Scientific Explanation

by

Joseph Pitt, Steven Mischler

• LAST MODIFIED: 30 March 2017
• DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0339

Introduction

The modern search for an adequate general theory of explanation is an outgrowth of the logical positivist’s agenda: to lay the groundwork for a general unified theory of science. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, cited under the Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation) was the first major attempt to put forth an account that met the positivist’s criteria. It initiated a lively debate that has continued up to the present. But as the attention of the philosophers of science became increasingly focused on the individual sciences, it quickly became clear that one general theory of explanation would not do since the particulars of the various sciences called for different accounts of what constituted an adequate explanation in physics and biology as well as chemistry, etc. This article attempts to capture the flavor of the debates and the nature of the shifting targets over the years. It does not profess to be complete, being largely restricted to work published in English, but it is a start. While the modern debates surrounding explanation can be said to begin with Hempel and Oppenheim, the history of philosophical accounts of explanation can be traced at least to Aristotle, whose metaphysics set the logical framework for explanations until Galileo urged that appeals to metaphysical categories be replaced by mathematics and measurement. For the most part, Galileo was not interested in appealing to causes or occult forces. The account of how things behaved was to be expressed in the language of mathematics. Descartes tried to capitalize on that insight with his resurrection of medieval discussions of causation relying on Aristotle’s framework framed in a mathematical physics, only to be countered by Newton, who introduced non-Aristotelian causal explanation grounded in mathematical physics. Finally John Stuart Mill begins the long march to contemporary accounts of causal explanation in both the physical and the social sciences, again relying on certain key assumptions about human nature. So the history of explanation is long and intertwined with a variety of metaphysical frameworks. The Positivists of the 20th century unsuccessfully eschewed metaphysics and sought to create an account of causal explanation that somehow aimed to stick strictly to the dictates of science, only to be thwarted by the metaphysical assumptions in the sciences themselves.

Introductions and Overviews

A range of books, articles, and encyclopedic entries are included here to introduce readers to the topic of scientific explanation. Hempel 1965 and Popper 1959 are introductory in the sense that these works have been at the center of the discussion of explanation since the 1960s. Familiarity with these works is required reading for engaging in philosophical discussion of explanation. Nagel 1961 is written as an introductory text, but it does not limit itself to surveying topics. Ruben 1990 and Okasha 2002 specifically aim to provide overviews for nonspecialists. Salmon 1989, Woodward 2014, and Skow 2016 provide overview accounts aimed at specialists. These overviews also contain rich bibliographies. Finally, Cartwright provides a historical survey of the role of the idea of explanation as opposed to other overviews that recount the various accounts of explanation.

• Cartwright, Nancy. “From Causation to Explanation and Back.” In The Future for Philosophy. Edited by Brian Leiter, 230–245. Oxford: Clarendon, 2004.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Cartwright examines the history of the philosophical project of explicating the notion of scientific explanation and how the field has changed to focus on the notion of causation. An undercurrent of Cartwright’s paper is that the influence of logical positivism had philosophers focusing on the linguistic relations present in scientific theories while purposively dismissing talk of causation as unsavory metaphysical speculation.

  Find this resource:

• Hempel, Carl G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press, 1965.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This book includes a number of Hempel’s influential papers in the philosophy of science, making it a useful volume for studying the issues of philosophy of science in general. Relevant here, the last section of essays is focused specifically on scientific explanation. Here Hempel addresses conceptual questions regarding explanation. He also develops and defends his own view of explanation (the influential deductive-nomological model).

  Find this resource:

• Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Nagel’s book provides a clearly written starting point. Nagel traces the history of contemporary problems and examines a number of cases studies, including a chapter-length treatment of logical problems of Newtonian mechanics. The latter half of the book examines issues regarding explanation in the special and social sciences.

  Find this resource:

• Okasha, Samir. Philosophy of Science: A Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

  DOI: 10.1093/actrade/9780198745587.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Witten for nonspecialists, Okasha’s book serves as a clear and brief primer on important topics in the philosophy of science, including scientific explanation, which is covered in the third chapter.

  Find this resource:

• Popper, Karl. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1959.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Popper’s text is a classic and serves as a useful starting point for investigation into the nature of explanation as well as other important issues in the philosophy of science.

  Find this resource:

• Ruben, David-Hillel. Explaining Explanation. New York: Routledge, 1990.

  DOI: 10.4324/9780203169308Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Ruben provides an accessible introduction to the subject. Much of the first chapter sets out useful distinctions and analyses of the concept of explanation. Later chapters engage the ancient and contemporary history of thought on explanation. A second edition was published in 2012.

  Find this resource:

• Salmon, Wesley C. Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Salmon provides a history of philosophical discussion of scientific explanation from 1948 through 1988, replete with an extensive bibliography for each decade. The book is divided into four main sections, each treating a decade of discussion. The first two sections focus on the rise and fall of the deductive-nomological model, while the third and fourth sections detail the rise of competing models of explanation as well as an examination of related philosophical questions, such as the relationship of explanation to argument and description.

  Find this resource:

• Skow, Bradford. “Scientific Explanation.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. Edited by Paul Humphreys, 524–543. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Skow’s entry is a short introduction to the topic that pays close attention to recent developments in the field. The entry is aimed at students and specialists.

  Find this resource:

• Woodward, James. “Scientific Explanation.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2014.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  An entry from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The entry provides an overview of the history and development of the main positions regarding the philosophy of scientific explanation. The entry includes a bibliography.

  Find this resource:

Anthologies

Each collection listed includes foundational works and discussions that have shaped the trajectory of the topic. Pitt 1988 and Ruben 1993 collect often discussed and cited works from well-known philosophers in the field. Knowles 1990 includes a wider range of papers that deal with explanation in the special sciences.

• Knowles, Dudley, ed. Explanation and Its Limits. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  An accessible collection of essays that covers a range of topics, including how explanation is treated by practitioners in a range of different scientific disciplines such as physics, biology, psychology, and the social sciences. This volume also includes a section that asks a number of questions about the study of explanation, including its relation to traditionally nonscientific areas of human life. Key authors include David Papineau, Elliot Sober, Richard Swinburne, and James Woodward.

  Find this resource:

• Pitt, Joseph C., ed. Theories of Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Collected here are several essays that clearly articulate key positions in the theory of explanation as well as a helpful introduction by the editor. Some key authors include Peter Railton, Bas van Fraassen, Wilfred Sellars, and Michael Friedmen.

  Find this resource:

• Ruben, David-Hillel, ed. Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This volume includes notable contributions to the literature of scientific explanation from a wide range of authors, including Wesley Salmon, David Lewis, James Woodward, and Jaegwon Kim.

  Find this resource:

Historical Accounts of Explanation

This section highlights the historical influences on the discussion of scientific explanation in the 20th century. Though undoubtedly many influences can be cited, works are listed by Aristotle (Aristotle 1994), Isaac Newton (Newton 1999), René Descartes (Descartes 1985), David Hume (Hume 1975), Immanuel Kant (Kant 2004), and John Stuart Mill (Mill 2014). These figures are towering with respect to the study of scientific explanation. In particular, Aristotle and Hume have shaped discussion regarding scientific knowledge as deductive in character and fostering an extreme skepticism regarding metaphysical causation, respectively. Contemporary articles that often mix historical-interpretive work with application of historical text to contemporary debate are cited in the next section.

• Aristotle. Posterior Analytics. 2d ed. Translated by Jonathan Barnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Aristotle’s most vivid remarks on scientific knowledge and explanation. Aristotle famously suggests that scientific knowledge is deductive in character.

  Find this resource:

• Descartes, René. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Vol. 1. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugland Murdoch. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy lays the foundation for Descartes account of scientific explanation and is a clear account of modern mechanism.

  Find this resource:

• Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Revised by Peter Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon, 1975.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Book 1 lays out Hume’s particular brand of empiricism. In Part 3, Hume discusses scientific knowledge and the necessity of causation, which has greatly shaped contemporary discussion of these issues.

  Find this resource:

• Kant, Immanuel. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Translated by Michael Friedman. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

  DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511809613Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Though notoriously difficult to penetrate, this text does provide an account of Kant’s clearest philosophical engagement with the natural sciences of his day.

  Find this resource:

• Mill, John Stuart. The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill: VIII; System of Logic; Ratiocinative and Inductive. Edited by John M. Robson. London: Routledge, 2014.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Aspects of Mill’s A System of Logic contain a forerunner to causal accounts of scientific explanation. Mill also has much to say about the development of scientific knowledge and does so by examining the figures of the scientific revolution.

  Find this resource:

• Newton, Isaac. The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Translated by I. B. Cohen and A. Whitman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Many contemporary discussions of explanation make liberal use of Newton’s work in the Principia; as such, the whole is a valuable resource for work in the philosophy of science quite generally. In Book 3 Newton lays out “Rules for the Study of Natural Philosophy,” which comment on the nature of scientific knowledge.

  Find this resource:

Contemporary Analysis of Historical Accounts of Explanation

This section lists contemporary discussion of many of the figures in the previous section. Wilson 1969a, Wilson 1969b, Wilkins 1970, and Broady 1972 discuss various aspects of Aristotle’s account of scientific explanation and apply the results to current debates in explanation then current. Lange 2013 and Miller 2015 discuss current controversies in analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science (with an emphasis on explanation) in concert with a historical reading of Hume on scientific explanation. Finally, Friedman 2013 offers a commentary on Kant’s metaphysical foundations, which the author recently translated.

• Broady, B. A. “Towards an Aristotelian Theory of Scientific Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 39.1 (1972): 20–31.

  DOI: 10.1086/288406Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Broady argues that Aristotle both anticipated and provided solutions for problems with the covering-law/deductive-nomological models of explanation. The solutions are given a modern reading and applied to contemporary problems.

  Find this resource:

• Friedman, Michael. Kant’s Construction of Nature: A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

  DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139014083Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Friedman provides a contemporary reading of Kant’s major work. He engages with substantive philosophical issues in relation to Kant in in the philosophy of science in general. While these two texts (Kant’s and Friedman’s) do not directly deal with explanation, these texts are useful for understanding Kant’s contribution to the philosophy of science and offer an alternative to the empiricist programs, which dominated much of 20th-century discussion.

  Find this resource:

• Lange, Mark. “Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws.” Philosophical Studies 164.1 (2013): 255–261.

  DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-0001-xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Many philosophers of science argue that Hume’s account of natural laws cannot play a role that natural laws are supposed to in theories of scientific explanation. That is, Humean laws are explanatorily inadequate. Lange’s paper provides a discussion of the history of this debate and argues that recently proposed solutions to this problem face a version of the challenge from explanatory inadequacy.

  Find this resource:

• Miller, Elizabeth. “Humean Scientific Explanation.” Philosophical Studies 172.5 (2015): 1311–1332.

  DOI: 10.1007/s11098-014-0351-7Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Miller’s paper is a response to the style of objection offered by Lange. She argues that Humeans have three strategies for responding to charges of explanatory inadequacy—all of which have various broader implications for the Humean view about natural laws and that view’s relation to discussions in metaphysics.

  Find this resource:

• Wilkins, Burleigh T. “Aristotle on Scientific Explanation.” Dialogue 9.3 (1970): 337–355.

  DOI: 10.1017/S0012217300028961Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Wilkins provides an in-depth analysis of Aristotle’s view on scientific explanation. Much of the focus of the article is given to important passages from Posterior Analytics.

  Find this resource:

• Wilson, Fred. “Explanation in Aristotle, Newton, and Toulmin: Part 1.” Philosophy of Science 36.3 (1969a): 291–310.

  DOI: 10.1086/288258Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Wilson’s two-part essay explores the nature of scientific explanation as science changed from having a broadly Aristotelian character to that of classical mechanics. Explanation as having a deductive character is defended on historical grounds with reference to major events in the history of science.

  Find this resource:

• Wilson, Fred. “Explanation in Aristotle, Newton, and Toulmin: Part 2.” Philosophy of Science 36.3 (1969b): 400–428.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  The second portion of Wilson’s two-part essay on the topic.

  Find this resource:

The Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation

The deductive-nomological model of explanation (DN) was borne out of the influence of the logical positivist movement. For the positivists, the study of metaphysics was essentially an exercise in uttering nonsense, which was to be rejected so that philosophers could focus on analytic postulates (which could, in principle, be empirically verified). Thus, philosophers began to focus on the study of language. Philosophers concerned with explanation began to treat explanation as a linguistic phenomenon. What is it to give a genuine or satisfying explanation? For Hempel, a genuine explanation takes the form of a deductive argument in which a major premise is a natural-scientific law statement. Hempel and Oppenheim 1948 and Hempel 1965 are the foundational works with respect to this view. The author of Bromberger 1966 is an early critic of the view, developing the asymmetry objection. Other critical discussion of this model has focused on how it is able to address statistical regularities as well as individual chance events; Salmon 1971 develops the most well-known objection on this score, dubbed the irrelevance objection. Railton 1978 and Railton 1981 revived the view and developed a strategy for the view to account for probabilistic phenomena. Gluck and Gimbel 1997 argues that Railton’s version of the DN model ends up suffering a number of the same problems as Hempel’s original model. Additionally, there has been intense discussion regarding this model’s application to the special sciences, biology in particular, in which the notion of law diverges from the familiar definitions found in physics (Pearce and Rantala 1985, Mitchell 1997, and Woodward 2000).

• Bromberger, Sylvain. “Why Questions.” In Mind and Cosmos: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Edited by R. Colodny, 86–111. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Bromberger develops a line of objection known as the asymmetry objection. The essential idea is that we intuitively expect certain causal features of a particular case to factor into an explanation over other features. The deductive-nomological model appears to treat two differently ordered causal explanations as genuine explanations, despite our intuitions to the contrary. The view developed here is a forerunner for the pragmatic model of explanation and is among the first to maintain that explanations are not arguments.

  Find this resource:

• Gluck, Stuart, and Steven Gimbel. “An Intervening Cause Counterexample to Railton’s DNP Model of Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 64.4 (1997): 692–697.

  DOI: 10.1086/392579Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Gimbel and Stuart argue that the DNP suffers from a family of traditional objections to the deductive-nomological argument, namely those involving intervening causes; similar to the irrelevance line of objection noted above.

  Find this resource:

• Hempel, Carl G., and Paul Oppenheim. “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 15.2 (1948): 135–175.

  DOI: 10.1086/286983Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This is generally taken to be the first paper that makes explicit the deductive-nomological model of explanation. The essential ideas are sketched out and defended, namely that an explanation takes the form of a deductive argument in which a major premise cites a statement of natural law.

  Find this resource:

• Hempel, Carl G. “Aspects of Scientific Explanation.” In Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. By Carl G. Hempel, 331–496. New York: Free Press, 1965.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Published nearly two decades after “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” this is the definitive presentation of the deductive-nomological model. Hempel examines what statistical explanations would look like according to this model.

  Find this resource:

• Mitchell, Sandra D. “Pragmatic Laws.” Philosophy of Science 64.Suppl. (1997): S468–S479.

  DOI: 10.1086/392623Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  There is considerable controversy regarding the nature of laws of nature in relation to the special sciences (e.g., biology, chemistry). Mitchell argues that the laws of biology, though much more contingent than the laws of physics, count as lawful. Thus, there is no special problem for biology and other special sciences under the deductive-nomological model.

  Find this resource:

• Pearce, David, and Veikko Rantala. “Approximative Explanation Is Deductive-Nomological.” Philosophy of Science 52.1 (1985): 126–140.

  DOI: 10.1086/289226Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Pearce and Rantala offer a defense of the deductive-nomological model as it relates to scientific theory change. The authors show that if scientific theory change is a matter of approximate reduction from an earlier to a current theory, the change in theory is best explained as a nomological deduction. The authors use the change from classical mechanics to special relative mechanics as an illustration.

  Find this resource:

• Railton, Peter. “A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation.” Philosophy of Science 45.2 (1978): 206–226.

  DOI: 10.1086/288797Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Railton develops what he calls the deductive-nomological-probabilistic (DNP) model of explanation. He also responds to criticisms of the deductive-nomological model, especially in regard to statistical explanation. He argues that probabilistic events point to real indeterministic laws that obtain independent of our epistemic position. Thus, probabilistic events can be explained deductively alleviating traditional problems with the deductive-nomological model.

  Find this resource:

• Railton, Peter. “Probability, Explanation, and Information.” Synthese 48.2 (1981): 233–256.

  DOI: 10.1007/BF01063889Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Railton introduces the notion of an “ideally explanatory text” to the DNP model. The ideal explanatory text is that which is true and explains every aspect of that which is to be explained. A main contention here is that ordinary scientific explanations, when they include genuinely explanatory information, illuminate part of a larger explanatory story.

  Find this resource:

• Salmon, Wesley C. “Statistical Explanation.” In Statistical Explanation & Statistical Relevance. Edited by Wesley C. Salmon, 29–88. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Salmon raises the irrelevance line of objection against the deductive-nomological model. Essentially, features irrelevant to the explanation of some phenomena can be cited in the explanatory argument and the model will still count the explanation as genuine. Salmon gives his well-known male pregnancy example here.

  Find this resource:

• Woodward, James. “Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51.2 (2000): 197–254.

  DOI: 10.1093/bjps/51.2.197Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Woodward argues that many generalizations in the special sciences fail to count as lawful. Yet, Woodward argues that such generalizations regularly factor into what we take to be meaningful or genuine explanations. If this is right, there is a special problem for the special sciences and the deductive-nomological model of explanation.

  Find this resource:

The Statistical Relevancy Model of Explanation

The statistical relevance model of explanation was born out of problems with Hempel’s treatment of statistical explanation. Salmon notes that an essential feature of Hempel’s account of statistical explanation is the expectation of lawful occurrences. The goal of statistical explanation is, essentially, to show that some event was to be expected given the laws posited by a theory. This focus on explaining singular events is the focus of several challenges to Hempel’s views. Jeffrey 1969 and Greeno 1970 explicitly challenge Hempel on this score and are forerunners to Salmon 1971, which gives a treatment of statistical explanation. Salmon forcefully argues that Hempel’s model simply cannot account for statistical irrelevancies, which is in some sense tied to Salmon’s insistence that explanations are not arguments. For example, one might explain the fact that John, a male human being, has not gotten pregnant by offering the following explanation: One is unlikely to become pregnant if one takes birth control pills. John has been taking birth control pills. The taking of birth control pills, then, explains John’s not being pregnant. There is something intuitively suspicious about this example, namely that taking birth control is irrelevant to why John is not pregnant. Yet, this case is treated as offering a genuine example on Hemple’s view. Salmon argues, citing cases such as this, in which statistical explanation must account for statistical relevance relationships. Spirtes, et al. 2000 offers a rigorous mathematical account of how statistics explain, while Cartwright 1979 offers a critical take on Salmon’s account.

• Cartwright, Nancy. “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies.” Noûs 13 (1979): 419–437.

  DOI: 10.2307/2215337Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Cartwright’s paper provides criticisms of the statistical relevance model. Her main argument is that even when relevance conditions are factored into an explanation we cannot say with any degree of certainty that some event A is directly related to the occurrence of a later event B. Cartwright’s paper is part of a broader view that rejects the idea that causal explanation can be reduced to statistical explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Greeno, James. “Evaluation of Statistical Hypotheses Using Information Transmitted.” Philosophy of Science 37 (1970): 279–294.

  DOI: 10.1086/288301Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Greeno argues that the real test of a scientific theory is that it be able to explain the likelihood of some event occurring rather than whether it can explain a single occurrence of some event. In general, Greeno challenges the idea that science must focus on singular explanation by appeal to general laws.

  Find this resource:

• Jeffrey, Richard C. “Statistical Explanation vs. Statistical Inference.” In Esssays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. Edited by Nicholas Rescher, 104–113. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1969.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Jeffrey argues that Hempel’s model of statistical explanation fails to be explanatory because it is not inferential. Some remarks are offered on the nature of what makes statistical information informative.

  Find this resource:

• Salmon, Wesley C., ed. Statistical Explanation & Statistical Relevance. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Salmon’s volume includes new work and reprints a number of important papers commenting on statistical explanation. The collected papers both criticize positions on statistical relevance, especially those explicating Hempel’s model, and offer distinct models of statistical explanation. Salmon’s own essay in the collection, “Statistical Explanation,” (Salmon 1971, cited under the Deductive-Nomological Model of Explanation) is an influential text as it both poses a serious problem for Hempel’s statistical model of explanation—the problem of irrelevant factors—and proposes the statistical relevance model of explanation as an alternative.

  Find this resource:

• Spirtes, Peter, Clark N. Glymore, and Richard Scheines. Causation, Prediction, and Search. 2d ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2000.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Originally published in 1993. Chapter 3 presents a mathematically rich discussion of the relationship between causation and statistical explanation. The discussion casts doubt on the notion that statistical relevance relations can account for causation.

  Find this resource:

The Causal-Mechanical Model of Explanation

The causal-mechanical model is borne out of attempts to resolve problems generated by the statistical relevance model, namely that statistical relevance relations are not robust enough to explain the occurrence of particular events. Wesley Salmon, having rejected the statistical relevance model, helped to develop the causal mechanical model. As such, Salmon 1984 is careful to employ a notion of causation that is as metaphysically innocuous as possible. A key idea is that of a causal marker. In essence the idea is counterfactual in kind. One can test for and detect causal processes by modifying A in such a way that A’s modification is easily identified at later stages. Once these markers are identified they constitute information relevant to explaining why some event occurred. Thus, explanations are given once a causal-mechanical process has been sufficiently tracked. Much of the earlier discussion of this model has focused on the marker view of causation and whether that model can do the appropriate work. Woodward 1989 offers some early criticism of Salmon’s view. Lewis 2000 and Salmon 1994 address, in particular, the issue of the counterfactual account of causation. Dowe 1992 and Hitchcock 1995 offer alternative accounts of the notion of causal process. Salmon 1997 is a reply to these papers. Woodward 2003, Strevens 2008, and Clarke 2016 advance the discussion of casual explanation, often significantly diverging from Salmon’s original account.

• Clarke, Christopher. “The Explanatory Virtue of Abstracting Away from Idiosyncratic and Messy Detail.” Philosophical Studies 173.6 (2016): 1429–1449.

  DOI: 10.1007/s11098-015-0554-6Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Clarke argues against the idea that the more an explanation can be presented as an abstraction from particular phenomena, the better it is. He draws on examples from various sciences to show that the more abstract an explanation, the less understanding there is.

  Find this resource:

• Dowe, Philip. “Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory.” Philosophy of Science 59.2 (1992): 195–216.

  DOI: 10.1086/289662Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Here Dowe provides a number of arguments that challenge Salmon’s notion of a causal process. Among the challenges are that Salmon’s arguments are circular and that the view does not adequately address the “no hidden powers” skepticism Hume has toward causality and natural laws. Dowe also develops the Conserved Quantity account causal processes.

  Find this resource:

• Hitchcock, Christopher Read. “Salmon on Explanatory Relevance.” Philosophy of Science 62.2 (1995): 304–320.

  DOI: 10.1086/289858Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Hitchcock’s is another paper critical of Salmon’s early formulation of the causal-mechanical model. Salmon has long held the view that many theories of explanation, especially the deductive-nomological model, fail to screen out irrelevant information. Hitchcock argues that Salmon’s causal-mechanical model succumbs to a problem regarding irrelevancies. Hitchcock also argues that many of the problems the causal-mechanical model suffers are related to problems that 18th-century theorists, such as Hume, also faced.

  Find this resource:

• Lewis, David. “Causation as Influence.” The Journal of Philosophy 97.4 (2000): 182–197.

  DOI: 10.2307/2678389Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Here Lewis develops and defends a counterfactual theory of causation. He defends this view in light of criticisms advanced by Woodward, Dowe, and Salmon.

  Find this resource:

• Salmon, Wesley C. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This is Salmons first definitive statement of the causal-mechanical model of explanation. Here he embraces and develops the idea of “causal marks” and shows how tracing causal marks is explanatorily powerful. Here he also introduces a way to distinguish genuine casual processes from pseudo causal processes. The first half of Salmon’s book includes a discussion of the history of explanation and poses several critical objections to rival theories, including the deductive-nomological model and the unification model.

  Find this resource:

• Salmon, Wesley C. “Causality without Counterfactuals.” Philosophy of Science 61.2 (1994): 297–312.

  DOI: 10.1086/289801Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Salmon responds to a number of criticisms of the causal mechanical model. The main focus of this paper is to respond to the problems related to his theory of causation being a counterfactual theory. An alternative view is advanced and defended.

  Find this resource:

• Salmon, Wesley C. “Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critiques.” Philosophy of Science 64.3 (1997): 461–477.

  DOI: 10.1086/392561Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  In this paper Salmon recasts the causal-mechanical model to address a number of the criticisms raised by Dowe 1992 and Hitchcock 1995. An important outcome of the paper is Salmon’s rejection of the causal mark view of causal process in favor of something more similar to Dowe’s conserved quantity view.

  Find this resource:

• Strevens, Michael. Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Strevens advances an account of causal explanation that focuses on idealizing or abstracting away from particular events to create models that contain only the relevant causal information. Strevens argues that this model for explanation solves and sidesteps a number of problems associated with the causal-mechanical model.

  Find this resource:

• Woodward, James. “The Causal Mechanical Model of Explanation.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (1989): 359–389.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Woodward provides an early critique of Salmon’s theory. Two prominent criticisms include a challenge to an orthodox commitment to universality of the logic of explanation and whether the counterfactual account Salmon offers is robust enough to do the work Salmon hopes it will.

  Find this resource:

• Woodward, James. Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Woodward’s view of explanation makes heavy use of the manipulationist account of causation. The key idea of this family of views is that causation ought to be understood in terms of the variables that we can control. Important to Woodward’s view is the idea of interventionist counterfactuals. The idea is that if A is a genuine cause of B, then one can manipulate B as a result of changing A. Woodward advances a view of explanation along these lines. Much of the book discusses the theory’s application in a broad range of sciences. The book also takes aim at unification theories of explanation.

  Find this resource:

Contemporary Mechanical Explanation

So-called new mechanism is a recent philosophical development in the philosophy of science, particularly in the philosophy of biology, that includes a distinct account of explanation. New mechanism suggests that phenomena are the result of the operations of component parts that produce causal regularities. As such, an explanation explains when it is given in terms of the various underlying mechanisms causing the phenomenon. Machamer, et al. 2000 offers a foundational account of new mechanism. Woodward 2002 offers a counterfactual account of mechanism, while Levy 2013 surveys various mechanistic commitments in the literature. Much of the discussion of new mechanism and explanation is bound up with discussions of models and various other resources scientists employ to give explanations. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 offers an account of mechanistic explanation that hues closely to the sort of explanations scientists give, while Craver 2006 focuses on how mechanistic models explain. Weiskof 2011 and Nicholson 2012 apply the general mechanistic commitments to psychology and biology, respectively. Weiskof in particular is skeptical about whether mechanistic explanation will help us understand psychological phenomena.

• Bechtel, William, and Adele Abrahamsen. “Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36.2 (2005): 421–441.

  DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.010Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Bechtel and Abrahamsen aim to show the difference between traditional accounts of explanation, like the DN model, and mechanistic explanation. They argue against the prevailing idea that linguistic representations have a privileged status as explanations and argue that scientists frequently employ nonlinguistic representations, such as diagrams and models, to do the work of explaining.

  Find this resource:

• Craver, Carl F. “When Mechanistic Models Explain.” Synthese 153.3 (2006): 355–376.

  DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9097-xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Carver surveys the various types of models one might encounter when engaging in various scientific research and notes that not all models explain. From this Carver develops a criteria for how to judge a model’s explanatory power and, in turn, uses this to develop an account of how mechanistic models explain.

  Find this resource:

• Levy, Arnon. “Three Kinds of New Mechanism.” Biology and Philosophy 28.1 (2013): 99–114.

  DOI: 10.1007/s10539-012-9337-zSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Levy argues that philosophers working in new mechanism often confuse or are unclear about the various commitments they hold, which has the potential to generate superficial philosophical problems. Levy outlines three central philosophical commitments of new mechanism and clearly shows how these commitments interact with one another in the literature.

  Find this resource:

• Machamer, Peter, Lindley Darden, and Carl F. Craver. “Thinking about Mechanisms.” Philosophy of Science 67.1 (2000): 1–25.

  DOI: 10.1086/392759Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  The authors advance a definition of mechanism and show that such an account of mechanism can be put to work to offer new solutions to long-standing problems in the philosophy of science, including adjudicating problems with explanation. This is the article to start with regarding new mechanism.

  Find this resource:

• Nicholson, Daniel J. “The Concept of Mechanism in Biology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43.1 (2012): 152–163.

  DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.05.014Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Nicholson’s paper both traces the history of the philosophical treatment of mechanism in biology and gives a critical assessment of the distinct concepts of mechanisms that philosophers typically discuss. This is an especially useful piece to turn to after becoming familiarized with some of the main currents of new mechanism.

  Find this resource:

• Weiskof, Daniel A. “Models and Mechanisms in Psychological Explanation.” Synthese 183.3 (2011): 313–338.

  DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9958-9Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Weiskof argues that while psychological explanations and models appear to be similar to the sort of mechanistic explanations given in fields like biology, the appearance is misleading. Psychological models abstract from a range of various properties and features. Much of the discussion here turns on the discussion in Craver 2006 of how to judge model’s explanatory power.

  Find this resource:

• Woodward, James. “What Is Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account.” Philosophy of Science 69.S3 (2002): S366–S377.

  DOI: 10.1086/341859Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  A central aim of Woodward in this article is to show that mechanistic explanation can be applied outside of sciences like biology to experimental scientific enterprises more generally. This is accomplished by marrying mechanistic notions with counterfactual notions, which serve to account for the predictive success of mechanistic explanations across a range of scientific domains.

  Find this resource:

Teleological Explanation

An explanation is teleological when the explanation is cast in terms of goal directedness. As such it is a common type of explanation in psychology and psychology adjacent fields. Much of the work surveyed here has its roots in the philosophy of action. As such Davidson 2008 provides a good starting point for the major issues. Sehon 1997 and Sehon 2005 defend a view that teleological explanation is irreducible to causal explanation. Reductionist accounts can be found in Peacocke 1979, Bishop 1989, and Mele 1992. The reductionist/anti-reductionist debate is present in the philosophy of psychology and is here represented by Holt 1988, which defends a reductionist account, and Valentine 1988, which defends an anti-reductionist account.

• Bishop, John. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Bishop outlines what he calls the “sensitivity strategy” to deal with deviant causal chains. In brief, that strategy suggests that an agent’s behavior must be appropriately sensitive to the content of the intention that causes the behavior. Deviant cases are explained away by noting that the behavior is not sensitive in the appropriate way.

  Find this resource:

• Davidson, Donald. Essays on Actions and Events. 2d ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 2008.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Originally published in 1980. This volume includes a number of Davidson’s essays in the philosophy of action. Of particular interest is “Freedom to Act,” which outlines the problem of deviant causal chains. Causal accounts of intentional action maintain that it is the result of an agent’s representing an action that the action occurs. Deviant causal chains show that it is possible to represent an outcome, yet have the outcome occur through accident rather than intentional action.

  Find this resource:

• Holt, D. Lynn. “Teleological Explanation: A Species of Causal Explanation.” Philosophical Psychology 1.1 (1988): 313–325.

  DOI: 10.1080/09515088808572947Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Holt argues that teleological explanation fails to genuinely account for psychological phenomena. Much of her argument turns on experimental data that shows that agents routinely misreport the reasons for their actions.

  Find this resource:

• Mele, Alfred R. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Mele responds to the problem of deviant causal chains by arguing that a notion of “guidance” can be understood in causal terms. The agents in deviant causal chains, while subject to accident, form an appropriate brain state that plays some role in achieving the desired result.

  Find this resource:

• Peacocke, Christopher A. Holistic Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Peacocke develops the idea of differential explanation, which is causal in kind and generally applied to a range of cases outside intentional action. In the case of intentional action, behavior must be the result of a differential process that starts with the content of an agent’s intention to act.

  Find this resource:

• Sehon, Scott R. “Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological Explanation.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78.2 (1997): 195–213.

  DOI: 10.1111/1468-0114.00035Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Sehon’s paper is a thorough treatment and rejection of the strategies employed by Bishop, Mele, and Peacocke.

  Find this resource:

• Sehon, Scott R. Teleological Realism. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  A central claim of the book is that our explanation of behavior is grounded in common sense psychology, which is itself grounded in teleological explanation. Sehon defends the view that causal explanation and teleological explanation can and do exist independently of one another. Defending such a view entails covering a lot of ground in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind.

  Find this resource:

• Valentine, Elizabeth. “Teleological Explanations and Their Relations to Causal Explanation in Psychology.” Philosophical Psychology 1.1 (1988): 61–68.

  DOI: 10.1080/09515088808572925Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Valentine argues in favor of teleological explanation in psychology. She suggests that causal and teleological explanations are both necessary features of psychological explanation. Further, she argues that it is a mistake to treat teleological explanation as predictive.

  Find this resource:

Historical Explanation

The methodology of historical sciences, which include such disciplines as astrophysics, evolutionary biology, geology, and paleontology, are quite different from the experimental sciences. A key difference is that the historical sciences cannot rely on experimental data since their aim is explaining events and occurrences that have long since occurred. So, then, how do these sciences purport to explain? Cleland 2002 and Cleland 2011 argue that there is a considerable difference in the sort of explanations experimental and historical sciences aim to provide. The author’s positive account of historical explanation relies on the principle of common cause. Hammer 2008 argues that experimental and historical sciences are both engaged in providing causal explanations. Wise 2011 and Currie 2014 offer accounts that depend on a notion of historical narrative.

• Cleland, Carol E. “Methodological and Epistemic Differences between Historical and Experimental Science.” Philosophy of Science 69.3 (2002): 474–496.

  DOI: 10.1086/342455Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  The focus of historical sciences is to account for past events rather than to explain regularities of event kinds. Evidence for past events is able to be collected and reconstructed, while regularities must be shown via experiment. She explains this difference as “asymmetric overdetermination” between the historical and experimental sciences and uses this notion to argue that experimental science is not more epistemically secure than historical sciences.

  Find this resource:

• Cleland, Carol E. “Methodological and Epistemic Differences between Historical and Experimental Science.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2011): 551–582.

  DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axq024Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Building on Cleland 2002, she suggests that historical explanation is rooted in the principle of common cause, which, roughly, states that improbable similarities are the product of some common event or cause (the principle traces to Reichanbach). She goes on to defend the view from common objections, typically offered in the context of the philosophy of biology.

  Find this resource:

• Currie, Adrian Mitchell. “Narrative, Mechanisms and Progress in Historical Science.” Synthese 191.6 (2014): 1163–1183.

  DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0317-xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Currie argues that historical explanation is a species of narrative explanation, in which the narrative traces a causal chain. This view is contrasted with mechanistic explanation, in which Currie ultimately argues that mechanistic explanation is not particular useful in the historical sciences.

  Find this resource:

• Hammer, Carl. “Explication, Explanation, and History.” History and Theory 47.2 (2008): 183–199.

  DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2303.2008.00446.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Hammer’s project is to provide a solution to a long-standing problem in the philosophy of science, namely what connects natural and historical scientific explanations? Hammer argues that both types of explanation are grounded in a causal account of explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Wise, Norton M. “Science as (Historical) Narrative.” Erkenntnis 75.3 (2011): 349–376.

  DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9339-2Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Wise’s paper focuses on the reliance on simulations in many of the historical sciences and how explaining from a simulation is strikingly similar to the sort of explanations given in social histories in that they both make us of narrative. Wise’s paper is a bridge between the methodologies of the “hard” sciences and the “human” sciences.

  Find this resource:

Explanation as Unification

Unification accounts of scientific explanation claim that the goal of explanation is to show how a range of phenomena are unified under various modes of argument or patterns. Friedman 1974 takes the major task of science to be to reduce the occurrence of phenomena to more fundamental phenomena. The view as developed by Philip Kitcher (Kitcher 1976, Kitcher 1981, Kitcher 1989) harkens back to the deductive-nomological model in its adherence to an argument structure and the insistence that metaphysical talk of causes is not useful when thinking about explanation. Barnes 1992 develops the asymmetry problem and Jones 1995 offers a plausible solution. Skipper 1999 argues that unification is problematic when applied to the biological sciences. Salmon 1985 and Strevens 2004 try to use insights from the unification theory to account for problems in competing views.

• Barnes, Eric. “Explanatory Unification and the Problem of Asymmetry.” Philosophy of Science 59.4 (1992): 558–571.

  DOI: 10.1086/289695Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Barnes argues, against the unification view, that it falls prey to a familiar problem of asymmetry. That is, the unification view cannot explain why two competing explanations, which evoke the same facts and features of a case, are not both explanatory.

  Find this resource:

• Friedman, Michael. “Explanation and Scientific Understanding.” The Journal of Philosophy 71.1 (1974): 5–19.

  DOI: 10.2307/2024924Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Friedman argues that a theory of scientific explanation is intimately bound up with the production of scientific understanding. He criticizes successor theories of explanation on the grounds that they fail to connect explanation to understanding. Friedman also attempts to connect reductionism to the theory of explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Jones, Todd. “How the Unification Theory Escapes from Asymmetry Problems.” Erkenntnis 43.2 (1995): 229–240.

  DOI: 10.1007/BF01128197Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Here Jones defends the unification theory against the charge that it allows for asymmetric explanations. Jones argues that the unification model has overlooked features, which allow for the view to rule out certain explanations as not genuine.

  Find this resource:

• Kitcher, Philip. “Explanation, Conjunction, and Unification.” The Journal of Philosophy 73.8 (1976): 207–212.

  DOI: 10.2307/2025559Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Kitcher provides a range of counterexamples to Friedman’s account of unification and provides a preliminary sketch of a theory of unification that avoids them.

  Find this resource:

• Kitcher, Philip. “Explanatory Unification.” Philosophy of Science 48.4 (1981): 507–531.

  DOI: 10.1086/289019Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Kitcher provides his account of the unification model. Here he introduces key concepts such as “schematic sentences,” “filling instructions,” “schematic argument,” and “general argument pattern.” These concepts are used to provide a formal account of the unification model. Kitcher shows how when this model is put to work, it avoids a range of problems that have long persisted in the theory of explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Kitcher, Philip. “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World.” In Scientific Explanation. Edited by Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, 410–505. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This paper is Kitcher’s definitive statement and defense of the unification model. Here he illustrates the differences between the unification model and other models, most notably the deductive-nomological model since both models have a focus on explanations being arguments. He also discusses the varying metaphysical commitments rival theories require to work, ultimately suggesting that unification can avoid some of the unsavory commitments.

  Find this resource:

• Salmon, Wesley. “Conflicting Conceptions of Scientific Explanation.” Journal of Philosophy 82.11 (1985): 651–654.

  DOI: 10.2307/2026421Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Salmon issues some brief remarks on how his causal model of explanation is grounded in similar considerations as Kitcher’s unification account, while also noting where their philosophical intuitions diverge.

  Find this resource:

• Skipper, Robert A. “Selection and the Extent of Explanatory Unification.” Philosophy of Science 66.Suppl. (1999): S196–S209.

  DOI: 10.1086/392725Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Skipper argues that Kitcher’s unification account runs into problems when trying to unify the biological sciences. Skipper then proposes an alternative to Kitcher’s view.

  Find this resource:

• Strevens, Michael. “The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified: Causally.” Noûs 38.1 (2004): 154–176.

  DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Strevens provides a somewhat unorthodox approach to explanation that draws on the resources of the unification account to solve a central problem with the causal account of explanation.

  Find this resource:

Pragmatic Theories of Explanation

Pragmatic theories of explanation break from traditional accounts and discussion of explanation, claiming that to give a full account of explanation one must understand the speech acts and psychological states of those who are in a position to offer explanations. As such, many of the articles here focus on the rules and norms associated with the act of giving an explanation. Central to many pragmatic accounts is the claim that to understand explanation, we must also understand the structure of why-questions, along with the contexts in which different why-questions are asked. One might offer a range of correct answers given the content of the question. For instance, some answers require information about causes, while other require information about probability, etc. In this we can see the beginnings of the critique of the pragmatic theorists of the traditional accounts of explanation. No single way to give an explanation will be the right way in all cases. Peter Achinstein (Achinstein 2010a, Achinstein 2010b) and Bas van Fraassen (van Fraassen 1980) are, historically, the two most prominent voices of this tradition. Tuomela 1980 is an early voice, examining the act of offering and requesting explanations. Kitcher and Salmon 1987, Temple 1988, and Cross 1991 offer substantial objections to the view, while De Regt and Dieks 2005 offers a contemporary revitalization of the view.

• Achinstein, Peter. Evidence, Explanation, and Realism: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010a.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This volume includes many of Achinstein’s publications on the philosophy of science. The second section, chapters 6–10, includes his work on the pragmatic theory of explanation. A general theme is skepticism of traditional models, while expanding and defending the view that the pragmatic elements are central to a working theory of explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Achinstein, Peter. The Nature of Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010b.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Originally published in 1983. Achinstein’s book is concerned with foundational questions regarding the concept of explanation. The central line of argument suggests that theories of explanation have discussed only the product of explanation and do not account for the act of explaining. The resulting positive view put forward is the “illocutionary theory of explanation,” in which explanation is best understood as both an action and an intellectual product.

  Find this resource:

• Cross, Charles B. “Explanation and the Theory of Questions.” Erkenntis 34.2 (1991): 237–260.

  DOI: 10.1007/BF00385722Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Cross raises two faults with the account in van Fraassen 1980. The first is that the theory does not include a component addressing how-questions and how to sufficiently answer such questions, which Cross sees as deeply important to the business of science. The second charge is that the theory seems to be too bound up with van Fraassen’s controversial constructive empiricist view. Cross then both develops a view that addresses how-questions and defends the view without falling back on constructive empiricism.

  Find this resource:

• De Regt, Henk W., and Dennis Dieks. “A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding.” Synthese 144.1 (2005): 137–170.

  DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-5000-4Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  De Regt and Dieks offer a contemporary version of the pragmatic theory, which engages both with the sociology and the psychology of science and more recent debates regarding scientific explanation, specifically debates regarding the unificationist and causal mechanical models. Importantly, they argue that understanding differs from explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Kitcher, Philip, and Wesley Salmon. “Van Fraassen on Explanation.” The Journal of Philosophy 84.6 (1987): 315–330.

  DOI: 10.2307/2026782Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Kitcher and Salmon provide a critique of van Fraassen’s view, suggesting that the view is faced with a problem of admitting too many explanations as genuine or satisfactory. To avoid such a problem, it is argued, van Frassen’s view would have to overcome the same set of problems traditional accounts face.

  Find this resource:

• Temple, Dennis. “The Contrast Theory of Why-Questions.” Philosophy of Science 55.1 (1988): 141–151.

  DOI: 10.1086/289421Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Temple is largely critical of the pragmatic view as developed by van Fraassen. He argues that van Fraassen’s underlying claim, that superficial grammar of “why-p?” gives way to a more complex underlying question “why p rather than q?” is not obviously true in a significant number of cases. From this, he argues that van Fraassen’s account treats why-questions no differently from traditional approaches.

  Find this resource:

• Tuomela, Raimo. “Explaining Explaining.” Erkenntnis 15.2 (1980): 211–243.

  DOI: 10.1007/BF02071512Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Toumela examines the linguistics of offering and requesting an explanation. Tuomela pays close attention to the contexts in which explanations are asked for and are given. He distinguishes between varying levels of detail required for satisfying a request for an explanation.

  Find this resource:

• van Fraassen, Bas. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This is van Fraassen’s major work that develops his constructive empiricist view, to which his theory of explanation is deeply wedded. His pragmatic theory of explanation is treated in chapter 5.

  Find this resource:

Explanation in Specific Sciences

The previous sections treat general accounts of scientific explanation. In some cases, considerations from specific scientific disciplines drive the discussion of such general accounts. This was the case with biology and the new mechanists as well as sciences like geology or paleontology in relation to historical explanation. Further, considerations from the specific sciences often formed the basis of objections to general models, as with the DN model. The aim of this section is to survey how the various general theories have been applied to specific areas of scientific inquiry. Cartwright 1983, Redhead 1990, and Clark 1990 address explanation in physics. Of particular concern is whether the DN model or a statistical model best serves physical explanation. Stemwedel 2004 and Goodwin 2007 both argue that the unification account best explains the results of both general and organic chemistry. Bechtel and Wright 2009 sketches an account of psychological explanation. Pitt 2009 discusses the relationship between scientific instruments as well as other pieces of technology influencing scientific explanation.

• Bechtel, William, and Cory D. Wright. “What Is Psychological Explanation?” In The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. Edited by John Symons and Paco Calvo, 113–130. London: Routledge, 2009.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Bechtel and Wright inquire into the nature of psychological explanation, especially as it relates to the prospect of psychological laws. The authors also develop an account of what it means to provide an adequate psychological explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Cartwright, Nancy. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Clarendon, 1983.

  DOI: 10.1093/0198247044.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Cartwright issues a book-length challenge to the traditional, deductive-nomological, view of explanation in physics. Central to her project is a discussion of the way philosophers and physicists understand the relationship between laws and the distinct phenomena laws aim to explain.

  Find this resource:

• Clark, Peter. “Explanation in Physics: Explanation in Physical Theory.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 (1990): 155–175.

  DOI: 10.1017/S1358246100005099Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Clark’s article is a direct response to Redhead 1990. He argues that a deductive-nomological model provides an ideal for physical explanation to strive toward, but ultimately a statistical model is to be preferred.

  Find this resource:

• Goodwin, William. “Scientific Understanding after the Ingold Revolution in Organic Chemistry.” Philosophy of Science 74.3 (2007): 386–408.

  DOI: 10.1086/522358Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Goodwin argues that the unification accounts of scientific explanation best account for the exponential outgrowth of knowledge resulting from Ingold’s revolution in organic chemistry. He uses this event to assess current accounts of unification in the philosophy of science.

  Find this resource:

• Pitt, Joseph C. “Technological Explanation.” In Philosophy of Technology and Engineering Sciences. Edited by Anthonie Meijers, 861–879. Handbook of the Philosophy of Science 9. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2009.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Pitt argues that in a technological explanation, there is no explanation without relating the thing to be explained to something else. This idea is elaborated by showing how artifact specific issues, such as the design, function, or structure of an artifact, can be adequately explained only by reference to the system in which they have a role.

  Find this resource:

• Redhead, Michael. “Explanation in Physics: Explanation.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 (1990): 135–154.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Redhead defends the deductive-nomological model of explanation in relation to modern physics. Along the way he discusses competing theories of explanation and shows how they come up short when applied to physics.

  Find this resource:

• Stemwedel, Janet. “Explanation, Unification, and What Chemistry Gets from Causation.” Philosophy of Science 71.5 (2004): 1060–1070.

  DOI: 10.1086/428010Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Stemwedel argues that Kitcher’s unification model of explanation has undesired results when applied to chemical explanation. In rejecting this view, Stemwedel argues that causation plays a crucial role in chemistry and argues for a causal-mechanical model of explanation.

  Find this resource:

Moral and Scientific Explanation

A final area of interest addresses whether scientific explanation bears any relation to explanation in our practical or ordinary moral lives. In particular, this section highlights work done on whether there is a relationship between moral and scientific explanation. Harman 1977 and Sturgeon 1986 hold opposite views regarding the nature of moral explanation. Harman’s view is that moral and scientific explanations are two very different modes of explanation that have two very different relations to empirical facts, while Sturgeon maintains the opposite. Leibowitz 2011 tackles the issue in a different way, suggesting that the history of moral explanation is one that is bound up with the deductive-nomological view and argues that this history has committed ethicists to adopt a rigid and stifling view of moral explanation.

• Harman, Gilbert. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press, 1977.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  The first two chapters of Harman’s book present a case for the claim that moral and scientific explanations have very different relationships with empirical evidence such that empirical evidence seems to not matter at all with respect to moral explanation. This problem has been labeled a special problem for objectivity in ethics. This is a useful starting point for those interested in explanation in ethics, as well as whether all explanations have the same form as scientific explanations.

  Find this resource:

• Leibowitz, Uri D. “Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation.” Noûs 45.3 (2011): 472–503.

  Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Leibowitz’s main claim is that many ethical theorists are committed to a version of the deductive-nomological model of explanation when constructing moral theories and that holding such a commitment has led to seemingly intractable issues in moral theory. By appealing to work on scientific explanation, he shows how ethicists could begin to adopt nondeductive methods of explanation.

  Find this resource:

• Sturgeon, Nicholas. “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 24.1 (1986): 69–78.

  DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01597.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Sturgeon’s article finds fault with the view in Harman 1977 and advances a counterposition that holds that scientific explanation and moral explanation really do share a common structure and form.

  Find this resource: