to understand the phenomenon of autism. It also has a good bibliography (under “Suggestions for Further Reading and Notes”).

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  • Goldman, Alvin. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

    DOI: 10.1093/0195138929.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Chapter 8 (“Ontogeny, Autism, Empathy, and Evolution”) provides a useful drawing together of several of the more scientific issues connected with the attribution of minds to others.

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  • Hobson, Peter R. Autism and the Development of Mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993.

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    Hobson is a philosophically informed clinical psychotherapist. His work is an important counter to much of the theory work in the field. The bibliography contains references to Hobson’s many papers on this topic.

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  • Hobson, Peter. The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking. London: Macmillan, 2002.

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    This is a book-length treatment of the baby’s capacity to think. Hobson proposes the radical idea that this capacity is integrally dependent on the quality of the baby’s relationships with others in the first months of his or her life. Chapter 8 is devoted to the child’s relationship to others. This book is aimed at a wider (nonacademic) audience.

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  • McGeer, Victoria. “Psycho-Practice, Psycho-Theory and the Contrastive Case of Autism: How Practices of Mind Become Second Nature.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8.5–7 (2001): 109–132.

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    While the dominant debate concerning how we ascribe mental states to others has been between theory theorists and simulation theorists, McGeer proposes another way: a know-how approach. She uses this approach to suggest that, just as autistic individuals suffer from an inability to understand others, so we are not able to understand autistic individuals.

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Evolution, Other Minds, and the Other-Species-of-Mind Problem

These are important issues and raise a host of questions. Each of these papers links the scientific discussion to the traditional problem of other minds, and each can be used as a jumping-off point to explore the literature. The phrase “the other-species-of-mind problem” comes from Allen and Bekoff 1997. Searle 1994 and Tye 1997 explain some of the issues for and against attributing consciousness to nonhuman animals, while Lurz 2009 brings together a collection of more recent papers on this topic. Block 2002 and Hohwy 2004 consider the problem of attributing consciousness to creatures physically different from ourselves. Baron-Cohen 1995 relates the author’s work on autism to that of evolutionary psychology. Sober 2000 and Shapiro 1999 discuss the claims of evolutionary psychologists to the effect that one can infer from the observation of adaptive behavior to the presence of mind in others.

  • Allen, Colin, and Marc Bekoff, eds. Species of Mind: The Philosophy of Biology and Cognitive Ethology. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997.

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    This is a collaboration between a philosopher (Allen) and a cognitive ethologist (Bekoff). Together they attempt to explain the activities and goals of the working cognitive ethologist and to tackle some of the philosophical issues and worries to which this work gives rise.

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  • Baron-Cohen, Simon. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1995.

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    Baron-Cohen takes his book to be a contribution to the study of evolutionary psychology.

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  • Block, Ned. “The Harder Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Philosophy 99.8 (2002): 391–425.

    DOI: 10.2307/3655621Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Block builds on what Thomas Nagel (“What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review 83 [October 1974]: 435–450) once called “the hard problem,” that is, the problem of saying how it is that consciousness arises from brain matter. The “harder” problem is tied to the problem of other minds. This problem arises when we consider how a science of consciousness based on human beings can generalize to creatures that have different physical properties.

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  • Hohwy, Jacob. “Evidence, Explanation, and Experience: On the Harder Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Philosophy 101.5 (2004): 242–254.

    DOI: 10.5840/jphil2004101525Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Hohwy explores the problem that Block 2002 labels the “harder problem” of consciousness and argues that it is not such a problem if we employ an argument from best explanation.

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  • Lurz, Robert W., ed. The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

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    Little has been written in philosophy on the topic of animal minds, but this book manages to bring together work that has appeared in the first decade of the 21st century.

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  • Searle, John R. “Animal Minds.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19.1 (1994): 206–219.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1994.tb00286.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Searle here explains why he is so confident that his dog, Ludwig Wittgenstein, is conscious—and why so many philosophers are committed to denying this. Available online by subscription.

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  • Shapiro, Lawrence. “Presence of Mind.” In Where Biology Meets Philosophy. Edited by Valerie Gray Hardcastle, 83–98. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1999.

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    Shapiro identifies a claim in the work of prominent evolutionary psychologists to the effect that one can make an inference from adaptive function to psychological mechanisms, that is, to the presence of mind in others. The claim is neither challenged nor justified in that work. Shapiro aims to make good this omission.

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  • Sober, Elliot. “Evolution and the Problem of Other Minds.” Journal of Philosophy 97.7 (2000): 365–386.

    DOI: 10.2307/2678410Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A discussion of the theory of evolution that ties it in with more traditional philosophical concerns. Available online by subscription.

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  • Tye, Michael. “The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Honey Bee?” Philosophical Studies 88.3 (1997): 289–317.

    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004267709793Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This is a good discussion of the other minds problem as it applies to simple animals, such as honey bees and fish. Tye argues that such creatures are the subject of phenomenally conscious experience but that they have no higher order consciousness. He concludes from this that such creatures do not suffer. Available online by subscription.

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Mirror Neurons

Neuroscientists have observed, originally in the brains of the macaque monkey, neurons that fire when the animal performs certain actions and also fire when the animal observes a similar action by another. This is a relatively new area of research, and its implications for the traditional problem of other minds have only just begun to be explored. The findings here are exciting because they provide evidence of a neurophysiological underpinning for our relation to others. Much of the scientific work is being developed in Italy, but it has excited interest around the world. Gallese and Goldman 1998 is an early attempt to tie the neurophysiology together with the theory theory–simulation theory debate. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008 is from a team of a neurophysiologist and a philosopher attempting to understand the science better. Gallese 2001 and Gallese 2005 are papers by a philosophically informed physiologist. Much of Vittorio Gallese’s work ties in with more recent trends in philosophy of mind informed by the phenomenological tradition.

  • Gallese, Vittorio. “The ‘Shared Manifold’ Hypothesis: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 8.5–7 (2001): 33–50.

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    This paper considers how actions are represented and understood from a neurobiological standpoint. Gallese proposes that agency lies at the heart of the understanding of intersubjectivity.

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  • Gallese, Vittorio. “‘Being Like Me’: Self-Other Identity, Mirror Neurons, and Empathy.” In Perspectives on Imitation. Vol. 1, Mechanisms of Imitation and Imitation in Animals from Neuroscience to Social Science. Edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater, 101–118. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005.

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    Gallese here argues that “intersubjective relations play a major and constitutive role in shaping out cognitive capacities and in providing the shared database required to establish meaningful bonds with other individuals.”

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  • Gallese, Vittorio, and Alvin Goldman. “Mirror Neurons and the Simulation Theory of Mind-Reading.” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2.12 (1998): 493–501.

    DOI: 10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01262-5Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Gallese (a professor of physiology at the University of Parma, Italy) and Goldman (a professor of philosophy in the United States) report on the discovery of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of monkeys that respond both when the monkey acts and when it observes others acting in a similar manner. They argue that the activity of these neurons accords better with the predictions of simulation theory than that of theory. Available for purchase online.

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  • Rizzolatti, Giacomo, and Corrado Sinigaglia. Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions and Emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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    This is a book written by a neurophysiologist (Rizzolatti, working at the University of Parma, Italy) and a philosopher (Sinigaglia, working at the University of Milan, Italy). Together they explain the working of mirror neurons and explore the theoretical underpinning of this work.

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