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Introduction

Nothing is more familiar to us than the ordinary objects—such as dogs, computers, tables, and trees—that we interact with daily. Yet contemplation of ordinary objects has provided much fodder for philosophical elucidation. Many of the central questions of metaphysics either directly concern ordinary objects or are best illustrated by examples involving ordinary objects. Issues that directly concern ordinary objects include constitution, coincidence, the ontological status of ordinary objects, and persistence. The central constitution questions are (1) What are ordinary objects made of (mereological simples, mereological complexes, matter, properties, matter and form)? and (2) Is an ordinary object identical to, or distinct from, that which constitutes it? The central coincidence question is Do ordinary objects coincide? This question can be made more specific by focusing on a particular type of coincidence (mereological, material, or spatio-temporal) and by asking what the purported coincident is (another ordinary object, an extraordinary object, some stuff). There are four standard ways of answering the question concerning the ontological status of ordinary objects: eliminativist (there are none), permissivist (there are ordinary objects, but there are a lot of other objects too), conventionalist (ordinary objects are conventional), and privileging (ordinary objects exist, no or few other objects do). Persistence concerns how an object exists over time. The standard answers are endurance (objects persist by being wholly located at different moments), perdurance (objects persist by being sums of instantaneous temporal parts), and exdurance (objects persist via standing in counterpart relations to other objects that exist at other times). Issues that are best illustrated by examples involving ordinary objects include mereology, properties, and vagueness. Mereology concerns the relation between part and whole. Mereological issues can be illustrated by focusing on exactly how an ordinary object is related to its parts. With regard to properties, focusing on the properties of ordinary objects sheds light on the nature of properties, as well as on that of objects. Vagueness arises when something—an ordinary object, an event, some stuff—has imprecise boundaries. There are three prominent accounts of vagueness: semantic (our words are vague), ontic (objects are vague), and epistemic (words and objects are precise; we’re just ignorant of the facts). Two final issues of importance in the philosophical study of ordinary objects are puzzles involving ordinary objects and metaontology, both of which are discussed in this article.

General Overviews

Few general overviews focusing on ordinary objects have been written. Many books on ordinary objects exist, but these books all focus on defending the author’s particular view of ordinary objects, rather than on providing a general canvassing of available views. The best general overview of ordinary objects is Korman 2015. See Margolis and Laurence 2007 for an anthology dealing specifically with ordinary objects that are artifacts.

Korman, Daniel. “Ordinary Objects.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta, 1–28. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2015.
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An overview of philosophical issues concerning ordinary objects, with particular emphasis on (1) eliminativism about ordinary objects, (2) permissivism about objects, (3) vagueness and sorites paradoxes, (4) the problem of the many, and (5) defending the existence of ordinary objects from debunking, strange kinds, and causal overdetermination arguments.
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Margolis, Eric, and Stephen Laurence, eds. Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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This anthology provides an interdisciplinary discussion of the ontology of artifacts and their role in our lives. In includes articles by philosophers such as Crawford Elder, Amie Thomasson, and John Searle, as well as articles by cognitive scientists and psychologists.
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Constitution: The Structure of Objects

There are two central issues in the constitution literature: (1) What are ordinary objects constituted by? (2) How are ordinary objects related to what they’re constituted by? Consider, first, the question of what ordinary objects are constituted by. Although McDaniel does not explicitly defend the view that ordinary objects are material simples, he argues that material simples are possible and, thus, makes room within logical space for the view that ordinary objects are material simples. The overwhelmingly more common view, however, is that ordinary objects are mereologically complex. There are a wide range of views within this camp. Baker and Burke, although on opposite sides of the coincidence debate, both agree that ordinary objects—such as dogs, tables, and statues—are composed of pluralities of smaller objects, such as atoms of gold and bits of copper. Bundle theorists (represented here by McDaniel and Paul) argue that, rather than being composed of smaller objects, ordinary objects are composed of properties. Stuff theorists, such as Jubien, Quine, and Zimmerman, argue that ordinary objects are composed of material stuff. A competing view, which traces to Aristotle, but which has gained increasing prominence in the 21st century, is the view that ordinary objects are mereological complexes consisting of both material parts and formal parts. Johnston, Fine, and Koslicki are the most prominent defenders of this view. In addition to asking what ordinary objects are constituted by, we might also ask how ordinary objects are related to what they’re constituted by. The central debate concerning this question is whether constitution is identity. Are ordinary objects identical to what constitutes them (e.g., to the aggregate of atoms, the bundle of properties, or the stuff)? Baker and Johnston argue that constitution is not identity. Noonan takes the opposing view.

Rea, Michael, ed. Material Constitution: A Reader. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
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An excellent anthology on issues concerning material constitution. Includes articles on (1) coincident entities, (2) contingent identity and counterpart theory, (3) eliminativism and dominant kinds, (4) indeterminacy solutions, and (5) relative identity and temporal parts, as well as an extremely clear introduction that outlines the problems of material constitution and summarizes the included articles.
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Wasserman, Ryan. “Material Constitution.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta, 1–19. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2015.
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An overview of work in material constitution presented via discussion of several standard puzzles (the debtor’s paradox, Dion and Theon, the ship of Theseus, the statue and the clay) in material constitution and then showing how different views (coinciding objects, temporal parts, eliminativism, dominant kinds, relative identity, deflationism) answer the puzzles.
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Ordinary Objects are Mereological Simples

McDaniel 2007 does not explicitly defend the view that ordinary objects are material simples. However, McDaniel argues that material simples are possible and, thus, makes room within logical space for the view that ordinary objects are material simples.

McDaniel, Kris. “Extended Simples.” Philosophical Studies 133 (2007): 131–141.
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-006-9010-y Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
An extended simple is a material object that lacks both temporal and spatial proper parts. McDaniel argues that extended simples are possible. His argument turns on the claim that shape-properties are extrinsic rather than intrinsic.
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Ordinary Objects are Mereologically Complex

Baker 2004 and Burke 1992 argue that ordinary objects—such as dogs, tables, and statues—are composed of pluralities of smaller objects, such as atoms of gold and bits of copper.

Baker, Lynne Ruder. “The Ontology of Artifacts.” Philosophical Explorations 7 (2004): 99–111.
DOI: 10.1080/13869790410001694462 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Baker argues that Statue is constituted by piece of Clay which is, itself, composed of a plurality of gold atoms. Although the statue is ultimately composed of a plurality of gold atoms, it cannot be reduced to them.
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Burke, Michael. “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account.” Analysis 52 (1992): 12–17.
DOI: 10.1093/analys/52.1.12 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Burke argues that Statue is composed of a plurality of copper atoms. This plurality may satisfy both the sortal statue and the sortal piece of copper. However, the only object that exists is the object whose sort is dominant. Since statue dominates piece of copper, only a statue exists.
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Ordinary Objects are Bundles of Properties

Bundle theorists McDaniel 2001 and Paul 2006 argue that, rather than being composed of smaller objects, ordinary objects are composed of tropes or properties.

McDaniel, Kris. “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects.” Philosophical Studies 104.3 (2001): 269–290.
DOI: 10.1023/A:1010310503120 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
McDaniel defends the view that ordinary objects are bundles of tropes. Statue is a bundle of this clayness, this shapedness, this texture, etc. McDaniel argues that his version of the bundle theory allows one to satisfactorily answer several puzzles of material constitution, resist Heller’s argument in favor of four-dimensionalism, and resist van Inwagen’s argument against mereological universalism.
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Paul, L. A. “Coincidence as Overlap.” Nous 40 (2006): 623–659.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00627.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Paul develops a property mereology for objects and argues that coincidents overlap with respect to all their spatio-temporal parts, but not with respect to all of their property parts. Statue is a bundle of being clay, being essentially statue-shaped, being in room r, being made by John, etc. Clay is a bundle of being clay, being accidentally statue-shaped, being in room r, being made by nature, etc.
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Ordinary Objects are Stuff

Stuff theorists, such as Jubien 2001 and Quine 1960, argue that ordinary objects are composed of material stuff. Zimmerman 1997 explores the extent to which endorsing a stuff ontology helps one to avoid puzzles of material coincidence.

Jubien, Michael. “Thinking about Things.” Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 1–15.
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Jubien defends the Quinean view that ordinary objects are just material stuff. He considers the logical implications of this view, including the truth of mereological essentialism. He argues that, by distinguishing between the object that is currently Statue and the Platonic property being Statue, we can render mereological essentialism intuitive.
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Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1960.
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Quine famously argues that ordinary objects comprise “the [material] content, however heterogeneous, of some portion of space-time, however disconnected and gerrymandered” (p. 171).
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Zimmerman, Dean. “Coincident Object: Could a ‘Stuff’ Ontology Help?” Analysis 51.1 (1997): 19–27.
DOI: 10.1093/analys/57.1.19 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Zimmerman considers whether taking ordinary objects to be stuff rather than objects helps one to avoid coinciding objects. He concludes that it does not.
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Ordinary Objects are Matter and Form (Hylomorphism)

Hylomorphism is the view that ordinary objects are mereological complexes consisting of both material parts and formal parts. Fine 2008, Johnston 2006, and Koslicki 2008 defend hylomorphism.

Fine, Kit. “Coincidence and Form.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 82 (2008): 101–118.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00164.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Fine argues that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter. Statue is composed of metal alloy and the statue-form. Piece is composed of (the same) metal alloy and the piece-form. Statue and Piece materially coincide, but they don’t formally coincide. An excellent article that explains modal grounding, as well as coincidence and the constitution of ordinary objects.
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Johnston, Mark. “Hylomorphism.” Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006): 652–698.
DOI: 10.5840/jphil2006103125 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Johnston spells out constitution in terms of genuine parts and principles of unity. What it is for this object (e.g., Statue) to be is for these genuine parts (e.g., clay parts) to have this principle of unity (e.g., to be arranged statuewise). What it is for this object (e.g., molecule of water) to be is for these genuine parts (e.g., hydrogen atoms and oxygen atom) to have this principle of unity (e.g., to be chemically bonded).
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Koslicki, Kathrin. The Structure of Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.001.0001 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Koslicki presents a portrait of ordinary objects as structured wholes that have both a material part and a formal part. Statue has both material proper parts (e.g., gold atoms) and formal proper parts (i.e., structural criteria an object has to satisfy to be a statue, such as being arranged statuewise). Koslicki’s book includes a detailed presentation and rejection of classical extensional mereology, as well as an overview of the Aristotelian metaphysics of which her view is the heir.
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Sosa, Ernest. “Subjects among Other Things.” Philosophical Perspectives 1 (1987): 155–187.
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Sosa sketches a broadly Aristotelian account on which ordinary objects are viewed as ontologically derivative from constitutive matter and form. A snowball “supervenes” on its matter’s being round, where the matter is the material component of the snowball and the roundness is the formal component of the snowball. Includes Sosa’s presentation of the famous snowdiscal case.
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Is Constitution Identity?

Are ordinary objects identical to what constitutes them (e.g., to the aggregate of atoms, the bundle of properties, or the stuff)? Noonan 1993 answers in the affirmative. Baker 1997 and Johnston 1992 answer in the negative.

Baker, Lynne Ruder. “Why Constitution Is Not Identity.” Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 599–621.
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Baker notes that for any x (e.g., a statue) and the y that constitutes it (e.g., some clay) the essential properties of x will differ from the essential properties of y. She concludes, on the basis of Leibniz’s Law, that x ≠ y and, hence, that constitution is not identity.
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Johnston, Mark. “Constitution Is Not Identity.” Mind 101 (1992): 89–105.
DOI: 10.1093/mind/101.401.89 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Johnston argues that the statue Goliath has different properties than the Lump that constitutes it. He defends the view that constitution is not identity from the mereological objection (Goliath and Lump have exactly the same parts, so Goliath = Lump) and from the intrinsic paradigm objection (if Goliath is a paradigm statue and Lump is an intrinsic duplicate of Goliath, then Lump is also a statue).
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Noonan, Harold. “Constitution Is Identity.” Mind 102 (1993): 133–146.
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Noonan defends the view that constitution is identity from the objections of Johnston 1992. In particular, Noonan argues that if Goliath is a paradigm statue and Lump is an intrinsic duplicate of Goliath, then Lump is also a statue.
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Ordinary Objects and Coincidence

Some argue that ordinary objects coincide with other objects; others argue just as passionately that they do not. The most common argument in favor of coincidence is the differing properties argument: Statue has the property being unable to survive smashing; Clay has the property being able to survive smashing so, Statue and Clay are distinct objects. However, Statue and Clay occupy exactly the same spacetime, so Statue and Clay coincide. Some have argued the differing properties argument can be avoided if we’re careful what we say about modal predication. Kit Fine has replied that Statue and Clay differ in a whole range of properties, including historical properties, evaluative properties, and physical properties. The most common argument against coincidence is that it’s not needed: we can explain the difference in properties without recourse to coincidence. One way to do this is to utilize Lewisian counterparts, qua statue-counterpart relation, o is unable to survive smashing, qua clay-counterpart relation, o is able to survive smashing. Another way to do this is to invoke Burke’s dominant sortal strategy. There simply is no object with the purported properties of Clay; there’s only Statue. A final solution is to invoke Jubien’s property-theoretic account: there’s one object. It instantiates the property being Statue and the property being some clay. If it were smashed, it would cease to instantiate being Statue, but would continue to instantiate being some clay. Additional issues surrounding coincidence include: (1) what kind of coincidence is at issue: spatio-temporal, material, or mereological, and (2) the double-counting issue: haven’t we really counted the same object twice when we claim Statue and Clay coincide; if there are really two objects, why do the two objects weigh only as much as Statue alone weighs?

Defending Coincidence

Although their motivations for doing so differ, Doepke 1982, Fine 2003, Gibbard 1975, Paul 2006, Thomson 1998, Wasserman 2002, and Wiggins 1968 are united in defending spatio-temporal coincidence. Paul 2006 and Wasserman 2002, in particular, emphasize that, although they accept spatio-temporal coincidence, they reject the (stronger) mereological coincidence. Rather than focusing on defending spatio-temporal coincidence, Bennett 2004 focuses on whether endorsing a plenituder version of spatio-temporal coincidence aids in solving the modal grounding problem.

Bennett, Karen. “Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem.” Philosophical Studies 118 (2004): 339–371.
DOI: 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000026471.20355.54 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Bennett evaluates plenituder coincidence, that is, the view that “[e]very region of spacetime that contains an object at all contains a distinct object for every possible way of distributing ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’ over the non-sortalish properties actually instantiated there” (p. 354). A motivation for endorsing plenituder coincidence is that it aids in resolving the modal grounding problem.
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Doepke, Fred. “Spatially Coinciding Objects.” Ratio 24 (1982): 45–60.
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Doepke presents a version of spatio-temporal coincidence and argues that his coincidence solution to problems raised by Wiggins is superior to the solutions offered by (1) the one-many view, (2) the relative identity view, (3) the diachronic view, and (4) the reductivist view.
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Fine, Kit. “The Non-Identity of a Thing and Its Matter.” Mind 112 (2003): 195–234.
DOI: 10.1093/mind/112.446.195 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Fine distinguishes three types of coincidence: spatial, material, and mereological. He points out that, although coincident objects are frequently noted to differ in their modal properties, they can differ in non-modal properties as well. He cites constitutional, evaluative, physical, practical, and temporal properties as non-modal properties coincidents can differ in.
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Gibbard, Alan. “Contingent Identity.” Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1975): 187–221.
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Gibbard presents the famous Lump1/Goliath case—a case of seeming coincidence where, since Lump1 and Goliath are created and destroyed at the same time, the standard four-dimensional solution to avoiding coincidence won’t work.
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Paul, L. A. “Coincidence as Overlap.” Nous 40 (2006): 623–659.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2006.00627.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Paul develops an account of how numerically distinct material objects spatio-temporally coincide when one constitutes the other. She endorses a bundle theory of objects. She argues that spatio-temporal coincidents share exactly the same spatio-temporal properties (thus ensuring spatio-temporal coincidence), but not all their other properties (thus ensuring distinctness).
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Thomson, Judith. “The Statue and the Clay.” Nous 32 (1998): 149–173.
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.00094 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Thomson argues, on the basis of the statue and the clay having different temporal parts, that the statue is not identical to the clay. She argues that Clay constitutes Statue and occupies a lower ontological level than Statue does. She invokes various temporal-fusion relations to more closely spell out their relation.
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Wasserman, Ryan. “The Standard Objection to the Standard Account.” Philosophical Studies 111 (2002): 197–216.
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021283405720 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
The standard account is spatio-temporal coincidence of enduring objects. The standard objection is, given that the coinciding objects are so similar, how can they differ in the modal properties the adherent of the standard account cites in favor of their distinctness? Wasserman responds that spatio-temporal coincidents are not mereological coincidents and that their differing modal properties can be grounded in their different parts.
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Wiggins, David. “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time.” Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 90–95.
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The original defender of coincidence, Wiggins argues that no two things of the same kind can occupy exactly the same space at exactly the same time.
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Against Coincidence

Jubien 2001 and Sidelle 1998 both think of ordinary objects as just some material stuff. They note that, if we take ordinary objects to be such stuff, spatio-temporal coincidence is easily avoided. Burke 1997 argues that the solution to avoiding coincidence is not to think of ordinary objects as stuff, but rather to think of ordinary objects as sortal-bound. Each object falls under a sortal (e.g., statue, clay). The sortal statue dominates the sortal clay. If some clay is formed into a statue, the clay ceases to exist and a statue begins to exist. In this way, spatio-temporal coincidence is avoided. Lewis 1986 avoids coincidence by invoking counterpart theory. There is just one object at region r. It has clay counterparts and statue counterparts. When we think of the one object as some clay, the clay counterpart relation is made salient. When we think of the one object as a statue, the statue counterpart relation is made salient. In this way, Lewis is able to accommodate talk that seems to imply there are coinciding objects (e.g., statue and clay) without endorsing an ontology of coinciding objects.

Burke, Michael. “Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place.” In Material Constitution: A Reader. Edited by Mike Rea, 236–269. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
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Burke defends the dominant sortal response to the puzzles that often lead people to endorse coincidence. He argues that when Clay forms Statue, statue becomes the dominant sortal and Clay ceases to exist. Hence, there is no coincidence.
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Jubien, Michael. “Thinking about Things.” Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 1–15.
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Jubien argues that if we take ordinary objects to be stuff-which-instantiates-Platonic-properties, then we can avoid coincidents. There is just one stuff that is StatueClay. It instantiates being statue s. It, also, instantiates being some clay. Different stuff might have instantiated being statue s. This explain why the statue and the clay have different modal properties.
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Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
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Includes the famous chapter “Counterparts, or Double Lives?” (pages 192–263) in which Lewis argues for inconstancy de re. Coinciding objects are often posited because we need different objects to bear incompatible modal properties, that is, the Statue can’t survive smashing, the Clay can. Lewis argues there’s just one object, o, which stands in many different counterpart relations. With respect to its Clay counterparts, o can survive smashing; with respect to its Statue counterparts, o cannot survive smashing.
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Sidelle, Alan. “A Sweater Unraveled: Following One Thread of Thought for Avoiding Coincident Entities.” Nous 32 (1998): 423–448.
DOI: 10.1111/0029-4624.00133 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Sidelle argues that if we take ordinary objects to be stuff, rather than things, we can avoid coinciding objects.
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The Ontological Status of Ordinary Objects

What is the ontological status of ordinary objects? Some (the eliminativists) argue that there are no ordinary objects. Others (the permissivists) argue that ordinary objects, though of special interest to us, are a small portion of the vast number of objects that exist. Conventionalists about ordinary objects argue that the existence or nature of ordinary objects is ineliminably bound up with convention. Finally, some privilege the ordinary. They argue that ordinary objects exist and that there’s something special about them. They’re objectively privileged, not just privileged from our point of view; the trees and the dogs really are importantly different from trout-turkeys and arbitrary mereological sums.

Eliminativist Accounts

Dasgupta 2009, Ladyman and Ross 2007, Unger 1979, and Wheeler 1979 endorse the radically eliminativist view that there are no ordinary objects. Merricks 2003 and van Inwagen 1990 endorse the less radical view that, although there are no nonliving ordinary objects, there are organisms, including people.

Dasgupta, Shamik. “Individuals: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.” Philosophical Studies 145 (2009): 35–67.
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Dasgupta argues that there are no ordinary objects, such as computers, atoms, and dogs. Rather, there is a fundamental structure to the world that allows us to make sense of general facts.
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Ladyman, James, and Don Ross. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Ladyman and Ross argue there are no objects, as ordinarily conceived. They defend ontic structural realism, according to which, although a real structure exists, ordinary objects do not. They argue for their view on the basis of our best physics.
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Merricks, Trenton. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon, 2003.
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Merricks argues, on the basis of causal overdetermination, that ordinary objects do not exist. Roughly, all the causal work there is to be done can be done by atoms arranged statuewise, so there’s no reason to postulate statues in addition to atoms arranged statuewise.
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Unger, Peter. “There Are No Ordinary Things.” Synthese 41 (1979): 117–154.
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Unger presents a sorites of decomposition against ordinary objects. He concludes, on the basis of this sorites, that there are no ordinary objects.
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van Inwagen, Peter. Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
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Van Inwagen argues that ordinary objects do not exist. He presents the special composition question and finds no answer to it that saves (nonliving) ordinary objects. He argues that we should, instead, accept an ontology of atoms arranged ordinary objectwise. There are simple atoms, there are pluralities of atoms (e.g., atoms arranged statuewise), and there are organisms (e.g., people, dogs), but there are no statues, rocks, or computers.
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Wheeler, Samuel. “On That which Is Not.” Synthese 41 (1979): 155–194.
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Wheeler argues, on the basis of the sorites argument, that neither ordinary objects nor people exist.
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Permissivist Accounts

Permissivism is, roughly, the view that there are lots and lots of objects. Some of these objects are the ordinary objects familiar to us in everyday life (e.g., tables, dogs, trees); others of these objects are kinds of objects we rarely think of outside of explicitly philosophical contexts (aggregates of atoms arranged dogwise, trout-turkeys, all of Dion except his left foot). There are a variety of different commitments that all lead to permissivism. Lewis 1986 and Sider 2001 defend the permissivist principle of mereological universalism. That is, they think any two objects sum to compose a third object. Bennett 2004 explores the permissivist principle of modal plenitude, that is, the view that any object whose existence is compatible with the nonmodal properties at region r actually exists at region r. Quine 1960 endorses a permissivist concept of what objects are—namely, the material content of any region whatsoever.

Bennett, Karen. “Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem.” Philosophical Studies 118 (2004): 339–371.
DOI: 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000026471.20355.54 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Bennett argues that the modal grounding problem is a problem both for coinciding objects theorists and for those who reject coinciding objects. She suggests the best option for the coinciding objects theorist is to argue that modal properties are ungrounded (i.e., primitive), and to lessen the counter-intuitiveness of this claim by endorsing plentitude, every way an object occupying region r could be is a way some object occupying region r is.
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Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
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Lewis endorses mereological universalism: for any two objects, there exists a third object that is their sum. It follows from this that there are both ordinary objects (e.g., trout, turkeys, the Eiffel Tower) and extraordinary objects (e.g., trout-turkeys, the sum of your nose and the Eiffel Tower).
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Quine, W. V. O. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1960.
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Quine famously argues that ordinary objects comprise “the content, however heterogeneous, of some portion of space-time, however disconnected and gerrymandered” (p. 171).
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Sider, Theodore. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
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Sider presents the argument from vagueness in favor of mereological universalism. He thinks if mereological universalism is false, we’ll end up with vagueness about how many objects exist. He thinks there cannot be such vagueness. Hence, he thinks universalism is true.
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Conventionalist Accounts

Conventionalists about ordinary objects, such as Heller 1990 and Sidelle 1989, argue that the existence or nature of ordinary objects is ineliminably bound up with human conventions.

Heller, Mark. The Ontology of Physical Objects. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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Heller argues that four-dimensional hunks of matter exist. He takes these four-dimensional hunks to have their spatio-temporal boundaries essentially and to be too different from our lay conception of objects to be ordinary objects. He argues that ordinary objects do not have their spatio-temporal boundaries essentially and exist only conventionally.
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Sidelle, Alan. Necessity, Essence, and Individuation. London: Cornell University Press, 1989.
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Sidelle argues that physical stuff exists. He argues that, whereas ordinary objects have modal properties, stuff does not. Ordinary objects, hence, aren’t identical to stuff. Ordinary objects exist, but—unlike stuff—they owe their existence to us, that is, to certain choices of modal individuation we make.
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Accounts That Privilege Ordinary Objects

Defenders of accounts that privilege ordinary objects, such as Baker 2007, Elder 2011, Hirsch 1993, Korman 2016, Lowe 2003 and Markosian 1998, argue that ordinary objects are special. They’re objectively privileged, not just privileged from our point of view. Trees and dogs really are importantly different from trout-turkeys and arbitrary mereological sums.

Baker, Lynne Ruder. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511487545 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Baker takes ordinary objects to be an irreducible part of reality. She defends the constitution view, whereby ordinary objects are ultimately constituted by (but not reducible to) microphysical particles.
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Elder, Crawford. Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511760129 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Elder argues that ordinary objects are mind-independently real. He argues against the view that statues reduce to atoms arranged statuewise by arguing that the only reason we’re able to denote atoms arranged statuewise is because we’re able to denote statues. Rather than statues (the familiar objects) depending on atoms arranged statuewise (a shadow of a familiar object), atoms arranged statuewise depend on statues.
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Hirsch, Eli. Dividing Reality. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
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Hirsch addresses the question of “why it seems reasonable for us to have words that classify and individuate in ordinary ways rather than other ways” (p. vii). Includes a brief discussion of the famous incar-outcar case first introduced in Hirsch’s The Concept of Identity.
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Korman, Daniel. Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
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Korman defends a conservative view, in which there are ordinary objects (e.g., dogs, chairs, trees), but not any extraordinary objects (e.g., fusions of my dog and the tree in your yard). He criticizes compatibilist views, according to which eliminativism and permissivism are compatible with ordinary beliefs and intuitions. Along the way he considers arbitrariness arguments, debunking arguments, overdetermination arguments, and arguments from vagueness against ordinary objects.
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Lowe, E. “In Defense of Moderate-Sized Specimens of Dry Goods.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 704–710.
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Lowe defends ordinary objects against Merrick’s causal exclusion argument.
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Markosian, Ned. “Brutal Composition.” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 211–249.
DOI: 10.1023/A:1004267523392 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Markosian argues that composition is brute. It occurs sometimes, but not every time. In particular, it occurs in such a way as to support our ordinary conception of objects. Ordinary objects exist; extra-ordinary objects (e.g., trout-turkeys, klables) do not.
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Mereology and Composition

Several issues concerning mereology and composition have been prominent in the ordinary objects literature, including (1) Is composition identity? (2) Is mereological essentialism true? (3) What’s the answer to the special composition question? Regarding (1), composition, unlike constitution, is a one-many relation. It concerns how an object is related to its parts. Some argue that identity can be one-many and, hence, that an object can be identical to the plurality that composes it. Less radically, others argue that, although Statue is not strictly identical to the clay atoms that compose it, it is, ontologically speaking, “nothing over and above them.” Its existence supervenes on their existence. Finally, some argue that composed objects do add to the furniture of the world. Their existence is distinct from the existence of that which composes them, and they deserve to be counted in their own right. Regarding (2), the intuitive view is that mereological essentialism is false. We change the tires on our car, cut our hair, and add a new room to our house. We conclude, on the basis of this, that ordinary objects can gain and lose parts, that is, that mereological essentialism is false. Despite the prima facie counter-intuitiveness of mereological essentialism, Chisholm and Jubien both defend it. Regarding (3), van Inwagen’s special composition question concerns the conditions under which a plurality of objects sum to form a further object. Some, including van Inwagen, argue that composition occurs only when a principle of life is present. Others, such as Lewis, argue that composition always occurs. Genuine compositional nihilists, such as Wheeler, argue composition never occurs. Markosian argues there’s no principled answer to the special composition question that matches our intuitions about when composition occurs. He recommends brutalism. Composition sometimes occurs and sometimes does not. It’s a primitive relation that follows no principled pattern. Additional questions within the mereology literature include whether objects have arbitrary undetached parts (van Inwagen and Parsons) and whether there’s one parthood relation or many (see Bennett, Fine, and Simons).

Is Composition Identity?

Cameron 2014 and McDaniel 2008 argue that composition is not identity. Both agree that there is a close relation between an object and the objects that compose it, but they think this relation falls short of identity. Wallace 2011 disagrees. She defends the view that composition is identity from various objections.

Cameron, Ross. “Parts Generate the Whole, but They Are Not Identical to It.” In Composition as Identity. Edited by A. J. Cotnoir and Donald L. M. Baxter, 90–107. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
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Cameron argues that, although there is a close relation between a whole and its parts, the relation is not so close as to be identity. Rather, the relation of parts to whole is one of grounding: the existence of the parts grounds the existence of the whole.
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McDaniel, Kris. “Against Composition as Identity.” Analysis (2008): 128–133.
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McDaniel argues against composition as identity on the grounds that it’s incompatible with emergent properties.
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Wallace, Meg. “Composition as Identity: Part 1.” Philosophy Compass 6.11 (2011): 804–816.
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Wallace defends the view that composition is identity; in so doing she rejects the indiscernibility of identicals. She argues that the arguments against composition as identity all either have a false premise or are invalid.
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Mereological Essentialism

Chisholm 1976 and Jubien 2001 both provide strong defences of the counter-intuitive view that objects have their parts essentially.

Chisholm, Roderick. Person and Object. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976.
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Chisholm argues that mereological essentialism is true for ordinary objects. He bases his argument on the intuition that, if table T is in fact composed of wooden circle C and wooden stump S we cannot imagine this very table being composed of a different wooden circle or a different wooden stump. That would result in a similar table, not in this very table.
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Jubien, Michael. “Thinking about Things.” Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001): 1–15.
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Jubien argues that mereological essentialism is true for ordinary objects. He takes an ordinary object, such as a statue, to be just some stuff that instantiates the property being statue s. Focusing on the fact that the object is just some stuff, he argues that we can’t imagine that we have the very same stuff without having all of it (i.e., all of its parts).
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The Special Composition Question

Van Inwagen 1990 presents the special composition question (SCQ). This SCQ concerns the conditions under which a plurality of objects sum to form a further object. Some, including van Inwagen, argue that composition occurs only when a principle of life is present. Others, such as Lewis 1986, argue that composition always occurs. Genuine compositional nihilists, such as Wheeler 1979, argue composition never occurs. Markosian 1998 argues there’s no principled answer to the special composition question that matches our intuitions about when composition occurs. He recommends brutalism. Composition sometimes occurs and sometimes does not. It’s a primitive relation that follows no principled pattern.

Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
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Lewis argues in favor of compositional universalism: two objects always sum to compose a third object.
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Markosian, Ned. “Brutal Composition.” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998): 211–249.
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Markosian defends the brutal composition response to van Inwagen’s special composition question. He argues, against the eliminativist about composition, that ordinary objects exist. He argues, against the universalist about composition, that not any two objects sum to compose a further object; there’s something special about ordinary objects that ensures that composition occurs in their case, but not in every case.
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van Inwagen, Peter. Material Beings. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990.
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The locus classicus concerning the special composition question. Van Inwagen presents the special composition question and surveys various answers to it. He concludes that two objects compose a further object only when a principle of life is relevantly involved. The result of this is that, although there are composite living things there are no composite nonliving things.
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Wheeler, Samuel. “On That which Is Not.” Synthese 41 (1979): 155–194.
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Wheeler argues in favor of compositional nihilism; there are no composite objects.
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Further Questions about Parthood

There are a variety of additional questions concerning parthood. Bennett 2013 and Fine 1999 address the question of whether there’s one parthood relation or many. Van Inwagen 1981 and Parsons 2004 consider the question of the existence of arbitrary undetached parts. See Simons 1987 for a thorough discussion of additional issues concerning parthood.

Bennett, Karen. “Having a Part Twice Over.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2013): 83–103.
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2011.637936 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Bennett argues that we should distinguish two senses of parthood: (1) being a parthood slot, “roles,” and (2) filling a parthood slot, “occupant.” The role parts of tables are, for example, legs, tabletop. The occupant parts of tables are the actual material bits that are the legs and the tabletop. The role parts of human are, for example, arm, leg, heart, eyes, hands, etc. The occupant parts are the matter/cells that make up the arms, legs, heart, etc.
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Fine, Kit. “Things and Their Parts.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1999): 61–74.
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Fine distinguishes between temporary parts (e.g., filter f is part of the air conditioner from t₁ to t_n) and timeless parts (e.g., hydrogen and oxygen atoms are parts of water molecules). He defends a hylomorphic account of ordinary objects, which he calls the “theory of embodiment.” He explains how temporary parts are related to wholes in the theory of variable embodiment. He explains how timeless parts are related to wholes in the theory of rigid embodiment.
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Parsons, Josh. “Dion, Theon, and DAUP.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85.1 (2004): 85–91.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2004.00188.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Parsons argues that van Inwagen’s famous DAUP argument relies crucially on the remainder principle, that is, on the principle that if P is a proper part of O, then there’s another object (the remainder object), O-P, which is distinct from O.
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Simons, Peter. Parts: A Study in Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon, 1987.
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The classical work concerning parthood. Topics covered include the logic of parthood (classical extensional mereology), temporary parts, essential parts, and ontological dependence.
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van Inwagen, Peter. “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1981): 123–137.
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Van Inwagen argues that arbitrary undetached parts—for example, all of Dion but his foot, the central bit of my right forearm—don’t exist.
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Ordinary Objects and Properties

Our philosophical interest in ordinary objects concerns not only their existence, but also what properties they have. A central issue surrounding the connection between ordinary objects and properties concerns how tightly objects are bound to their properties. At one extreme, we have the view that objects are not at all bound to their properties: there can be bare particulars. At the other extreme, we have the view—famously defended by Leibniz—that objects are very closely bound to their properties: every object has all its properties essentially. In between, we have the two moderate views: anti-Essentialism (objects have all their properties accidentally) and Essentialism (objects have some, but not all, their properties essentially).

Properties: An Overview

Orilia and Swoyer 2016 provides a nice overview of what properties are and of how they’re connected to objects via the instantiation relation. Lewis 1999 introduces the famous distinction between natural and unnatural properties.

Lewis, David. “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. By David Lewis, 8–55. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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Building on earlier work by Armstrong, Lewis introduces the distinction between natural and unnatural properties. He argues that the natural properties are a subset of the properties.
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Orilia, Francesco, and Chris Swoyer. “Properties.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta, 1–42. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2016.
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Ordinary objects instantiate properties, for example, the dog instantiates being mammalian, the computer instantiates being on the desk. Orilia and Swoyer present a thorough overview of properties covering arguments for their existence as well as differing accounts of the nature of properties.
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Bare Particulars: Objects Have No Properties

The view that there are bare particulars—that is, objects that have no properties—is not widely endorsed in contemporary metaphysics. Armstrong 1978 argues that, although we can conceptually separate an object from its properties (“thin particulars”), all objects that actually exist (“thick particulars”) have properties. Sider 2006 takes on the formidable task of defending the plausibility of bare particulars.

Armstrong, D. M. Nominalism & Realism, Universals and Scientific Realism. Vol. I. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
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Although primarily an account of universals, the volume includes a section on particulars. Armstrong presents the contrast between the thin conceptions of particulars (object only) and the thick conception of particulars (object plus its properties). Armstrong argues that all actual particulars are thick. The thin conception is an abstraction: we can think of an object distinct from its properties, but all objects, in fact, have properties.
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Sider, Theodore. “Bare Particulars.” Philosophical Perspectives 20 (2006): 387–397.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2006.00112.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Sider clarifies substratum theory (aka, the “bare particulars” view) and examines various arguments against bare particulars. He argues that the complaint against bare particulars rests on a confusion and that most of the arguments fail to apply to substratum theory properly understood.
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Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism

Essentialism is the view that objects have de re modal properties independently of how they’re described. Kripke 1980, Mackie 2006, and Paul 2004 defend the view that objects have essential properties. Lewis 1986 argues that which modal properties an object has depends on which counterpart relation is salient. Some take Lewis to defend essentialism. Others argue that, by making de re modality relative to a counterpart, Lewis rejects genuine essentialism. Quine 1966 rejects the notion of essentialism as nonsensical. Quine thinks it only makes sense to ask what modal properties an object has relative to how the object is described.

Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980.
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Arguably, the most famous work on essentialism. Kripke argues that Queen Elizabeth has her parentage essentially, that this table has its origin essentially, and that ordinary objects, in general, have essential properties. He defends his argument both on intuitive grounds and by appeal to the causal theory of reference.
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Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
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Lewis defends inconstancy de re. He argues that the essential properties an object has are relative to a counterpart relation that is determined by context.
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Mackie, Penelope. How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Oxford: Clarendon, 2006.
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Mackie argues that ordinary objects have both essential and accidental properties. She defends a minimalist account of the essential properties of ordinary objects, whereby ordinary objects have only a few essential properties.
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Paul, L. A. “The Context of Essence.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2004): 170–184.
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Paul defends a representational, actualist view of the de re modal properties of ordinary objects. She responds to the variability of modal intuitions argument against essentialism.
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Quine, W. V. O. “Three Grades of Modal Involvement.” In The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. By W. V. O. Quine, 158–176. New York: Random House, 1966.
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Quine’s famous argument against “quantifying in” is presented. The first grade of modal involvement is necessity attached to names of statements. The second grade of modal involvement is necessity attached to closed statements. The third grade of modal involvement is necessity attached to open statements, that is quantifying in. The third grade is seen as leading us “back into the metaphysical jungles of Aristotelian essentialism” and is rejected.
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Persistence: How Ordinary Objects Persist through Time

Persistence concerns how ordinary objects exist over time. In his On the Plurality of Worlds (1986) Lewis defined endurance as the view that an object persists via being wholly present at different times. For example, all of table T exists at t₁ and all of table T exists at t_n. Table T persists from t₁ to t_n by virtue of the object that exists at t₁ being identical to the object that exists at t_n. A central argument in favor of endurance is that it best matches our intuitive view of ordinary objects. A central argument against endurance is the argument from temporary intrinsics. Lewis defined perdurance as the view that an object persists via having temporal parts. For example, temporal part t₁ of table T exists at t₁, temporal part t₂ of table T exists at t₂, . . . temporal part t_n of table T exists at t_n. Table T persists from t₁ to t_n by virtue of having a temporal part at each instant between t₁ and t_n. Table T, itself, is the sum of temporal parts t₁–t_n. Arguments in favor of perdurance include that it solves the problem of temporary intrinsics and that it’s suggested by our best physics. Arguments against perdurance include the argument that temporal parts are nonsensical, the argument that it blurs the distinction between ordinary objects and events, and the argument that it can’t account for genuine change. The third main view of persistence, exdurance, is defended by Sider and Hawley. Exdurance is the view that, rather than being sums of instantaneous temporal parts, ordinary objects are the instantaneous temporal parts. Table T is identical to temporal part t₁. Table T persists over time by having temporal counterparts that exist at other times. Those that defend exdurance argue that it solves puzzles of material constitution better than perdurance does. The central argument against exdurance is that it fails to capture genuine persistence.

Goswick, Dana. “Change and Identity over Time.” In A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Edited by Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon, 365–386. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
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Goswick presents the central arguments for and objections to endurance, perdurance, and exdurance.
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Haslanger, Sally, and Roxanne Kurtz, eds. Persistence: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2006.
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An anthology containing readings covering endurace, perdurance, and exdurance. The central problems for each approach are presented, as are the central reasons in defense of each approach. Includes papers by Quine, Lewis, Sider, Hawley, Thomson, Haslanger, Zimmerman, van Inwagen, Markosian, Balashov, and others.
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Endurance

Fine 2006 and Thomson 1983 defend the endurantist view that objects persist via being wholly present at different times.

Fine, Kit. “In Defense of Three-Dimensionalism.” Journal of Philosophy 103.12 (2006): 699–714.
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Fine clarifies the distinction between 3Ders (aka, endurantists) and 4Ders (aka, perdurantists). He considers the advantages and disadvantages of each view and argues that, ultimately, three-dimensionalism is preferable.
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Thomson, Judith. “Parthood and Identity across Time.” Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 201–220.
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Thomson argues against temporal parts on the grounds that the notion is incoherent.
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Perdurance

Heller 1984 and Lewis 1986 defend the perdurantist view that objects persist via having temporal parts.

Heller, Mark. “Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects.” Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 323–334.
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Heller argues that objects persist via being sums of temporal parts.
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Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
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Lewis clarifies the terminology of persistence by introducing “endurance” for the view that objects persist via being wholly located at different times, “perdurance” for the view that objects persist via having temporal parts, and “persistence” as a neutral term indicating that an object exists at different moments of time. He defends perdurance.
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Exdurance

Hawley 2001 and Sider 1996 defend the exdurantist view that objects persist via having temporal counterparts.

Hawley, Katherine. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
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Hawley presents an extended defense of exdurance. In so doing, she raises interesting issues concerning vagueness, coincidence, modality, and change.
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Sider, Theodore. “All The World’s a Stage.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1996): 433–453.
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Sider accepts the basic four-dimensional ontology of instantaneous temporal parts and spacetime “worms,” which are sums of temporal parts. He argues that we should associate ordinary objects with the instantaneous stages (exdurance) rather than with sums of such stages (perdurance). His reason for so arguing is that exdurance better solves the problems of material constitution.
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Vagueness: Are Ordinary Objects Vague?

Vagueness concerns boundaries. What is the boundary between bald and not bald? Where does the mountain begin? How tall do you have to be to count as tall? The standard view, reiterated by Lewis 1986, has long been that all vagueness is semantic. Objects have definite boundaries, but our words—“bald,” “mountain,” “tall”—are vague and, thus, we aren’t able to always definitely classify objects. Timothy Williamson defends the view that vagueness is epistemic. Objects have definite boundaries and our words have definite meanings, but we’re ignorant of these boundaries and these meanings. Vagueness arises due to our particular epistemic situation. Ontic vagueness—vagueness in objects themselves—was (following Lewis) long thought to be incoherent. Barnes has recently attacked this view, arguing forcefully both that ontic vagueness makes sense and that it sometimes occurs.

Barnes, Elizabeth. “Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed.” Nous 44.4 (2010): 607–627.
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Barnes develops a framework for understanding ontic vagueness. Ontic vagueness is the view that objects are vague in a way that can’t be fully accounted for by semantic or epistemic vagueness.
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Carmichael, Chad. “Vague Composition without Vague Existence.” Noûs 45 (2011): 315–327.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00807.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Carmichael endorses the pre-cisificational view of vagueness. He argues, contra Lewis, that vague composition does not entail vague existence. On this basis, he argues that vague composition is less problematic than it is commonly thought to be.
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Evans, Gareth. “Can There Be Vague Objects?” Analysis 38.4 (1978): 208.
DOI: 10.1093/analys/38.4.208 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Evans presents a proof that asserting the existence of vague objects leads to a contradiction.
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Lewis, David. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. 212.
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Lewis argues that all vagueness is semantic. There’s not some vague object, the outback; rather, there’s semantic indecision with regard to which precise object “the outback” refers to.
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Sorensen, Roy. “Vagueness.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta, 1–16. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2013.
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Sorensen provides a thorough introduction to the issue of vagueness. He discusses conditions under which vagueness arises, as well as provides a survey of the most common ways of responding to vagueness.
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Williamson, Timothy. Vagueness. London: Routledge, 1994.
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Williamson defends an epistemic account of vagueness.
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Wilson, Jessica. “A Determinable-Based Account of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.” Inquiry 56.4 (2013): 359–385.
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.816251 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Wilson presents a novel account of ontic vagueness. She argues that ontic vagueness arises when, although an object has a particular determinable (such as being colored), it has no unique determinate of that determinable. Either it has no determinate at all (no specific color) or it has multiple determinates (being entirely blue, being entirely purple).
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Puzzles and Paradoxes Concerning Ordinary Objects

Ordinary objects are puzzling. Although we interact with them every day, a closer evaluation quickly reveals a plethora of paradoxes. These include puzzles of material constitution, sorites puzzles, and the problem of the many. Among the central puzzles of material constitution are: Given that Statue and Clay have so many properties in common, what grounds their distinctness (for the coinciding object theorist)? Given that Statue and Clay are identical, what explains their seemingly different modal properties (for those who reject coincidence)? and the Ship of Theseus (If we replace the ship’s planks one by one over a period of a year, then take all the removed planks and build a ship, which is the original ship: the one with the replaced planks or the re-built one?). Sorites puzzles are a particular form of vagueness. If I have 10002 grains of sand, I have a heap of sand. Surely removing one grain can’t make the difference between having a heap and lacking a heap, so, when there’s 10001 grains of sand, there’s still a heap. If we repeat this procedure 10000 times, we get that there’s a heap of sand when there’s only one grain. Surely that’s false. Hyde, Heller, and Unger discuss how to resolve (or avoid) this problem. The famous problem of the many concerns how many cats are sitting on the mat. If there’s a cat with 1000 hairs on the mat, then there’s something on the mat very catlike with 999 hairs. Is this a cat? If so, then we’ve got 1000 cats. The one with 1000 hairs, the one with 999 hairs (missing hair one), the one with 998 hairs (missing hair two), and so forth. Unger and Geach present this problem. Lewis and Lowe discuss how to resolve it. Additional puzzles concerning ordinary objects are the puzzle of causal redundancy, namely, Does endorsing ordinary objects lead to problematic causal overdetermination? and the puzzle of where ordinary objects fit into a scientific worldview.

Puzzles of Material Constitution

Paul 2010 and Rea 1997 both discuss a wide variety of puzzles of material constitution.

Paul, L. A. “The Puzzles of Material Constitution.” Philosophy Compass 5 (2010): 579–590.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00302.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Paul discusses three familiar problems of material constitution: (1) a conceptual puzzle asking how we’re to make sense of Statue and Clay being distinct when they share so many of their properties, (2) a grounding puzzle asking, for the few properties Statue and Clay don’t have in common, what grounds this difference, and (3) an overdetermination puzzle concerning causal overdetermination involving Statue and Clay. Paul presents three new puzzles concerning mereology, compositional structure, and the asymmetry of constitution.
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Rea, Michael, ed. Material Constitution: A Reader. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
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This anthology draws together many of the classical articles concerned with material constitution. Puzzles discussed include the Ship of Theseus, sorites puzzles, puzzles arising from material coincidence, parthood puzzles, and persistence puzzles.
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Sorites

Hyde 2014 presents a detailed discussion of the sorites paradox. Heller 1990 and Unger 1979 both argue for eliminativism about ordinary objects on the basis of the sorites paradox.

Heller, Mark. The Ontology of Physical Objects. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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Heller presents a sorites argument against the existence of objects with imprecise boundaries. His solution to the puzzle is to argue that the only objects are four-dimensional hunks of matter that have precise boundaries.
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Hyde, Dominic. “Sorites Paradox.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward Zalta, 1–20. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2014.
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Hyde provides an overview of the issues surrounding, and literature on, the sorites paradox. He considers various responses to the sorites paradox including ideal language approaches, epistemic approaches, supervaluationism, many-valued logics, and contextualism.
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Unger, Peter. “There Are No Ordinary Things.” Synthese 41 (1979): 117–154.
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Unger presents several sorites arguments against the existence of ordinary things, including a sorites of decomposition, a sorites of slicing/grinding, and a sorites of separating. He takes these sorites to offer a reductio against the existence of ordinary objects. He, hence, is an eliminativist about ordinary objects.
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Problem of the Many

Geach 1980 and Unger 1980 present the problem of the many. Lewis 1999 and Lowe 1982 provide solutions to it. Lewis’s two solutions are the supervaluationist solution and the partial identity solution. According to supervaluation, different utterances of “cloud” pick out different groups of water droplets in the same vicinity, but on each utterance of “cloud” it’s true that, for example, there’s a cloud, the cloud is visible from here, etc. According to the partial identity solution, although the clouds aren’t identical neither are they entirely distinct, namely, they overlap a great deal. When we count in ordinary English, we treat large overlap of same kind as identity and, thus, count only one cloud.

Geach, Peter. Reference and Generality. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980.
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In section 110 Geach presents the famous problem of the many. Consider the cat Tibbles, who is sitting on a mat. Like most cats, Tibbles has many hairs. Surely, Tibbles minus hair1 is still a cat. Surely, Tibbles minus hair2 is still a cat. And so forth. So, we end up with many cats sitting on the mat where, intuitively, there is only one.
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Lewis, David. “Many, but Almost One.” In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. By David Lewis, 164–182. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
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Lewis presents two solutions to the problem of the many: the supervaluationist solution and the partial identity solution.
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Lowe, E. “The Paradox of the 1,001 Cats.” Analysis 42 (1982): 27–30.
DOI: 10.1093/analys/42.1.27 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
In response to Geach’s problem of the many, Lowe argues that the sort cat applies only to the entire actual cat. Tibbles minus hair1 is not a cat. It’s a lump of feline tissue. Although there are many lumps of feline tissue on the mat, there is only one cat.
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Unger, Peter. “The Problem of the Many.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980): 411–467.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00416.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Unger introduces the famous problem of the many. Suppose cloud C consists of water droplets d₁–d_n. Surely, there would still be a cloud if we considered all the water droplets except d₁. Call that cloud C₁. Surely, there would still be a cloud if we considered all the water droplets except d₂. Call that cloud C₂. We quickly end up with a multitude of clouds where, intuitively, it seems there is only one cloud.
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Causal Redundancy

Causal redundancy arguments contend that it would be causally redundant to include objects of kind k (e.g., ordinary objects) in one’s ontology as the relevant causal work is already done by objects of kind k* (e.g., aggregates of atoms arranged ordinary objectwise). Merricks 2003 argues against the existence of ordinary objects on the basis of causal redundancy. Sider 2003 and Thomasson 2007 respond.

Merricks, Trenton. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon, 2003.
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Merricks presents the causal redundancy argument against the existence of ordinary objects.
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Sider, Ted. “What’s So Bad about Overdetermination?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003): 719–726.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00321.x Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Sider responds to the causal redundancy argument against the existence of ordinary objects.
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Thomasson, Amie. Ordinary Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Thomason presents a detailed response to the causal redundancy argument.
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Rivalry with Science

Some worry that the world as revealed by science (i.e., a world a small particles, forces, quantum fields, etc.) leaves no room for ordinary objects as ordinarily conceived of (i.e., solid objects that persist through changes). Eddington 1928 and Sellars 1966 present such worries. Ryle 2015 dispels them.

Eddington, Arthur. The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1928.
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Eddington discusses the interplay between philosophy and science, includes Eddington’s famous discussion of the “two tables,” namely, tables as ordinary objects and tables as scientific objects.
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Ryle, Gilbert. Dilemmas. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
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Ryle discusses a number of dilemmas in philosophy. Chapter 4, pages 58–69, deals explicitly with the problem of reconciling our everyday experience of ordinary objects with science.
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Sellars, Wilfrid. Science, Perception and Reality. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.
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Sellars provides a detailed account of how to reconcile our everyday perceptions of the world, including our perception of ordinary objects, with science.
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Metaontology

Metaontology, or metametaphysics, concerns the status of first-order metaphysical debates. When you ask if there’s an objective fact of persistence that endurantists and perdurantists are attempting to track, you’re asking a metametaphysical question. When you ask whether universalists and permissivists about composition are engaged in a substantive debate or in a mere verbal dispute, you’re asking a metametaphysical question. Bennett, Dorr, and the authors in the Metametaphysics anthology ask these questions. Another aspect of metaontology concerns the status of ordinary objects: are they fundamental constituents of the world or are they derived entities? Schaffer presents a picture of metaphysics in which the question of an object’s ontological status (fundamental or derived) is as important as the question of its existence. The articles by Cameron and by O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens argue that ordinary objects are not fundamental.

Are Debates About the Existence and Nature of Ordinary Objects Substantive?

Bennett 2009 asks whether certain debates within metaphysics are substantive. Dorr 2005 discusses the connection between quantifier variance and answers to existence questions. The Chalmers, et al. 2009 anthology contains a number of excellent articles dealing with various issues in metametaphysics. Thomasson 2007 addresses a wide variety of methodological issues concerning ordinary objects. Thomasson 2014 defends the methodological claim that ontology is easy.

Bennett, Karen. “Composition, Colocation, and Metaontology.” In Metametaphysics. Edited by David John Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 38–76. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
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Bennett considers the debate over whether simples sometimes sum to compose a composite object and the debate over whether ordinary objects spatio-temporally coincide. She argues that there are no real grounds for choosing between the competing positions. Our epistemic position is such that, even after we’ve surveyed all the available information, there is still no decisive answer.
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Chalmers, David John, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, eds. Metametaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
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This anthology contains a collection of articles concerned with metametaphysical issues. Many of the articles directly impact various issues concerning ordinary objects. See, in particular, Bennett, Chalmers, Fine, Hirsch, Schaffer, Sider, Thomasson, van Inwagen, and Yablo.
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Dorr, Cian. “What We Disagree about When We Disagree about Ontology.” In Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Edited by Mark Kalderon, 234–286. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
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Different linguistic communities may use the existence quantifier in different ways. It is, however, feasible to argue that there’s a privileged use of the existence quantifier. If so, then, despite quantifier pluralism, there are answers to existence questions, such as, “Does ordinary object o exist?”
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Thomasson, Amie. Ordinary Objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Thomasson addresses a wide variety of methodological issues concerning ordinary objects. In addition to the question of whether debates about the existence and nature of ordinary objects are substantive, she addresses questions concerning causal redundancy, coincidence, vagueness, the special composition problem, rivalry with science, and parsimony.
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Thomasson, Amie. Ontology Made Easy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385119.001.0001 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Thomasson argues that questions about the existence of ordinary objects—such as, “Do tables exist?” and “Do dogs exist?”—are easy. She defends Realism about ordinary objects from various methodological concerns.
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Are Ordinary Objects Fundamental?

Another aspect of metaontology concerns the status of ordinary objects: are they fundamental constituents of the world or are they derived entities? Schaffer 2009 presents a picture of metaphysics in which the question of an object’s ontological status (fundamental or derived) is as important as the question of its existence. Cameron 2010 and O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens 1995 argue that ordinary objects are not fundamental.

Cameron, Ross. “How to Have a Radically Minimal Ontology.” Philosophical Studies 151 (2010): 249–264.
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9442-2 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
Cameron reconciles a minimalist ontology with the truth of sentences concerning ordinary objects (which, according to the minimalist ontology, don’t exist) by arguing that the truth of such sentences depends on the existence of truthmakers for the sentences, rather than on the existence of ordinary objects. So, for example, “There are tables” can be true even if there are only atoms arranged tablewise, as long as the existence of such atoms serves as a truthmaker for the sentence.
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O’Leary-Hawthorne, John, and Andrew Cortens. “Towards Ontological Nihilism.” Philosophical Studies 79 (1995): 143–164.
DOI: 10.1007/BF00989707 Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »
O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cortens argue that, fundamentally, reality contains no ordinary objects.
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Schaffer, Jonathan. “On What Grounds What.” In Metametaphysics. Edited by David John Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 347–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
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Schaffer argues that rather than being merely about what exists, metaphysics concerns what is fundamental. The metaphysically interesting question is not “Do ordinary objects exist?” (of course they do); the metaphysically interesting question is, “Are ordinary objects fundamental?” Schaffer argues that they are not.
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