Ethical Deontology

by

Jörg Schroth

• LAST REVIEWED: 14 September 2022
• LAST MODIFIED: 15 January 2019
• DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0383

Introduction

Deontology is usually contrasted with consequentialism (and both with virtue ethics). Whereas consequentialists maintain that the right action is determined solely by its consequences, deontologists deny this and hold that the right action is not determined solely by its consequences. This characterization makes room for the important distinction between moderate deontology (or threshold deontology) and absolutism: Absolutists assert that there are exceptionless moral rules or intrinsically wrong actions that are absolutely wrong and may never be performed, whatever the consequences. Moderate deontologists reject exceptionless moral rules or absolutely wrong actions and regard all moral rules as prima facie rules. A further distinction is between agent-centered deontological theories, which focus upon agents’ duties, and patient-centered (or victim-centered) deontological theories, which focus upon people’s rights. Deontology is associated with the following features which play a more or less significant role in different deontological theories: agent-relativity, especially agent-relative constraints (restrictions), options (prerogatives) and special obligations; priority of the right over the good; definition of the right independently of the good; priority of honoring values over promoting values; intrinsically wrong actions; absolutely wrong actions and exceptionless moral rules; duty for duty’s sake; pluralism of moral rules; respect of persons; non-instrumentalization of persons; human dignity; inviolable rights. Deontologists also maintain the moral relevance of the following distinctions: positive versus negative duties, doing versus allowing (killing versus letting die; see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Doing and Allowing.”), and intention versus foresight and unintended side-effects. Famous deontological moral principles are Kant’s Categorical Imperative, the Pauline Principle (“Evil may not be done for the sake of good”), the principle of double effect (see the bibliography on Bibliographien zu Themen der Ethik) and the principle that the end does not always justify the means. Deontology can take many forms, the most important ones are Kant’s and Kantian ethics (see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Immanuel Kant: Ethics”); Ross’s and Rossian-style moral pluralism, natural law theory, and moral contractualism (see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Moral Contractualism”); libertarianism (in political philosophy); moral particularism (see the bibliography on Bibliographien zu Themen der Ethik); and principlism (in bioethics). Deontology is also often associated with ethical intuitionism (see the Oxford Bibliographies article in Philosophy “Ethical Intuitionism”) although not every deontological theory is grounded in moral intuitions.

General Overviews

There is no textbook or book-length general overview on deontology available. Even many ethics textbooks do not have a single chapter on deontology, but instead a chapter on Kant’s or Kantian ethics, and sometimes one or more additional chapters on contractualism, intuitionism, moral pluralism, or natural law theory. Alexander and Moore 2016 is a good introduction to the distinction between agent-centered and victim-centered (patient-centered) deontological theories (not dealt with in the other overviews) and to the main current controversies regarding deontology versus consequentialism. Birnbacher 2003 focuses on the comparison between monistic and pluralistic deontological theories. Hurley 2013 offers a short overview of deontology based on a particular understanding of deontology. Gaus 2001 discusses in the author’s two-part article several proposed definitions and characteristic features of deontology. F. M. Kamm is one of the most important contemporary proponents of deontology and presents in Kamm 2007 a (not always easy to read) introduction to the author’s own (victim-focused) view of deontology. Good introductions to Rossian-style deontology can be found in McNaughton and Rawling 2006 and McNaughton and Rawling 2014. Kagan 1999 goes beyond the previously mentioned overviews and offers a comprehensive but still introductory discussion of several deontological constraints (which he regards as the defining feature of deontology). Timmermann 2015 considers various characterizations of deontology and concludes that the word “deontology” is useless and should be banished.

• Alexander, Larry, and Michael Moore. “Deontological Ethics.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. 2016.

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  An up-to-date and very detailed overview of deontology with a special focus on the division into agent-centered and victim-centered (patient-centered) deontological theories. (Ross is only mentioned once in passing, and none of the many papers on deontology by David McNaughton and Piers Rawling are mentioned.)

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• Birnbacher, Dieter. “Deontologische Ethik.” In Analytische Einführung in die Ethik. By Dieter Birnbacher, 113–172. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003.

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  A very clear and detailed introduction to deontology with a special emphasis on the comparison between monistic (Kant and M. G. Singer) and pluralistic deontological theories.

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• Gaus, Gerald F. “What Is Deontology. Part One: Orthodox Views.” Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): 27–42.

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  In this two-part article, Gaus discusses several ways of characterizing deontology. The first part is mainly concerned with deontology as nonteleological, nonoptimizing, and as giving the right priority over the good.

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• Gaus, Gerald F. “What Is Deontology. Part Two: Reasons to Act.” Journal of Value Inquiry 35 (2001): 179–193.

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  In the second part, Gaus considers various attempts to distinguish deontology from teleology in terms of different reasons to act. He finally distinguishes ten ways to understand deontology and contends that each deontological theory is deontological only in some of these ways.

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• Hurley, Paul. “Deontology.” In The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, 1272–1287. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

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  In this brief introduction Hurley argues that the common feature of all deontological theories is a special class of deontological reasons which can be described as impartial but not impersonal reasons.

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• Kagan, Shelly. Normative Ethics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

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  An introduction to normative ethics almost exclusively in terms of the opposition between deontological and consequentialist (and teleological) theories. Essential reading for anyone who wants a thorough understanding of the current debate between deontology and consequentialism. Picked with ingenious arguments and written in an engaging style.

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• Kamm, F. M. “Nonconsequentialism.” In Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. By F. M. Kamm, 11–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

  DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189698.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This is not so much an overview on deontology in general as an introduction to Kamm’s own view of deontology and her (victim-focused, rights-based) defense of deontological constraints. Much more demanding than the other titles in this section.

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• McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling. “Deontology.” In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Edited by David Copp, 424–458. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

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  Very helpful overview from two authors who have co-authored many articles on deontology in which they defend a Rossian version of deontology.

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• McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling. “Deontology.” In Ethics in Practice. 4th ed. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, 37–48. Chichester, UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2014.

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  Shorter presentation of the authors’ view of deontology than in McNaughton and Rawling 2006.

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• Timmermann, Jens. “What’s Wrong with Deontology?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2015): 75–92.

  DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2015.00385.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  This paper is not so much an overview, but rather a critique of the very idea of deontology, based on an overview of different characterizations of deontology. Timmermann argues that supposedly deontological theories have nothing in common except being nonconsequentialist.

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Anthologies

There are only a few anthologies on deontology available. Darwall 2003 is a collection of classical and contemporary readings on deontology. It is the only anthology specifically intended as an introduction to deontology. Haber 1994 contains influential articles in the debate whether there are any intrinsically wrong actions that are also absolutely wrong and may not be performed whatever the consequences. Woodward 2001 is a comprehensive collection of articles on the pros and cons of the principle of double effect, which is of central importance to absolutist deontology. Hooker 2012 contains six unrelated and advanced articles on special topics of deontology. The essays in Oderberg and Laing 1997 address various topics in bioethics with the express aim of offering an alternative approach to the dominating consequentialism. Holderegger and Wolbert 2012 is a of newly written articles on historical and systematic topics in the debate between deontological and teleological ethics in theology and philosophy.

• Haber, Joram Graf, ed. Absolutism and its Consequentialist Critics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994.

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  Collection of nineteen previously published articles, most of them favoring absolutism or moderate deontology.

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• Darwall, Stephen, ed. Deontology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

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  A short but instructive introduction to the typical features of deontology is followed by five classical selections (from Kant, Price, and Ross) and seven influential selections from contemporary deontologists on constraints and agent-relativity as deontology’s underlying rationale (Robert Nozick, Thomas Nagel, and Stephen Darwall) and on the trolley problem, the doctrine of double effect and on Kant on the right to lie (Thomson, Kamm, Quinn, and Korsgaard).

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• Holderegger, Adrian, and Werner Wolbert, eds. Deontologie – Teleologie. Normtheoretische Grundlagen in der Diskussion. Fribourg, Switzerland: Academic Press Fribourg, 2012.

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  Contains seventeen newly written articles organized under four headings: concepts and distinctions; state of the art in theological ethics; philosophical positions; and areas of application. A wide-ranging collection on historical and systematic topics.

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• Hooker, Brad, ed. Developing Deontology: New Essays in Ethical Theory. Malden, MA: Wiley, 2012.

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  Although the title of this collection (without an introduction) may suggest otherwise, there is no underlying common theme in these newly written advanced essays from Elizabeth Harman, David Owens, Michael Smith, Philip Stratton-Lake, Peter Vallentyne, and Ralph Wedgwood (published also as a special issue in Ratio 24 [2011]).

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• Oderberg, David S., and Jacqueline A. Laing, eds. Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.

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  This collection of twelve newly written articles wants to break the dominance of consequentialism (and Peter Singer in particular) in bioethics by criticizing consequentialism and defending an alternative—deontological—way of doing bioethics.

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• Woodward, P. A., ed. The Doctrine of Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Moral Principle. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001.

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  The principle of double effect is a key component of absolutist deontology (especially in the natural law tradition) but highly contested and with many difficulties of interpretation. This collection gathers many influential articles and covers the whole spectrum of issues, including a section on applied ethics.

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Historical Sources of Ethical Deontology

The two main historical sources of contemporary ethical deontology are Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and the British intuitionists H. A. Prichard (1871–1947), E. F. Carritt (1876–1964), W. D. Ross (1877–1971) and C. D. Broad (1887–1971). Another historical source—less important to philosophical ethics in general, although the meanwhile widely discussed principle of double effect and most forms of absolutism are rooted in this tradition—is the Catholic natural law tradition.

Agent-relativity

Agent-relativity is often taken to be a defining feature of deontology in contrast to agent-neutral consequentialism: Agent-relative constraints prohibit that I kill someone; agent-relative options (prerogatives) allow me to pursue my own projects even if they have no agent-neutral value and even if I thereby do not maximize the good; agent relative special obligations are commitments to persons due to their relationship with me. Conceiving deontology and consequentialism in terms of agent-relativity and agent-neutrality is of relatively recent origin—the terms (but not the idea behind them) were introduced in Derek Parfits’s Reasons and Persons (1984). Meanwhile the distinction is understood (and formalized) in many different ways, which are helpfully explained in Jollimore 2001, McNaughton and Rawling 1991, and Ridge 2017. Before reading these advanced articles one should read Nagel 1986 to get an impression of why the idea of agent-relativity is so important for deontology and at the same time so difficult to make sense of. See also Constraints and the Paradox of Deontology.

• Jollimore, Troy A. “Three Accounts of Agent-Relativity.” In Friendship and Agent-Relative Morality. By Troy A. Jollimore, 117–139. New York: Garland, 2001.

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  This chapter explains, compares, and evaluates the following three accounts of agent-relativity: Amartya Sen’s relativity of permissibility, Thomas Nagel’s relativity of reasons, and David McNaughton’s and Piers Rawling’s relativity of principles. Jollimore rejects all three accounts and in the subsequent chapter defends his own “moral preferability account.”

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• McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling. “Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening Distinction.” Philosophical Studies 63 (1991): 167–185.

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  The authors evaluate the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction drawn by Nagel, Parfit, Pettit, and Sen and develop their own account of the distinction.

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• Nagel, Thomas. “Ethics.” In The View from Nowhere. By Thomas Nagel, 164–188. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.

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  Reprinted as “Agent-Relativity and Deontology” in Darwall 2003 (cited under Anthologies). A fascinating account of agent-relativity and the puzzling nature of agent-relative constraints (based on Nagel’s Tanner Lectures, published in 1980).

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• Ridge, Michael. “Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. Zalta. 2017.

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  A very helpful explanation of the various interpretations of the agent-neutral/agent-relative distinction and its relevance (Section 6: “Why the Distinction Matters”) to deontology.

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Constraints and the Paradox of Deontology

Deontological constraints (restrictions, side-constraints) are agent-relative prohibitions, which may not be violated, even if their violation would have better consequences than obeying them and even if a single violation of a constraint would minimize the total number of violations of that same constraint: You may not kill someone even if that is the only way to prevent someone from killing two. Constraints are the essential feature of deontology and account for its intuitive appeal. So much the worse that they seem to be paradoxical or irrational: if killing is morally wrong, isn’t it irrational to allow more killings to happen instead of minimizing them? This so-called paradox of deontology is widely regarded as the most serious objection to deontology and has generated a huge body of literature. To quickly get a vivid idea of what is so puzzling about constraints one should read Kagan 1989 (pp. 27–32). Kagan 1999 is the best introduction to constraints and the most accessible text. A very brief and more difficult introduction to the paradox of deontology is provided by Hurley 2013. A classic and must-read on constraints is Scheffler 1994 who set the terms for the debate with his sharp arguments against constraints. Famous (patient-based) defenses of constraints building on the value of inviolability are Kamm 1995 and Nagel 2008. Lippert-Rasmussen 1999 evaluates different accounts of why constraints are puzzling and criticizes Kamm’s and Nagel’s defense of constraints. Kamm’s defense of deontology in Kamm 2007 is essential reading for anyone seriously interested in deontology (but due to its extreme difficulty, can only be recommended to those with a very serious interest). Chappell 2014 and Heuer 2011 are two recent attempts to dissolve the paradox of deontology.

• Chappell, Timothy. “Intuition, System, and the ‘Paradox’ of Deontology.” In Knowing What To Do. Imagination, Virtue, and Platonism in Ethics. By Timothy Chappell, 60–79. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

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  According to Chappell the “paradox” is a contradiction that results from the assumptions “that it is the role of agency to produce goodness, and that it is good to respect constraints” (p. 66). The solution is to reject the first (consequentialist) assumption: although it is one role of agency to produce goodness, it is not its only role. The rationality of agency therefore need not be assessed only by the criterion of productiveness of good.

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• Heuer, Ulrike. “The Paradox of Deontology, Revisited.” In Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1. Edited by Mark Timmons, 236–267. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

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  Argues that there is no paradox resulting from the general structure of deontological constraints, because constraints involve “personal reasons” to comply with them but do not imply reasons to prevent others from violating them. But since there may be other (nonpersonal) reasons (e.g., to help someone), which may outweigh constraints and therefore allow the violation of constraints, deontology is still saddled with the problem of determining when constraints may be violated.

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• Hurley, Paul. “Paradox of Deontology.” In The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Edited by Hugh LaFollette, 3790–3794. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

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  A short and clearly written introductory article. According to Hurley, the paradox of deontology can be dissolved if one rejects the teleological theory of value.

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• Kagan, Shelly. “Constraints.” In The Limits of Morality. By Shelly Kagan, 24–32. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

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  The whole of the book is a rigorous case for consequentialism and against constraints and options. On pp. 27–32 Kagan vividly illustrates why consequentialists regard the defense of constraints as hopeless: he dismisses five attempts to justify the constraint against killing one to save two as failing to give even the beginnings of an explanation. These few pages give a vivid impression of why constraints are so widely considered to be paradoxical.

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• Kagan, Shelly. “‘Doing Harm’ and ‘Other Constraints.’” In Normative Ethics. By Shelly Kagan, 70–152. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

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  The best starting point for getting acquainted with constraints and their difficulties. A clear, rigorous, and ingenious discussion of doing harm, doing and allowing, intending harm, lying, promises, special obligations, duties to oneself, and thresholds for constraints (which are required by nonabsolutist deontological theories). Fair presentation of constraints by a consequentialist.

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• Kamm, F. M. “Inviolability.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 165–175.

  DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1995.tb00310.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  A short and reasonably accessible article, explaining how the value of (persons’) inviolability can justify constraints.

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• Kamm, F. M. Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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  One of the most important (and certainly most difficult) books on deontology. Kamm is known for her method of arguing with a painstaking analysis of lots of slightly different examples. Extremely demanding reading. Contains sixteen revised essays on various topics (including the trolley problem and the doctrine of double effect), which together amount to a forceful defense of deontological constraints.

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• Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper. “In What Way Are Constraints Paradoxical?” Utilitas 11 (1999): 49–70.

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  An advanced article that discusses different accounts (by Nozick, Scheffler, Kamm, and Nagel) of why constraints are paradoxical and criticizes Kamm’s and Nagel’s defense of constraints (in terms of the inviolability of persons).

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• Nagel, Thomas. “The Value of Inviolability.” In Morality and Self-Interest. Edited by Paul Bloomfield, 102–113. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

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  English version of a paper originally published 1994 in French. Building on Kamm’s idea of inviolability Nagel argues that the impersonal value of inviolability can justify deontological constraints (interpreted as noninstrumental rights).

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• Scheffler, Samuel. The Rejection of Consequentialism. A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions. Rev. ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

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  First edition, 1982. Scheffler was the first to systematically discuss deontological constraints. Because his sustained attack on constraints shaped the subsequent debate this book is a must-read. The revised edition contains three previously published essays which deal with objections from Foot, Bennett, and Kagan. The response to Foot in “Agent-Centred Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues” (Mind new series 94.375 (1985): pp. 409–419) is especially recommended.

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Priority of the Right over the Good

The slogan that in deontology the right is prior to the good is very popular but it has to be used with care because there is no single conception of the priority of the right. Among its different meanings are the following: The right is independent of values, the good and the pursuit of the good; the right is not defined instrumentally as the maximization of the good; the principles of the right do not presuppose principles of the good; the right constrains the good; the good is not defined independently of the right; morality is a system of categorical imperatives. The idea of the priority of the right over the good is attributed to Kant 1996 but was made prominent by Rawls 1999 when Rawls claimed that the structure of an ethical theory is determined by the definition and the relationship of the right and the good: In teleological theories, the good is defined independently of the right whereas in deontological theories the right has priority over the good because the right constrains the good and the good is not defined independently of the right. Rawls 2005 explains how the priority of the right figures in the author’s theory of justice as fairness. Kymlicka 1989 argues that there is no real issue about whether the right or the good has priority and that Rawls’s contrast between teleology and deontology in terms of the priority of the right is based on a confusion. Freeman 2007 defends and explains in detail Rawls idea of the priority of the right and argues that it is Kymlicka, not Rawls, who is confused about the distinction between teleology and deontology. Larmore 1996 argues for a different conception of the priority of the right, according to which the priority of the right means that morality is a system of categorical imperatives and is characteristic of both consequentialism/utilitarianism and deontology in contrast to the priority of the good in virtue ethics.

• Freeman, Samuel. “Utilitarianism, Deontology and the Priority of the Right.” In Justice and the Social Contract. Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy. By Samuel Freeman, 45–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

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  Originally published 1994. Extensive interpretation and clarification of Rawls’s idea of the priority of the right. Defends Rawls against Kymlicka 1989 and argues that the priority of the right must not be confused with deontology.

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• Kant, Immanuel. “The Analytic of Practical Reason. Chapter II: On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason.” In Critque of Practical Reason. By Immanuel Kant. Edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor, 186–194. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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  Originally published 1788. The locus classicus of the idea of the priority of the right where Kant asserts “that the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law . . . but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it” (p. 190). Difficult reading. Prussian Academy pagination 5:57–67.

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• Kymlicka, Will. “The Right and the Good.” In Liberalism, Community and Culture. By Will Kymlicka, 21–43. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

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  Criticizes Rawls’s distinction between utilitarianism and deontology, because according to Kymlicka, there are two forms of utilitarianism, an utterly implausible teleological one in which the good is prior to the right and a more compelling (but still implausible) nonteleological one. In nonteleological utilitarianism, the right is not defined as the maximization of the good; rather, the maximization of the good follows from each individual’s claim to equal consideration.

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• Larmore, Charles. “The Right and the Good.” In The Morals of Modernity. By Charles Larmore, 19–40. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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  Larmore argues that the priority of the right over the good does not distinguish deontology from consequentialism. The priority of the right means that morality is a system of categorical imperatives and duty is independent of the agent’s own good, and this is true of both deontology and consequentialism, and, more general, of modern ethics in contrast to ancient ethics or virtue ethics.

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• Rawls, John. “‘Classical Utilitarianism’ and ‘Some Related Contrasts.’” In A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition. By John Rawls, 19–30. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.

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  First edition 1971. In these sections from A Theory of Justice Rawls distinguishes utilitarianism as a teleological theory from his theory of “justice as fairness” as a deontological theory: in teleological theories, the good has priority over the right, in justice as fairness the right is prior to the good because it constrains the permissible conceptions of the good and is not defined as the maximization of the good.

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• Rawls, John. “The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good.” In Political Liberalism. Exp. ed. By John Rawls, 173–211. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

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  Originally published in 1988. Explains in detail the meaning and the central role of the priority of the right in “justice as fairness.” The chapter is concerned (more than Rawls 1999) with political philosophy and the conceptions of the good that are compatible with the priority of the right. Essential for understanding the priority of the right in political philosophy but not so much for understanding ethical deontology versus consequentialism.

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Honoring (versus Promoting) Values

The distinction between promoting and honoring values is a further attempt to distinguish consequentialism from deontology. It was introduced in Pettit 1991, further explained in Pettit 1997, and has been criticized by McNaughton and Rawling 1992.

• McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling. “Honoring and Promoting Values.” Ethics 102 (1992): 835–843.

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  McNaughton and Rawling reject Pettit’s approach of characterizing ethical theories in terms of the proper response to values, because on their Rossian version of deontology the right is independent from the good and our duties should not be interpreted as a response to values.

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• Pettit, Philip. “Consequentialism.” In A Companion to Ethics. Edited by Peter Singer, 230–240. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.

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  Argues that consequentialists and deontologists have different views on the proper response to values: Consequentialists think that the proper response to values is to promote them, whereas deontologists think the proper response is that agents honor values in their own lives even if this fails to promote their general realization. Pettit thinks that promoting values is more rational and results in a much simpler ethical theory.

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• Pettit, Philip. “Value Theories.” In The Consequentialist Perspective. By Philip Pettit, 92–174, 124–133. Three Methods of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997.

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  A more detailed account of the honoring/promoting-distinction.

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Forms of Deontology

Ethical deontology can take many different forms. A basic distinction is between absolutist and moderate deontology. Absolutists hold that there are some kinds of intrinsically wrong actions that are absolutely wrong—wrong in any circumstances and whatever the consequences of not performing them. Moderate deontologists deny this and hold that intrinsically wrong actions may be performed to avert sufficiently bad consequences. According to their historical roots three forms of deontology can be distinguished: Natural law theory is an absolutist deontology that goes back to Thomas Aquinas. Moral pluralism is a moderate deontology inspired by the British Intuitionists and especially by W. D. Ross. Kantian ethics can be absolutist as well as moderate and comprises Kant’s ethics and its defenders and Kant-inspired forms of deontology such as contractualism.

Deontology in Applied Ethics

Deontology in its various forms has, of course, made many important contributions to applied ethics, some examples of which are listed here. Altman 2011 shows the usefulness of Kant’s ethics to some topics in applied ethics. Beauchamp and Childress 2009 and Gert, et al. 2006 both defend a “common morality” approach to biomedical ethics, based, respectively, on four moral principles and ten moral rules. Kamm 2013 applies the author’s method of eliciting our moral intuitions through extensive use of lots of slightly modified hypothetical examples. Oderberg 2000 and some authors in Oderberg and Laing 1997 defend a natural law approach to applied ethics. Regan 1983 uses a rights based view to argue for animal rights.

• Altman, Matthew C. Kant and Applied Ethics: The Uses and Limits of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.

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  This in-depth analysis of the value of Kant’s ethics to applied ethics demonstrates that Kant’s ethics can make important contributions to many topics in applied ethics (such as animal ethics, environmental ethics, health care, patient autonomy, physician-assisted suicide, refusing life-saving treatment, organ donation, death penalty, and same-sex marriage) but is of limited use in other areas (e.g., the abortion debate and business ethics).

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• Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 6th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

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  First edition 1979. In this book—the most influential book in biomedical ethics—the authors present their four-principles approach (also called “principlism”) and argue that biomedical ethics should proceed by applying the principles of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. These principles are rooted in our “common morality” and cannot be derived from an overarching supreme principle but allow the derivation of more specific moral rules.

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• Gert, Bernard, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser. Bioethics: A Systematic Approach. 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

  DOI: 10.1093/0195159063.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  The authors defend their “common morality” approach to bioethics (and morality in general), contrast it with Beauchamp/Childress’s principlism and apply it to various topics in medical ethics (e.g., death, euthanasia, informed consent, malady, mental maladies, and paternalism). Essential to their approach are ten moral rules and a procedure for determining justified violations of these rules.

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• Kamm, F. M. Bioethical Prescriptions: To Create, End, Choose, and Improve Lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

  DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199971985.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

  A collection of twenty-seven essays by one of the foremost defenders of deontology. The essays cover a wide range of topics grouped under the headings “Death and Dying,” “Early Life,” “Genetic and Other Enhancements,” “Allocating Scarce Resources,” and “Methodology.”

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• Oderberg, David. Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.

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  Treatment of abortion, euthanasia, animal ethics, capital punishment, and war from a fierce anti-consequentialist point of view.

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• Oderberg, David S., and Jacqueline A. Laing, eds. Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.

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  This collection, aimed to challenge the dominance of consequentialism in bioethics, contains twelve newly written articles on various bioethical topics (e.g., speciesism) from a deontological point of view.

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• Regan, Tom. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

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  In this classic Regan compares different ethical theories and defends the “rights view” as the best theory all things considered.

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