Political Science Hybrid Regimes
by
Jean-François Gagné
  • LAST REVIEWED: 02 May 2019
  • LAST MODIFIED: 10 March 2015
  • DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0167

Introduction

Hybrid regimes are found in most developing countries, especially since the end of the Cold War. They are called hybrid because they combine democratic traits (e.g., frequent and direct elections) with autocratic ones (e.g., political repression). To better understand this vast grey zone of institutional ambiguities, Typologies have been created in order to identify various institutional arrangements of hybrid regimes and how they differ from other types of regimes. The current annotated bibliography of literature on hybrid regime trajectories points to a logical sequence of scientific inquiry in the following three domains: Causes of Emergence, Conditions of Stability, and Transition from Hybridity. It is supported with proposed key readings for each. Also included are datasets, major journals, and university presses on the subject. The selection was largely driven by the criteria of originality and potential for generalization, leaving aside the question of iterated testing and idiographic research. The crosscutting from literature on authoritarian to democratic regimes is what makes hybrid regimes such a dynamic subject for generating new insights and innovative thinking toward a better understanding of political regimes in developing countries.

Seminal Contributions

Authors’ works in the field of political development, based on geographic considerations as well as the nature of regimes, are excellent aids to the process of thinking about hybrid regimes. The influential work Finer 1970, a comparative analysis of political regimes around the world, is essential to any students in the field. Almond and Coleman 1960 focuses on developing countries, Collier 1979 depicts the specifics of Latin American regimes, and Zolberg 1966 those of West Africa. Linz 2000, originally published in 1975, outlines types of nondemocratic regimes, and the same can be said about Perlmutter 1981. Huntington and Moore 1970 addresses the issue of single-party regimes. Hermet, et al. 1978 examines how elections unfold in these particular systems of representation. These authors promote alternative approaches to seeing political regimes in a polymorphous way by constructing new concepts that challenge the standard autocracy/democracy dichotomy. In doing so, without using the name, their works are precursors of the studies on hybrid regimes.

  • Almond, Gabriel A., and James S. Coleman, eds. The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960.

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    The editors survey the various polities in the southern hemisphere, emphasizing regional specificities. The conclusion includes a synthesis that exposes the diversity of political regimes—the majority being hybrid variants—and a diagnosis of which pivotal political group influences the agenda in each country’s regime.

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  • Collier, David, ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

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    Collier gathers Latin American specialists’ views regarding how the military and bureaucracy support the ruling elites by looking at the nature, origins, and trajectories of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model. It is about an authoritarian subtype also present in other regions such as Asia.

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  • Finer, Samuel E. Comparative Government. London: Penguin, 1970.

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    Presents a systematic way to analyze Third World states, liberal democracies (the United Kingdom, the United States, France) and totalitarianism (the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). Third World states are divided into three categories: façade democracy, quasi-democracy, and military regime. The first two are an integral part of the actual lexicon on hybrid regimes.

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  • Hermet, Guy, Alain Rouquié, and Richard Rose, eds. Elections without Choice. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978.

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    This collective project highlights the malleability of democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, emphasizing how the state controls elections and escalates into vote-buying related phenomena which distort the voting process.

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  • Huntington, Samuel P., and Clement H. Moore, eds. Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

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    Within the historical relationship between modernization and institutionalization of the ruling party in authoritarian regimes lies the key link to explaining political stability.

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  • Linz, Juan J. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

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    This updated version of earlier works examines nondemocratic regimes based on level of mass participation, importance of ideologies, and nature of limited political pluralism. Linz’s concept of authoritarianism serves as a cornerstone of one category of hybrid regime: Authoritarianism with Adjectives.

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  • Perlmutter, Amos. Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981.

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    Perlmutter’s main argument concerns the twin processes of integration of society into the state and the simultaneous state autonomy from society, which constitute the core of all forms of authoritarian regimes. Of particular interests are the corporatist and praetorian models, for which the organizational structure and mechanisms of repression are described.

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  • Zolberg, Aristide. Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966.

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    The question raised in this book regarding hegemonic party regimes and opposition is why such regimes sometimes survive with few resources while others fall in a similar context. The argument is twofold. First, ideology is central for achieving unanimity. Second, electoral malpractice and arbitrary use of law help contain dissent.

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General Overview

This section touches upon a variety of subjects related (but not exclusive) to hybrid regimes, while covering the main analysis found in the literature specific to hybrid regimes. Brooker 2000 as well as Ezrow and Frantz 2011 offer a comprehensive discussion on conceptual and analytical dimensions. Brachet-Marquez 2005 focuses on concepts and definitions and whether they are context dependent. Ottaway 2003 reviews analytical issues from an actor/structure perspective. Schedler 2002 privileges one analytical avenue—that is, identifying the ruler’s repertoire of malpractice in hybrid regimes. Engberg and Ersson 1999 investigates whether these actions are part of an overall institutional design or an unplanned, improvised action-reaction decision-making process. Geddes 1998 explores another angle by reflecting on political dynamics rulers face according to various institutional settings.

  • Brachet-Marquez, Viviane. “Undemocratic Politics in the Twentieth Century and Beyond.” In The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization. Edited by Thomas Janoski, Robert Alford, Alexander Hicks, and Mildred A. Schwartz, 461–481. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

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    A chapter that presents a geographical distribution of nondemocratic regimes: Europe is home to totalitarianism, Latin America and Southern Europe to authoritarianism, and Asia and Africa to sultanism. The author also wonders whether these and other concepts related to types of regime are historically contingent.

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  • Brooker, Paul. Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

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    The author breaks down the motives, means, and opportunities associated with military, party, and personalist types of regime through a review of reference works on the subject. He also addresses how one type of regime can lead to another type and how they fit in relation to hybrid regimes.

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  • Engberg, Jan, and Svante Ersson. “Illiberal Democracy in the Third World – An Empirical Enquiry.” Mannheim, Germany: European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, March 1999.

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    A statistical proof of the difference between illiberalism by design—defined as intentional actions that are part of an overall strategy by the ruler to hold in check the opposition—and illiberalism by default, which is the aftermath of immediate reaction and piecemeal adjustment to social crisis.

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  • Ezrow, Natasha, and Erica Frantz. Dictators and Dictatorships – Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and Their Leaders. London: Continuum, 2011.

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    This piece represents a thorough examination of definitions and processes of military, personalistic, and single-party regimes, and how they follow diverse paths in terms of economic development, international relations, and resilience.

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  • Geddes, Barbara. “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument.” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, August 1998.

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    This conference paper is a must-read. It develops a rational model, based on game theory, as to why single-party regimes are more durable than personalistic ones and most of all military ones.

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  • Ottaway, Marina. Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003.

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    From a practitioner’s point of view, this book traces post-Cold War hybrid regime trajectories in Egypt, Azerbaijan, Venezuela, Senegal, and Croatia. It surveys actor-level factors as well as structural ones explaining the raison d’être of hybrid regimes and options available to foreign agencies involved in democratic assistance.

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  • Schedler, Andreas. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13.2 (2002): 36–50.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0031Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Schedler sketches a profile of the ruling elite’s formal and informal practices in their attempt to contain the opposition and to win an election. He points out how in hybrid regimes conflict about the rules rather than within the rules characterizes political interactions.

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Typologies

When dealing with hybrid regimes, concept formation and classification schemes are the object of intense debates. Some scholars argue that there is no need for creating concepts. Armony and Schamis 2005, for example, questions the relevance of devoting so much academic energy to designing new concepts. On the other hand, others assert that existing concepts do not adequately depict the diversity of institutional architectures found in the developing world. In this regard, Wigell 2008 proposes a detailed checklist to construct various types of regimes, notably ones leaning toward hybridity. Still, others are proponents of aiming at knowledge accumulation. Bogaards 2009 advocates for the need to integrate existing types into a single matrix, while Gilbert and Mohseni 2011 favors criteria identification to facilitate systematic comparison. Ultimately, concepts of authoritarianism and hybrid regimes sometimes overlap. The two secondary headings will provide additional clarifications on how to make sense of this conceptual blurriness: The first one deals with Democracy with Adjectives and the second one with Authoritarianism with Adjectives.

  • Armony, Ariel C., and Hector E. Schamis. “Babel in Democratization Studies.” Journal of Democracy 16.4 (2005): 113–128.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0055Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The authors cast many doubts on the plethora of concepts describing types of regime. They assert that, in fact, little has changed to justify such endeavors and that the current taxonomical effort fails to build mutual exclusive categories.

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  • Bogaards, Matthijs. “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism.” Democratization 16.2 (2009): 399–423.

    DOI: 10.1080/13510340902777800Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Dissects the respective particularities of defective democracy versus electoral authoritarianism, why they are difficult to integrate into a single classification scheme, and why efforts should be devoted to this task.

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  • Gilbert, Leah, and Payam Mohseni. “Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid Regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development 46.3 (2011): 270–297.

    DOI: 10.1007/s12116-011-9088-xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A look at the terminological confusion between hybrid and nondemocratic regimes, as well as at the diminishing subtypes of democracy and authoritarianism. The authors advance a three-dimensional mapping of regime types based on competitiveness, civil liberties, and tutelage interferences.

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  • Wigell, Mikael. “Mapping ‘Hybrid Regimes’: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics.” Democratization 15.2 (2008): 230–250.

    DOI: 10.1080/13510340701846319Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This article lays down a list of criteria based on electoral and constitutional conditions to create a multitude of regime types and move beyond a linear representation along the continuum between autocracy and democracy.

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Democracy with Adjectives

The “democracy with adjectives” label is mostly used by and associated with experts on Latin America. This label was created to reflect the fact that many of the continent’s regimes underwent a democratic transition from 1970 to 1990 without leading to a democratic consolidation. In other words, these regimes manifested irregularities with regards to democratic standards. Przeworski 1988 emphasizes the pervasive role of military in politics. Remmer 1985 and O’Donnell 1994 underline problems of popular political participation, while Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994 is more focused on competition between parties. Zakaria 1997 draws attention to the inimical impact of centralization of judicial and legislative powers within the executive on political rights. Collier and Levitsky 1997 compiles all existing subtypes and sorts them based on political interactions and political authority. Merkel 2004 refines and adds criteria to assess democratic defects and matches a subtype to each one that represents diminishing democracy.

  • Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” World Politics 49.3 (1997): 430–451.

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    An extensive review of all diminishing subtypes of democracy. It regroups them into two categories: one is about electoral rules and their actual application, the other is about the effective power to govern.

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  • Hartlyn, Jonathan, and Arturo Valenzuela. “Democracy in Latin America since 1930.” In The Cambridge History of Latin America. Vol. 6, 1930 to the Present. Edited by Leslie Bethell, 97–162. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

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    In Part 2, Politics and Society, this chapter emphasizes the high barriers to entry that political parties face, an arbitrary process akin to oligarchic democracy.

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  • Merkel, Wolfgang. “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11.5 (2004): 33–58.

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    For the most part a synthesis of previous works, this article identifies the main defects of new and fragile democratic regimes, ascribes a particular type of defect to each regime—including their respective causes—and in conclusion integrates all types into one single coherent framework.

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  • O’Donnell, Guillermo. “Delegative Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 5.1 (1994): 55–69.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.1994.0010Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    For many countries, the only voice citizens have is during elections. Outside of that context, the space of contention is closed, and politics remains the privilege of elites. Describes a genuine disconnection between politicians and citizens.

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  • Przeworski, Adam. “Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts.” In Constitutionalism and Democracy. Edited by Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, 59–80. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139173629Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This chapter is about the concept of tutelary democracy. It centers on the deleterious presence of military officers in politics, shaping policies to satisfy first and foremost their own corporate interest and political agenda even if it goes against the popular will.

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  • Remmer, Karen L. “Exclusionary Democracy.” Studies in Comparative International Development 20.4 (1985): 64–85.

    DOI: 10.1007/BF02717356Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Pervasive socioeconomic inequalities in Latin America are a key obstacle to democracy. They are detrimental to political inclusion. In some countries, poor people are not allowed to vote based on discriminatory criteria such as gender, property, literacy, and race.

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  • Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76.6 (1997): 22–43.

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    Zakaria highlights an interesting pattern: civil liberties are increasingly enforced while political rights lag behind, leading to a precarious situation where society is empowered while the state is weak, and hence unable to respond quickly and efficiently to the rapidly rising public demands.

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Authoritarianism with Adjectives

In the 2000s, a second generation of hybrid regime concepts emerged and basically replaced in the lexicon concepts of Democracy with Adjectives. They have been described as “authoritarianism with adjectives.” The term came into being after scholars realized the persistence of authoritarian traits in many former Soviet republics and sub-Saharan regimes that had experienced multiparty elections for the first time in the 1990s. Schedler 2006 coined the term “electoral authoritarianism,” which he had also evoked in earlier publications. Diamond 2002 elaborated two variants of this concept: hegemonic electoral authoritarianism and competitive electoral authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way 2002 concentrates on the latter.

  • Diamond, Larry. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13.2 (2002): 21–35.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0025Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    In some hybrid regimes, the incumbent controls the electoral process in such a way that the opposition has no chance whatsoever to win; he is in a hegemonic position. In other hybrid regimes, the outcome is less certain. Competition is real. The opposition captures a significant share of the vote and sometimes incumbents are defeated.

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  • Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13.2 (2002): 21–35.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0026Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The authors focus on the concept of competitive authoritarianism, which includes free multiparty elections; however the playing field is uneven because the ruling elites use state resources for partisan purposes.

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  • Schedler, Andreas, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

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    In the introductory chapter, Schedler details what he means by electoral authoritarianism. Opposition parties are allowed to compete in elections but the rules are designed to systematically advantage the incumbent. Of particular importance, this edited volume contains great insights about hybrid regimes’ conceptual and analytical issues.

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Political Institutions

A regime rests on a number of political institutions, both formal and informal. Hybrid regime institutions tend to be depicted as informal in nature. Lehoucq 2003 centers on the prevalence of electoral fraud. Levitsky and Murillo 2009 affirms that formal institutions are weak given that very few actors comply with rules and the rules change all the time. Yet Gandhi 2008 asserts that legislatures are effective instruments of political communication between elites. That being said, as Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009 concludes, many questions remain. In fact at the heart of the debate is the interplay between informal autocratic practices and formal democratic rules (Mechanisms of Co-optation touches on this subject). The real issue here is not whether formal institutions are meaningful or not, but which formal ones have bearing on the behavior of political actors, and which ones do not and why? To support this, Constraints on the Incumbent stresses the compromises rulers need to make in order to stay in power. The material in both headings, Mechanisms of Co-optation and Constraints on the Incumbent, is interconnected and clearly shows how the ability to co-opt opponents is intimately related to the existence of effective constraints on the incumbent’s arbitrary powers.

  • Gandhi, Jennifer. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510090Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This book tests the following hypothesis: formal institutions in hybrid regimes and various forms of nondemocratic regimes are not a mere façade in that they actually signal preferences and cement consensus about a specific set of public policies.

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  • Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. “Elections under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 403–422.

    DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060106.095434Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Outlines the main contributions surrounding electoral dynamics in authoritarian regimes. They come to the conclusion that the literature has little to say about how local and national elections link voters, candidates, and incumbents in authoritarian regimes and how this is connected to regime survival and policy outcome. There is also a dearth of evidence on many countries, with China, Mexico, and Egypt attracting all the attention.

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  • Lehoucq, Fabrice. “Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences.” Annual Review of Political Science 6 (2003): 233–256.

    DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085655Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Discusses the complex issue of ballot rigging, a common and multidimensional practice in hybrid regimes. Overall, intensity and strategies of electoral fraud are a function of the level of political competition.

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  • Levitsky, Steven, and Maria Victoria Murillo. “Variation in Institutional Strength.” Annual Review of Political Science 12 (2009): 115–133.

    DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Two key dimensions of institutional strength are presented: enforcement and durability. On both counts, hybrid regimes are problematic. The source of institutional weaknesses is grounded in actor-level, societal-level, and international-level factors.

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Mechanisms of Co-optation

In hybrid regimes, electoral and party systems are instruments of the ruling elites, serving their ambition to remain in power through containment. The target groups and the ways the ruling elites’ governing instruments use them are where the central problems lie and must be resolved. Geddes 2006 develops an argument about the necessity to regulate conflict with the military establishment while Eisenstadt 2000 focuses on opposition parties. In order to cement loyalty from would-be challengers, the ruling elites have to offer something in return. Gandhi and Przeworski 2006 argues that public offices are a currency exchanged for loyalty to power; the privilege to access power is conditional. Blaydes 2007 contends precisely that only those capable of defeating electoral contenders are worthy candidates. Simpser 2013 argues that the means by which Political Institutions interfere reduce the risk of uncertainty associated with elections in nondemocratic settings.

  • Blaydes, Lisa. “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt.” Paper Presented the Annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL, 2007.

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    Blaydes wants to answer an understudied question: how elections are used as a spoil mechanism. Elections serve other purposes as well: to measure the value of political allies and to evaluate their inclination to be savvy and dependable politicians. Ultimately, those who deliver the vote and stay loyal to the ruling elites are reliable partners.

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  • Eisenstadt, Todd. “Eddies in the Third Wave: Protracted Transitions and Theories of Democratization.” Democratization 7.3 (2000): 3–24.

    DOI: 10.1080/13510340008403669Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The author proposes analytical tools to distinguish between various kinds of opposition parties (“transition-seeking”, “patronage-seeking” and “anti-regime parties”) in developing countries, according to their willingness to cooperate with the government. Thus the cleavages between parties are not simply about right/left, ethnic/religious, or center/periphery conflicts but are interest-based/need-based.

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  • Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. “Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under Dictatorships.” Economics and Politics 18.1 (2006): 1–26.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00160.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The key finding here is that the higher the threat of rebellion, the more likely the dictator will make policy concessions and distribute rents, notably in the form of positions (elected or otherwise) with access to public funds and policy influence.

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  • Geddes, Barbara. “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, DC: 31 August—3 September 2006.

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    This conference paper exposes why an incumbent who used to resort to repression would now agree to conduct elections and form political parties. The paper is focused on the creation of rules to regulate relationships with various stakeholders—especially the military, which is capable of threatening the powerholders. Military and powerholders reduce the incidence of mass demonstrations when presenting a united front during elections.

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  • Simpser, Alberto. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice and Implications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139343824Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the impact of informal institutions on formal ones, an interaction with multiple ramifications. It exposes how electoral fraud alters the vote count in a way that displays the omnipotence of the incumbent and how it shapes the interests, preferences, and expectations of political actors in the state, regime, and society.

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Constraints on the Incumbent

Formal institutions are not mere window-dressing designed to hide the ruling elites’ deceitful actions. If that were the case, the bargaining process with challengers would be futile. The day-to-day way of doing politics cannot be arbitrary. Boix and Svolik 2013 envisions the development of Political Institutions as a credible commitment to the rules of the game and as a vehicle to solve collective problems. Magaloni 2008 brings another layer to the analysis by introducing a condition on the pact between political elites: the presence of ideological affinities. Posusney 2002 warns that elections in hybrid regimes are by no means always predicable, nor is the incumbent’s victory inevitable or assured. Elections inject a dose of uncertainty. Electoral alternation is always possible, as is periodic contestation of electoral results—hence, no one can be absolutely sure of the actual unfolding of events. No matter what the eventuality, the incumbent needs to be careful about how much force to exert on protesters.

  • Boix, Carles, and Milan Svolik. “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships.” Journal of Politics 75.2 (2013): 300–316.

    DOI: 10.1017/S0022381613000029Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Using formal models and regressions, the authors validate the binding force of legislative institutions in making alliances resilient. These institutions restrain the ruler from reneging on previous promises, without which the alliance quickly dissolves and the ruler loses power.

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  • Magaloni, Beatriz. “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule.” Comparative Political Studies 41.4–5 (2008): 715–741.

    DOI: 10.1177/0010414007313124Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This article presents a sophisticated demonstration as to why the incumbent will willingly accept losing his monopolization of power. The premise is simple: the ruler cannot govern alone. He needs allies to survive. But in order to consolidate the alliance, the ruler has to compromise and create institutions that will check his own ambitions. He will readily do so as long as would-be allies continue to be ideologically close to him.

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  • Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. “Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering and Oppositional Strategies.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36.4 (2002): 34–62.

    DOI: 10.1007/BF02686332Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The argument centers on the ruling elites’ control over elected positions and how they use this control to ratify laws that further secure their powers. Despite this definite advantage, the conduct of elections offers a window of opportunity for an eventual boycott, a dangerous road where events can easily escalate and/or derail the hoped-for outcome.

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Causes of Emergence

The emergence of a hybrid regime is explained by a myriad of factors that are often specific to each country. Beyond the idiographic aspect, a number of causes come into effect across a variety of settings. Previously cited in the section Democracy with Adjectives, Merkel 2004 also includes a list of plausible causes to explain the emergence of hybrid regimes: modernization-related processes, economic crisis, lack of social capital, weak state status, past institutions, and transitional modes. While all are worth considering, some have been examined with greater scrutiny. Morlino 2009 focuses on past institutions, while Munck and Leff 1997 on transitional modes. Croissant 2003 injects the notion of social capital into the analysis. Fish 2006 stresses the weakness of certain Political Institutions. And Levitsky and Loxton 2013 develops its arguments against a background of deteriorating economic conditions. Overall, hybrid regimes are relatively new, their existence dating back to around the 1950s. That being said, the real puzzle is their recent proliferation. Joseph 1998 proposes an answer in the influence of international factors that simultaneously left their imprint on many sub-Saharan countries, where the bulk of new hybrid regimes are located.

  • Croissant, Aurel. “Legislative Powers, Veto Players, and the Emergence of Delegative Democracy: A Comparison of Presidentialism in the Philippines and South Korea.” Democratization 10.3 (2003): 68–98.

    DOI: 10.1080/13510340312331293937Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Looking into small circles of elites, Croissant reveals that if veto players are reduced to a network of “friends” and “collaborators,” the onset of one subtype of hybrid regime, delegative democracy, is more likely; if competition, heterogeneity, and absence of cohesion prevail it is less likely.

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  • Fish, M. Steven. “Creative Constitutions: How Do Parliamentary Powers Shape the Electoral Arena?” In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Edited by Andreas Schedler, 181–197. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

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    An endogenous explanation of hybrid regime emergence, this chapter examines one very specific factor: weak legislative powers underscored in a constitution favor the creation of hybrid regimes, whereas strong legislatures give actors incentives to invest in political parties and encourage democratic practices.

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  • Joseph, Richard. “Africa, 1990–1997: From Abertura to Closure.” Journal of Democracy 9.2 (1998): 3–17.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.1998.0028Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This article summarizes the complexity of hybrid regime occurrence in sub-Saharan Africa: a fallout of political openings created by structural adjustment programs and the end of Cold War superpower patrons, followed by closure when social upheavals that burst into violent conflicts were harshly repressed by authorities.

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  • Levitsky, Steven, and James Loxton. “Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in the Andes.” Democratization 20.1 (2013): 107–136.

    DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2013.738864Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The democratic breakdown leading to hybridity is in this case the end sequence of a charismatic new leader elected on the basis of antiestablishment rhetoric. In the name of the poor, he purges the public administration of old elites and destroys altogether the institutions associated with the positions they were holding.

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  • Morlino, Leonardo. “Are There Hybrid Regimes? Or Are They Just an Optical Illusion?” European Political Science Review 1.2 (2009): 273–296.

    DOI: 10.1017/S1755773909000198Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The argument links past regimes with certain types of hybrid regime. It explains and demonstrates empirically the multiple paths from personal, military, civil/military, mobilization, postcolonial, and democratic regimes to limited democracy, democracy without the state, and protected democracy.

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  • Munck, Gerardo L., and Carol Skalnik Leff. “Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective.” In Special Issue: Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow. Edited by Lisa Anderson. Comparative Politics 29.3 (1997): 343–362.

    DOI: 10.2307/422125Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This article focuses on the interlude between past and future regimes; how the strategy (confrontation or accommodation) and the identity (incumbent elite or counterelite) of the agent of change intervenes in the transformative process. The most conducive context to hybridity is when incumbent elites adopt a confrontational posture.

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Conditions of Stability

There are interesting puzzles related to hybrid regime stability that have been studied more extensively as compared to Causes of Emergence and Transition from Hybridity. First, it is imperative to assess whether hybrid regimes are more or less stable than other types of regime and, if indeed that be the case, why is it so. Epstein, et al. 2006 found that hybrid regimes are more likely to experience instability than outright autocracies or full-fledged democracies, an empirical conclusion corroborated by many other studies. Gates, et al. 2006 puts forward the idea that such a state of decay is caused by institutional incoherence. Menocal, et al. 2008 insists on the fact that the entire regime rests on the shoulders of an individual orchestrating secretive pacts. As leaders come and go, so do regimes. Second, there is the question related to variations among hybrid regimes: why are certain hybrid regimes more stable than others? Hadenius and Teorell 2007 found that the most stable hybrid regimes are those governed by a dominant party, a claim confirmed by other inquiries on the subject. The two secondary headings, Economic Instruments and Organizational Capacities, will detail what makes a party dominant. Nevertheless, Langston 2006 pleads that a dominant party eventually disintegrates, confronted with the centrifugal forces of would-be rulers motivated by the opportunities created by competitive elections. For Case 2006, hybrid regime stability is about a leader’s skills. According to Svolik 2012, one of the greatest challenges that the ruler faces is the trade-off between curbing mass protest and sharing power with those with the means to repress. The failure to cope with this predicament often means the overthrow of the ruler. However, many theoretical problems remain such as elaborated in Art 2012, where it is stated that there is little research on the distinctive role of diverse coercive apparatus in maintaining stability.

  • Art, David. “What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After Ten Years?” Comparative Politics 44.3 (2012): 351–373.

    DOI: 10.5129/001041512800078977Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A review of recent books on hybrid regimes, which highlights their contribution and pinpoints their main weakness—most of all, the unsound theoretical foundation of Political Institutions and the monolithic conception of coercive apparatus.

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  • Case, William. “Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?” In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Edited by Andreas Schedler, 95–112. Boulder. CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

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    An adamant attitude is a recipe for disaster. Using Southeast Asia as a source of illustrative cases, the author hypothesizes that coherent policies coupled with small and judicious institutional adjustments to resolve punctual crises go a long way toward explaining the success of certain hybrid regimes.

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  • Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran. “Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 50.3 (2006): 551–569.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00201.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A refined statistical test of the determinants of regime stability and instability leads to a far-reaching conclusion: none of the standard factors explaining stability in autocracies and democracies hold for hybrid regimes.

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  • Gates, Scott, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard Strand. “Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: The Duration of Polities.” American Journal of Political Science 50.4 (2006): 893–908.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00222.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This empirical study demonstrates that hybrid regimes are more likely to be unstable than other types of regime because incongruities in their institutional architecture prevent the self-reinforcing benefits of institutional harmony.

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  • Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. “Pathways from Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 18.1 (2007): 143–156.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.2007.0009Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Using a duration analysis of authoritarian regimes, including hybrid regimes, the authors ascertain that the most potent way to achieve stability is the presence of a dominant party. Furthermore, instability, or regime change to be more precise, tends to operate within the boundaries of nondemocratic polities.

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  • Langston, Joy. “Elite Ruptures: When Do Ruling Parties Split?” In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Edited by Andreas Schedler, 57–75. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

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    Comparing the faith of the Kuomintang (Taiwan) and PRI (Mexico), this chapter alleges that regardless of organizational strength, succession crisis and electoral competition take their toll on the regime capacity to reproduce itself.

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  • Menocal, Alina Rocha, Verena Fritz, and Lise Rakner. “Hybrid Regimes and the Challenges of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy in Developing Countries.” South African Journal of International Affairs 15.1 (2008): 29–40.

    DOI: 10.1080/10220460802217934Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A reflection on the prospect of hybrid regimes, this work’s core argument is that hybrid regimes are unstable given the predominance of institutional volatility, a hallmark of personalism and informal practices.

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  • Svolik, Milan W. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139176040Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The focal point of this book is the interconnection of the problems of control of the masses and of power sharing among elites. Most of all, in order to prevent a revolution from below and stay in power, the ruling elites need the military to repress dissent. In that capacity, military officers obtain greater decision-making power, a condition for stability.

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Economic Instruments

In stable hybrid regimes, the driver of economic development is often the state. According to Greene 2007, the omnipresence of the state in the economy is of the utmost importance for the ruling elites. It allows for the spoiling of large segments of society with lucrative jobs in parastatal companies or administrative offices. Magaloni 2006 concentrates on the provision of social programs, especially before Election Day. There is something more at stake here than simply vote buying. McMann 2006 examines how economic insecurity (or economic dependence on the state) creates a culture of impunity and passiveness. Repression becomes intangible. Rodan and Jayasuriya 2009 stresses that this is especially acute among the middle class. Zinecker 2009 points out that economic inequalities breed political injustices such as the avid thirst for profit of a few well-connected individuals monopolizing the political agenda. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2008 considers that the masses are not as defenseless as they seem if the economy is based on labor-intensive activities. For instance, a countrywide general strike can paralyze an economy and the government by the same token. Even if the ruling elites have access to rents, Escribà-Folch 2010 argues that its ineffective use may have the unexpected consequence of provoking the elites’ own downfall. Indeed, bad economic performance creates grievances and galvanizes an angry mob that calls for the incumbent’s resignation.

  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change.” Comparative Political Studies 42.2 (2008): 167–197.

    DOI: 10.1177/0010414008323330Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Using a multi-method design, it is theorized that, in the face of popular protest, the ruler will repress the masses if substantial revenues generated by low labor inputs such as resources or aid rents are available. Otherwise, the regime will be liberalized.

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  • Escribà-Folch, Abel. “Autocrats’ Modes of Exit, Rents and Crisis in Africa.” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 4.7 (2010): 272–283.

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    This article distinguishes between “regular” ousting of an incumbent based on his incapacity to effectively use patronage resources, foster elite cohesion, and prevent opposition coalition versus “irregular” ousting caused by economic decline and widespread poverty.

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  • Greene, Kenneth F. Why Dominant Parties Lose – Mexico’s Democratization in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511509803Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This book includes compelling evidence about how public ownership of large companies can be used as a political instrument (i.e., a steady salary in exchange of political support). Thus the privatization process has a highly destabilizing effect. As the number of civil servants decreases, defection to the opposition increases.

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  • Magaloni, Beatriz. Voting for Autocracy – Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510274Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The long-lived domination of a party is explained by the lack of experience of the opposition as competent rulers, steady economic growth, and generous distributive policies to loyal constituencies, mostly in rural areas where targeted programs are more cost effective.

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  • McMann, Kelly. Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510281Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    This book explores the pervasive effect of economic statecraft: without economic autonomy, democracy is an empty shell. Citizens are highly reluctant to uphold their rights when the government controls the economy and has the power to fire anyone on a partisan basis. Self-censorship and regime endorsement is the norm.

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  • Rodan, Garry, and Kanishka Jayasuriya. “Capitalist Development, Regime Transitions and New Forms of Authoritarian in Asia.” Pacific Review 22.1 (2009): 23–47.

    DOI: 10.1080/09512740802651003Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    An article on the sociopolitical consequences of state capitalism: massive state intervention precludes the active participation of the private sector and labor unions in politics, preventing a driving force for change toward democracy. Political debates are eliminated while some economic, social, and environmental debates are allowed.

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  • Zinecker, Heidrun. “Regime-Hybridity in Developing Countries: Achievements and Limitations of New Research on Transitions.” International Studies Review 11.2 (2009): 302–331.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00850.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    The approach here concentrates on rent-seeking behavior, arguing that economic marginalization and money politics distort the essence of political rights and civil liberties, consolidating the hybrid status quo in favor of power holders.

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Organizational Capacities

The ability to coordinate action and mobilize followers is a cornerstone of party domination in hybrid regimes. To do so, extending tentacles into all segments of society and presenting a single voice no doubt helps in getting out the vote. Yet what applies to the party in power also applies to the opposition. A weak or strong ruling party will stay in power facing a weak opposition. The outcome is much more ambiguous if the opposition is strong. Levitsky and Way 2010 focuses on the power holders and the same can be said about Brownlee 2007 and Mauzy 2006. Ekman 2009 as well as Bunce and Wolchik 2010 privilege the opposition. These contributions help to establish what “strong government” or “strong opposition” means. Friedman and Wong 2008 insists on how political crises generate uncertain times. Who will come out as the winner depends on circumstances, not a predetermined path.

  • Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511802348Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A rich chronicle of the ruling parties in Egypt, Iran, the Philippines, and Malaysia, which supports the idea that organizational power helps to eliminate rival political forces, mitigate conflicts from within, and provide opportunities for subalterns to replace the incumbent, which can nonetheless go wrong if the latter refuses to abdicate.

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  • Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. “Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” World Politics 62.1 (2010): 43–86.

    DOI: 10.1017/S0043887109990207Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Based on extensive fieldwork, this research confirms that instability can be traced in the synchronized effort among various opposition groups (political parties, nongovernmental organizations, foreign donors) to politicize the masses. The determining factor is the degree of sophistication of mobilization techniques used—that is, their diversity and novelty.

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  • Ekman, Joakim. “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.” International Political Science Review 30.1 (2009): 7–32.

    DOI: 10.1177/0192512108097054Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    If the incumbent is able to thwart the opposition and most of all to preserve a genuine disconnection between the voters and opposition parties, there is no reason to worry. Using Tanzania, Russia, and Venezuela as illustrative cases, the author asserts that opposition parties are a collection of free-floating elites.

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  • Friedman, Edward, and Joseph Wong, eds. Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems: Learning to Lose. New York: Routledge, 2008.

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    A survey of dominant party strategies in a context of adversity—mostly in hybrid regimes but not exclusively—this collective work is a reminder that, even when apparently secure, rulers are often confronted by political crises, the outcomes of which are often conjectural.

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  • Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

    DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511781353Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Compiles thirty-five case studies structured by detailed conceptual and methodological choices. The ingredients of stability are mostly based on a strong ruling party and an effective coercive apparatus.

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  • Mauzy, Diane. “The Challenge to Democracy – Singapore’s and Malaysia’s Resilient Hybrid Regimes.” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2.2 (2006): 47–68.

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    Mauzy draws attention to the imperative necessity for the ruling party to control the media and occupy the ideological center. The latter gives policy flexibility to adjust to unforeseen events without alienating the political base; the former reduces the political spectrum by limiting the issues open for debates.

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Transition from Hybridity

Political development is not automatically a linear process from autocracy all the way down to democracy. It may very well be a back-and-forth, trial-by-error process. Yet the closer a regime is to democracy, the more likely it will engage in a democratic transition. This is precisely the argument developed by Brownlee 2009. Furthermore, according to Lindberg 2009, there is a build-up phenomenon. Multiple experiences with elections lead to incremental openings. Beyond these statements, the outcome is largely contingent on opposition strategies and elite actions. Howard and Roessler 2006 points out how the opposition may resist attacks on its ability to operate freely. It comes down to forging political alliances. Van de Walle 2006 states that opposition parties join under a single banner when they are convinced that electoral victory is within their reach. Karl 1995 suggests what kinds of opposition alliances in hybrid regimes successfully generate democracy. Alexander 2008 tests the idea that confident elites are more willing to engage in democratization than insecure ones; Levitsky and Way 2005 redirects the object of inquiry to exogenous factors. Finally, Waterbury 1997 contends that a leader’s actions have unintended consequences. All these contributions adopt the following as a point of view: hybrid regimes become democracies and not the other way around; in fact, the literature is relatively silent on the transition to autocracy because it is a rather rare event. Once direct and frequent elections with universal suffrage as well as the legalization of parties are institutionalized, they are almost never canceled for a prolonged period.

  • Alexander, Marcus. “Democratization and Hybrid Regimes: Comparative Evidence from Southeast Europe.” East European Politics and Societies 22.4 (2008): 928–954.

    DOI: 10.1177/0888325408327634Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    Alexander exposes how a strong state and foreign support push a regime into institutional reforms whereas a united opposition pulls a regime into status quo—hence, cooperation is more conducive to transition from hybridity than confrontation.

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  • Brownlee, Jason. “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 53.3 (2009): 515–532.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00384.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A quantitative study of regime trajectory that reveals a discernible trend: hybrid regimes with multiparty elections are not more likely to break down than other forms of nondemocratic regimes, but are more conducive to democracy once they do break down.

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  • Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50.2 (2006): 365–381.

    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00189.xSave Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    A cross-national time-series analysis of factors favoring a departure from hybridity, this article demonstrates that a divided opposition is vulnerable to repressive and co-opting tactics whereas an opposition coalition – not necessarily cohesive – changes significantly the balance of power. Suddenly it can make a legitimate claim as a credible contender.

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  • Karl, Terry Lynn. “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America.” Journal of Democracy 6.3 (1995): 72–86.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.1995.0049Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    An assessment of the prospect of hybridity in a specific region, this socioeconomic snapshot of political institutionalization singles out a major prerequisite for democracy to flourish: the middle class and civil society should channel their effort into party politics.

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  • Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. “International Linkage and Democratization.” Journal of Democracy 16.3 (2005): 20–34.

    DOI: 10.1353/jod.2005.0048Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    In an era of globalization, external factors cannot be ignored. This article explains how the balance of power between western democracies and authoritarian regimes may incite the latter to democratize and how the political, economic, social, communication, and cultural interactions between these two cultivate this liberalization process.

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  • Lindberg, Staffan I., ed. Democratization by Elections – A New Mode of Transition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

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    This edited book examines the validity of the following hypothesis—iterated elections foster democratization—while also exploring how it resonates in different contextual settings, notably in hybrid regimes.

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  • van de Walle, Nicolas. “Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?” In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Edited by Andreas Schedler, 77–92. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

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    Opposition groups unite if their chance of winning is high. While the author mentions the drivers behind such an expectation, he stresses that the opposition alliance is often precarious: united in opposition yet divided in what should come next.

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  • Waterbury, John. “Fortuitous By-Products.” Comparative Politics 29.3 (1997): 383–402.

    DOI: 10.2307/422127Save Citation »Export Citation » Share Citation »

    There is no clear-cut pattern to democratic transition, from a hybrid regime or other types of regimes. It is the isolated leader who, with no other viable option, will engage in democratization. Once the process is launched, it takes on a life of its own.

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Datasets on Political Regimes

Although datasets on political regimes abound, few introduce considerations pertaining to hybrid regimes and have information updated on an annual basis. Those selected here not only cover the ongoing year, but also include at least three decades of political history as of the early 21st century. In many cases, the classification differs, sometimes significantly, among them even if they do follow a similar evaluation process involving regional experts, career analysts, and academics. Differences largely depend on how much weight is given to a specific dimension of a political regime. Freedom in the World appears to privilege the issue of civil liberties, Polity IV the activity surrounding the executive, and Database of Political Institutions electoral results.

  • Database of Political Institutions. 1975–2012.

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    A project of the World Bank, this dataset provides concise information on a wide range of political institution characteristics. The legislative and executive indicators of electoral competition help in assessing the domination of the incumbent or party in power in hybrid regimes.

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  • Freedom in the World. 1972–2013.

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    One of the most commonly used source of information by hybrid regime experts, this dataset divides world regimes into three categories: free, partly free, and not free. Hybrid regimes refer to the partly free category. The organization also provides a snapshot of the political situation and a regime evaluation for each country in its annual report.

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  • Polity IV. 1800–2012.

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    A unique source of information that embodies over two centuries of political development, it classifies polities as either full democracy, democracy, open anocracy, closed anocracy, or autocracy based on executive recruitment procedures, the independence of executive authority, and political competition and opposition. Hybrid regimes correspond to anocracy.

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Academic Publishing

Research on hybrid regimes is found in few peer-review journals and university presses. Analytical issues are mostly dealt with in books; Cambridge University Press is undoubtedly a key source on the subject, while Johns Hopkins University Press also addresses the topic. Many journals in political science publish articles on hybrid regimes. Top-tier ones such as the American Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, World Politics and Annual Review of Political Science occasionally select papers discussing a variety of topics related to hybrid regimes, while using mostly (but not exclusively) quantitative methods. That being said, there are specialized journals that give a prominent place to hybrid regimes. In that matter The Journal of Democracy is probably a leading publication. Its new branch, the Taiwan Journal of Democracy, is also worth mentioning. Democratization as well as Studies in Comparative International Development both tend to focus on conceptual problems.

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