Practical Moral Skepticism

by

Anita M. Superson

• LAST REVIEWED: 15 December 2022
• LAST MODIFIED: 27 April 2017
• DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0343

Introduction

The issue of why be moral is one of the most intractable in moral philosophy. Plato is the first Western philosopher to address it extensively in The Republic. In the dialogue, Thrasymachus asserts that justice is the interest of the stronger, which he illustrates with the story of the ring of Gyges. The ring, when turned a certain way, makes its bearer invisible and thus able to escape detection when acting immorally. Glaucon challenges Socrates to demonstrate that the just life is more advantageous than the unjust life, or, that rationality requires being a moral person. In the 1600s, Thomas Hobbes addresses the skeptic who wants to be shown that every morally required action is rationally required and who understands rational action to be identified with self-interested action, or, action that best satisfies one’s desires or preferences. Hobbes develops his contractarian moral theory in the context of his attempt to defeat a self-interest based skeptic about moral action. Henry Sidgwick, in the late 1800s, argues that there are two equally compelling sets of reasons—moral and prudential—and that there is no way to adjudicate between them such that one always overrides the other. Immanuel Kant argues that reason requires that one follow duty rather than inclination even when following morality thwarts all one’s inclinations, self-interested or otherwise. David Hume believes that most of us have reasons to be moral grounded in the universal sentiment of sympathy or benevolence, but for others, such as the sensible knave, who lacks such feelings, Hume offers self-interested reasons having to do with peace of mind, reputation, and the like, and, if these be rejected, there is nothing more to say. Aristotle’s approach was similar on this last point, as he addresses his discussion of this issue to those who are already at least somewhat disposed to morality or at least not pigheaded about the arguments for following it. Since the time when these historical figures tackled the issue of why be moral, it has been largely ignored. We might extract from error theory, the view that all moral talk is false because there are no moral facts, that the practical skeptic’s challenge is moot. Recently, however, the topic of practical skepticism has garnered significant attention since 1986 when David Gauthier, in the spirit of Hobbes, proposed a self-interest based contractarian theory with an eye to defeating the skeptic who wants it to be shown that every morally required action is rationally required. This theory of rational action and choice, known as the expected utility theory, is appealed to heavily by economists and social scientists and is taken by Gauthier to be the parameter within which skepticism needs to be defeated for the reason that self-interested action is seen as action that is most in opposition to moral action. Hence, if the skeptic is successfully defeated, the moral philosopher will have defeated the worst-case scenario against morality. Some philosophers after Gauthier adhere to the Hobbesian strategy and propose different answers to the skeptic, while others propose different moral theories and in their context address skepticism, and still others challenge the way the skeptic’s position is traditionally defined. Other challenges are more indirect, aiming at the expected utility theory, the notion of self-interest as desire satisfaction, and the legitimacy of the desires that rationality dictates the agent to satisfy. An issue related to skepticism is that of the possibility of rational amoralism. The amoralist recognizes that there is a reason to act morally but denies the force of moral reasons, believing that they do not necessarily motivate. Internalists about reasons and motives, who endorse a position known as motivational internalism, deny that amoralism is a tenable position, while externalists, who deny the necessary connection between reasons and motives, insist that it is. The vast amount of literature on this debate takes the issue of skepticism to a deeper level than merely demonstrating the overridingness of moral reasons. A similar point can be made about the issue of the authority of moral reasons, or whether moral reasons necessarily bind a rational person. Demonstrating that acting in morally required ways is rationally required addresses the theoretical skeptical challenge, while demonstrating that moral reasons necessarily take on, or grip, rational agents addresses the practical skeptical challenge.

Responses to Skepticism

The Skeptic’s Challenge

The difficulty in defeating the practical skeptic has left some moral philosophers questioning whether the traditional view of the skeptic steeped in self-interest and preference satisfaction is plausible. Copp 1991 argues that self-interest based contractarianism defended by Hobbes and later by Gauthier 1986 can never succeed in defeating skepticism due to its constraints and grounding in expected utility theory. Copp 1997 goes further than Copp 1991 in arguing that there is no standpoint of reason simpliciter that would always dictate either self-interested or moral action. Finlay 2008 agrees and argues that we choose between self-interest and morality on the basis of our own preferences. Sterba 2012 finds that the traditional challenge is question-begging because the skeptic accepts only reasons of self-interest and the moralist accepts only moral reasons, and the author argues for a way to accommodate both reasons. Kavka 1984 weakens the skeptic’s demand so we can answer it; Superson 2009 strengthens it by expanding it to cover more cases of immoral action than self-interested action. Superson 2012 goes beyond Superson 2009 in proposing a more robust model of ideal rational agency than the preference-satisfaction model of the traditional skeptic that accords the privileged and the nonprivileged an equal perspective from which to ask what kind of action is rationally required. Copp 2007 examines what the skeptic’s question is really asking. Garner 2007 argues in favor of error theory, claiming that morality is fictional, as is practical skepticism.

• Copp, David. “Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism.” In Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement. Edited by Peter Vallentyne, 196–228. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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  Significant for challenging whether any self-interest based contractarian theory can defeat skepticism because of its constraints and grounding in the expected utility theory of rationality. Outlines problems with connecting the rationality of adopting a moral disposition with the acts it expresses, whether the code that emerges from agreement is a moral one and whether the argument speaks to actual person.

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• Copp, David. “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason.” In Self-Interest. Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, 86–106. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

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  Important for resurrecting Sidgwick’s view that there is no standard of Reason according to which moral reasons or self-interested reasons are always overriding. Argues that answering the why be moral question is more pressing than answering the why be self-interested question given facts about human psychology and that the former should be answered from the standpoint of self-grounded reason where one best promotes one’s values or desires.

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• Copp, David. “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp. 33 (2007): 97–130.

  DOI: 10.1353/cjp.0.0079Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Makes useful distinction about the why be moral question: (1) whether acting morally makes sense—this assumes that there are moral reasons and asks whether to follow them and (2) whether giving any weight to moral considerations makes sense—this questions the nature of moral reasons and their authority and should explain why an act is wrong. Defends the view that morality is a social code of shared standards.

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• Finlay, Stephen. “Too Much Morality.” In Morality and Self-Interest. Edited by Paul Bloomfield, 136–154. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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  Novel thesis that since morality is radically other-regarding, and self-interest has to do with one’s life going well over its course, the requirements of morality and of self-interest are too excessive and there is no clear answer as to which overrides the other. Having an all-things-considered preference for one over the other is decisive.

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• Garner, Richard. “Abolishing Morality.” In Special Issue: Moral Skepticism: 30 Years of Inventing Right and Wrong. Edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10.5. (2007): 499–513.

  DOI: 10.1007/s10677-007-9085-3Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Takes up Mackie’s error theory and argues that it is best for error theorists to abolish morality and moral language because it is fictional. At best, we have moral thoughts but not beliefs, though it is unlikely that they move us to act morally and they are too costly to our integrity to maintain because they are fictional.

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• Kavka, Gregory S. “The Reconciliation Project.” In Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics. Edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman, 297–319. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984.

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  Novel for reducing the skeptical challenge along four dimensions: audience, agent, social, object. Argues that we need not show that every morally required act is rationally required and that we need to address the puzzled ordinary person who is willing to listen. Proposes the Wider Reconciliation Project according to which it is normally prudent to be moral but sometimes rational to be moral even if not prudent.

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• Sterba, James P. Morality: The Why and the What of It. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2012.

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  Reconstrues the skeptic’s position in a way that invokes non-question-begging reasons. Defends “morality as compromise,” according to which moral reasons are seen as a compromise between egoistic or self-interested reasons that the skeptic endorses and altruistic reasons, according to which each person ought to do what best serves the overall interest of others. Morality is compromise because it includes requirements for both self-regard and a constraint on the pursuit of self-interest.

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• Superson, Anita. The Moral Skeptic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

  DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Unique in expanding the skeptic’s challenge that we demonstrate that every morally required action is in one’s self-interest to capture many more immoralities than self-interested action, especially those perpetuating women’s oppression, thereby nuancing the skepticism project to political concerns. Argues that a successful defeat of the skeptic requires demonstrating that, on grounds of consistency, one not disrespect others’ humanity by privileging oneself and one’s reasons over another and his or her reasons.

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• Superson, Anita M. “Standards of Rationality and the Challenge of the Moral Skeptic.” In Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. Edited by Sharon L. Crasnow and Anita M. Superson, 139–173. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

  DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199855469.003.0007Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Examines two models for asking and answering “Why be moral?” The Hobbesian model allows the privileged to ask why participate in a system requiring self-sacrifice; the Kantian allows the nonprivileged to ask why participate in a system that harms them. Argues for a combination and envisions a fuller model of practical reason and a robust model of ideal rational agency to inform the position of the skeptic. Novel for approaching the skeptical challenge in line with feminist aims.

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Objections to the Skeptic’s Position

Traditionally, the skeptic is defined as endorsing the expected utility theory of rational choice and action, according to which rational action is taken to be action that maximizes the agent’s expected utility, or, the satisfaction of the agent’s interests, desires, or preferences. In order to defeat the skeptic, it must be shown that practical reason dictates acting in morally required ways, even when doing so is against the agent’s self-interest, defined as maximal desire or preference satisfaction. Philosophers have challenged this theory, and if it turns out to be flawed, its failure casts doubt on whether it should be the starting point of the skeptic. Anderson 1993 challenges whether expected utility is the best theory of rational choice and action. Morse 1997 argues for a more complex view of self-interest than mere preference satisfaction. Anderson 2002 and Cudd 2002 examine whether expected utility theory is compatible with feminist aims, with Cudd arguing more favorably in support of it. Superson 2009 questions whether desires deformed by patriarchy count as rational on expected utility theory and, despite the strengths of the theory, rejects it as the skeptic’s starting point. Hampton 1993, however, stresses the importance of promoting self-interest for feminist reasons, which may be a point in favor of expected utility theory.

• Anderson, Elizabeth. Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

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  Sustained examination of the problems with the expected utility theory of rational choice. Detailed defense of a pluralistic expressive theory of value for which desiring is not the only kind of valuing. Defends the theory in terms of questioning whether certain goods can be treated as market commodities. Argues against the commodification of women’s bodies in prostitution, pornography, and surrogacy. Acknowledges the effect of the role of desires deformed by patriarchy on rational choice theory.

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• Anderson, Elizabeth. “Should Feminists Reject Rational Choice Theory?” In A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. 2d ed. Edited by Louise M. Antony and Charlotte E. Witt, 369–397. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002.

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  Detailed and thorough examination of the compatibility of expected utility theory and feminism. Favors the rhetorical version of the theory that purports to explain behavior but takes the ideal rational agent to have stereotypical male qualities. Examines pros and cons of this view of rational agency for feminism.

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• Cudd, Ann E. “Rational Choice Theory and the Lessons of Feminism.” In A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. 2d ed. Edited by Louise M. Antony and Charlotte E. Witt, 398–417. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002.

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  Detailed analysis of how feminist theory can show the usefulness of rational choice theory, despite the rejection of the latter by some feminists on the grounds that it privileges the status quo in political and social policymaking and has a masculine conception of rationality. Defends rational choice theory as a way to model ideal ways of being and social change, showing that it is not rational for women to give care unless care is reciprocated.

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• Hampton, Jean. “Selflessness and the Loss of Self.” In Altruism. Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, 135–165. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

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  Important for acknowledging that acting self-interestedly is sometimes morally required in order to avoid losing one’s self by being too self-sacrificial. Argues that morality requires service to others only when it is grounded in authentically defined preferences by one who pursues the satisfaction of one’s objective needs that all humans have and sees oneself as having intrinsic and equal value as a human being.

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• Morse, Jennifer Roback. “Who Is Rational Economic Man?” In Self-Interest. Edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, 179–206. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

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  Argues that the economists’ view of rational agency that persons act rationally by maximizing on their preferences in full knowledge of them is incomplete. Argues for a more complex view of the self that includes reflective preferences, as well as Longings, which are desires for ultimate goods defining a person. Significant for accounting for our being rational in placing appropriate weight on Longings even when they conflict with satisfying appetites.

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• Superson, Anita. The Moral Skeptic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

  DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Detailed defense of a model of rationality grounded in consistency rather than self-interest. Defines consistency as coherence between an agent’s reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory or principles the agent adopts, the agent’s reasons for acting, and the agent’s desire to be a moral person as reflected in the maxim the agent adopts. Analyzes the effect of desires deformed by patriarchy on expected utility theory and defeating skepticism.

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Amoralism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate

The amoralist recognizes that there is a reason to act morally but denies the force of moral reasons. Some internalists, called motivational internalists, believe that amoralism is not a tenable position because the amoralist is either inconceivable, irrational, or simply lacks a reason to act morally. Motivational internalists take there to be a necessary connection between moral reasons and motivation. Brink 1986 is an externalist who defends the possibility of a sincere amoralist. Internalists Korsgaard 1986 and Smith 1994, the latter responding to Brink 1986, argue against the possibility of a rational amoralist. Superson 2009 responds to Korsgaard 1986 and Smith 1994 and defends weak externalism and the possibility of a rational amoralist but argues that even if we do not defeat the amoralist, we will not have failed to defeat skepticism, because whether one is motivated by a reason is a psychological, not a philosophical, reason. Van Roojen 2010 responds to Brink 1986 and argues for a way in which rationalism is compatible with internalism, allowing for the possibility of a rational amoralist. Mumm 2015 responds to Smith 1994 and other internalists and attempts to unify the gap between internalists and externalists about the possibility of amoralism.

• Brink, David. “Externalist Moral Realism.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 Supp. (1986): 23–41.

  DOI: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01594.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Notable for acknowledging the possibility of the sincere amoralist who understands moral considerations but remains unmoved. Distinguishes three kinds of internalism: agent, appraiser, and hybrid. Defends externalism against the charge that it threatens morality by making motivation separate from moral reasons by arguing that internalism threatens morality because lacking a motivation means the agent lacks the reason.

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• Korsgaard, Christine M. “Skepticism about Practical Reason.” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 5–25.

  DOI: 10.2307/2026464Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Well-known paper defending internalism by arguing that recognizing a moral consideration entails having a motive to act on it but only for a rational agent. On this view, the amoralist is conceivable but irrational. Argues that skepticism about practical reason, or whether reason necessarily motivates, need not entail skepticism about pure practical reason, or whether there is a reason to act morally.

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• Mumm, John. “Two Functions of Moral Language.” In Motivational Internalism. Edited by Gunnar Bjӧrnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Bjӧrklund, 282–297. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

  DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0014Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Novel argument attempting to unify the gap between internalists and externalists about the possibility of amoralism. Argues that amoralists can make sincere and competent moral judgments but fail to endorse them and so fail to intend to express reactive attitudes and do not take them to have practical clout, making them illegitimate.

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• Smith, Michael. The Moral Problem. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1994.

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  Detailed defense of neo-Humean internalism that amoralists try to make moral judgments but fail because they do not understand them because they lack the appropriate motivation, like a colorblind person who knows how to use color terms but lacks the concept. Denies the possibility of a rational amoralist who understands moral reasons and remains unmoved by them.

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• Superson, Anita M. The Moral Skeptic. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

  DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195376623.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Argues against prominent internalist views by Hume, Korsgaard 1986, and Smith 1994 that we need not address the skeptic who believes that amoralism is tenable and defends a weak externalism according to which recognition of a moral reason does not necessarily motivate. Important for arguing that failure to defeat the amoralist does not mean failure to defeat skepticism.

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• Van Roojen, Mark. “Moral Rationalism and Rational Amoralism.” Ethics 120 (2010): 495–525.

  DOI: 10.1086/652302Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Responds to the concern in Brink 1986 that a rational amoralist is possible. Argues for a way in which rationalism, the view that the requirements of ethics are requirements of practical reason, is compatible with internalism, the view that moral judgments necessarily motivate, in the face of cases of rational amorality and immorality. Is novel for employing Frege’s Puzzle to show the possibility of not acknowledging moral demands while being rational.

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Authority of Moral Reasons

The authority of moral reasons refers to the categoricity or bindingness of moral reasons. While the issue of practical moral skepticism is about demonstrating the rational requiredness of moral reasons, the issue of the authority of moral reasons is about the “grippedness” of moral reasons, or the way they “take” on our reason; it explains their force. Thus it speaks to the practical side of the why be moral issue. It is a separate issue from motivational internalism, which is the view that reasons for action, including moral reasons, necessarily motivate, at least under certain conditions. The issue of the authority of moral reasons lies with explaining exactly what their force is, locating its source, and showing why moral reasons are special because they have it. Korsgaard 1997 follows Kant and grounds the authority of morality in reflection and our identity as part of humanity. Brink 1992 and Copp 2010, both skeptical about the authority of moral reasons, ground it in rationality such that failure to consider moral reasons is irrational. Brink 1997 distinguishes inescapability, authority, and supremacy of moral reasons and argues that moral reasons are no more special than reasons of prudence. Dreier 2001 believes that moral reasons are not authoritative but that the form of instrumental reasoning is, and the author locates it in what he calls “acceptance” of an argument form. Hampton 1998, in a book the author almost finished before her death, likens the authority of a reason to its compellingness but in the end finds the idea mysterious.

• Brink, David O. “A Puzzle about the Rational Authority of Morality.” Philosophical Perspectives 6 (1992): 1–26.

  DOI: 10.2307/2214236Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Outlines four individually plausible claims about the rational authority of morality that are mutually inconsistent. Useful for explaining the rational authority of morality as there being a reason to behave in accordance with moral norms such that failure to do so is pro tanto irrational. Rejects Foot’s argument comparing the norms of etiquette to those of morality and defends an externalist response that moral norms are more intimately related to people’s important interests than etiquette.

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• Brink, David O. “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy.” In Ethics and Practical Reason. Edited by Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, 255–291. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

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  Useful distinction and discussion of the difference between the inescapability, authority, and supremacy of moral requirements as categorical imperatives. Argues that, for Kant, the imperatives of categorical prudence may override the reasons of categorical impartiality, or, morality: one has reason to promote one’s own rational agency as well as reason to promote agency impartially.

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• Copp, David. “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness.” In A World without Values. Edited by Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, 141–164. Philosophical Studies Series 114. New York: Springer, 2010.

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  Important for examining accounts of the authority of moral reason offered by Mackie, Joyce, Williams, Darwall, and Smith and for postulating “the authoritative reasons proposal,” according to which if a rational person believes he or she has a moral reason to do something, he or she is thereby motivated to do it and disposed such that were he or she to deliberate about what to do, he or she would take into account this reason as counting in favor of doing it.

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• Dreier, James. “Humean Doubts about Categorical Imperatives.” In Varieties of Practical Reasoning. Edited by Elijah Millgram, 27–47. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001.

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  Denies the categoricity of moral reasons but defends the categoricity of the form of means/ends or instrumental reasoning. Innovative view that the categoricity lies with “accepting” the argument form, which is just what it is to have a reason such that if one denies an argument form, one does not understand what it is to have a reason.

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• Hampton, Jean E. The Authority of Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

  DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511625213Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  Detailed examination of the authority of reason, which is what it means for a norm to apply to us. Argues that there are objectively authoritative norms in science, making science not as far removed from objectivist moral theories. Examines Kantian, Millian, Humean, and naturalized Kantian accounts to explain the authority of hypothetical imperatives, which is allegedly the same as the force of objective moral reasons.

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• Korsgaard, Christine M. “The Authority of Reflection.” In The Sources of Normativity. Edited by Onora O’Neill, 90–130. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

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  Important for showing that reason—having a reason to live and act—is the source of obligation which stems from our identity as human beings. Argues that our moral identity is inescapable and governs other identities that we have in terms of our social roles but that moral obligations need not always trump other reasons for action. Our autonomous, reflective nature commands us to act in ways we deem good in terms of our identity.

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