Redistricting and Electoral Competition in American Politics
- LAST MODIFIED: 28 August 2019
- DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0279
- LAST MODIFIED: 28 August 2019
- DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0279
Introduction
Redistricting, or the process of redrawing congressional district boundaries, can be a highly contentious and political affair. Electoral competition within districts is dependent on both of the major American political parties being evenly balanced. Therefore, redistricting can enhance or diminish competition through how it distributes partisans across districts. Indeed, politicians have used this process to manipulate boundaries in their favor for centuries. In fact, the term most commonly used for exploiting the redistricting process for partisan gain—gerrymandering—was coined in 1812 as Massachusetts governor Elbridge Gerry signed legislation creating a map with heavily distorted districts, one of which resembled a salamander. Thus, the portmanteau “gerry-mander” was born. The misshapen districts produced the intended effect of facilitating greater electoral success for members of the governor’s party. Throughout history, Congress, the US Supreme Court, individual states, the American electorate, and an ever-evolving political environment have all impacted the construction of district maps. Additionally, each of these factors further influences the level of electoral competition within the district. Therefore, this work seeks to outline how redistricting can directly or indirectly influence electoral competition within congressional districts. Directly, different redistricting entities (legislatures, commissions, and courts) possess different motivations and constraints when drawing district lines, which can impact competition. Indirectly, redistricting can influence voting behavior and the incumbency advantage, which can also impact competition. This work also explores the tradeoff between representation and competition, the relationship between redistricting and polarization, what constitutes a gerrymander, and how durable redistricting plans are over time. Each can have a substantial impact on electoral competition, which in turn bears consequences for our understanding of the consequences of redistricting.
Partisan Redistricting and Competition
The effects of partisan redistricting on competition are not a settled matter. Conclusions cover the entire spectrum of no effects, positive effects, negative effects. There is, however, agreement that the overall levels of competition within congressional elections has declined in recent decades, as demonstrated by Ferejohn 1977 and Abramowitz, et al. 2006. However, as McDonald 2006 shows, this conclusion is dependent on measurement. In a similar vein, Engstrom 2006 turns to an analysis of 19th-century redistricting plans to gain additional leverage on this question. Conversely, some researchers have found the opposite effect—that partisan redistricting is beneficial to elections, such as Gelman and King 1994 and Yoshinaka and Murphy 2011. These findings suggest that, though counterintuitive, partisan redistricting plans can produce positive effects on election outcomes. Winburn 2008 suggests that the effect is dependent on the rules and constraints placed on the state legislature. Regardless of the effect on competition, Buchler 2005 and Brunell 2008 defend a lack of competitiveness as a potentially positive attribute, contrary to the popular conception of competition as necessary for a healthy democracy. These authors suggest that competition is not the variable of interest when evaluating redistricting plans, but the effects on representation should instead be considered.
Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. “Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in US House Elections.” Journal of Politics 68.1 (2006): 75–88.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00371.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These scholars sought to identify the source of declining competition and ultimately contend that this decrease can be attributed to partisan polarization and the incumbency advantage but not to the redistricting process.
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Brunell, Thomas L. Redistricting and Representation: Why Competitive Elections Are Bad for American. New York: Routledge, 2008.
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The author contends that competitiveness has the negative consequence of leaving voters less satisfied with Congress and their Representative.
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Buchler, Justin. “Competition, Representation, and Redistricting: The Case against Competitive Congressional Districts.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 17.4 (2005): 431–463.
DOI: 10.1177/0951629805056896Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This author argues that competition does a surprisingly poor job of producing representative election outcomes.
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Engstrom, Erik J. “Stacking the States, Stacking the House: The Partisan Consequences of Congressional Redistricting in the 19th Century.” American Political Science Review 100.3 (2006): 419–427.
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055406062277Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work finds that parties that enjoyed unified control of the redistricting process produced maps with a strong enough partisan bias to help determine partisan control of the US House.
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Ferejohn, John A. “On the Decline of Competitiveness of Congressional Elections.” American Political Science Review 71 (1977): 166–176.
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055400259364Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This seminal work illustrates the decline of competition in elections as well as highlights similar contributions by others.
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Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. “Enhancing Democracy through Legislative Redistricting.” American Political Science Review 88.3 (1994): 541–559.
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These authors produce a seemingly counterintuitive conclusion by arguing that redistricting increases responsiveness from incumbents.
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McDonald, Michael. “Drawing the Line on District Competition.” PS: Political Science and Politics 39.1 (2006): 91–94.
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This research employs an alternative measure of competitiveness, which leads the author to conclude that partisan redistricting indeed reduces the number of competitive congressional elections, contrary to other works. Available by subscription online
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Winburn, Jonathan. The Realities of Redistricting: Following the Rules and Limiting Gerrymandering in State Legislative Redistricting. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008.
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This book dissects different legislative redistricting entities, but its primary contribution is attention to state, as opposed to federal, districting. Winburn finds that redistricting can indeed have significant effects on elections, but state-imposed constraints on gerrymandering can remove some partisanship from the process.
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Yoshinaka, Antoine, and Chad Murphy. “The Paradox of Redistricting: How Partisan Mapmakers Foster Competition but Disrupt Representation.” Political Research Quarterly 64 (2011): 435–477.
DOI: 10.1177/1065912909355716Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors show that partisan redistricting induces greater instability in elections, which can have positive electoral consequences.
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Courts, Competition, and Redistricting
At times, the legality of redistricting plans comes under scrutiny. In those instances, the judicial branch must intervene, but the effects courts have on the redistricting process vary. Some evidence, like that of Cottrill and Peretti 2013, suggests that courts are constrained by legal standards and must act as neutral arbiters when considering district maps. This in turn increases the overall level of competition. However, others acknowledge that judges are political actors seeking to assist like-minded political actors in other branches of government, such as Lloyd 1995. Others, like McKenzie 2012, offers a more nuanced perspective. In an indirect way, the courts have shaped how redistricting can impact competition through deciding what constitutes an unlawful partisan gerrymander. Issacharoff and Karlan 2004; Hirsch 2003; and McGann, et al. 2016 provide useful context related to redistricting court cases as well as offer potential remedies and justifications for combatting gerrymandering. Furthermore, one of the primary issues courts must consider regarding redistricting cases is adherence to the one person, one vote standard, which requires districts to have as close to equal populations as possible. Persily, et al. 2002 provides an interesting discussion of the electoral consequences of this standard.
Cottrill, James B., and Terri J. Peretti. “Gerrymandering from the Bench? The Electoral Consequences of Judicial Redistricting.” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 12.3 (2013): 261–276.
DOI: 10.1089/elj.2012.0176Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research suggests that judicial redistricting does enhance competition, although it can also at times offer an advantage to one party.
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Hirsch, Sam. “The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest Round of Congressional Redistricting.” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 2.2 (2003): 179–216.
DOI: 10.1089/153312903321578188Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author argues that the Supreme Court would need to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering cases in order to ensure proper representation of the electorate.
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Issacharoff, Samuel, and Pamela S. Karlan. “Where to Draw the Line? Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 153 (2004): 541–578.
DOI: 10.2307/4150632Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work provides a discussion of court cases related to partisan gerrymandering as well as some of their consequences.
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Lloyd, Randall D. “Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts.” American Political Science Review 89.2 (1995): 413–420.
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This research demonstrates that judges are less likely to vote against plans offered by members of their own party.
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McGann, Anthony J., Charles Anthony Smith, Michael Latner, and Alex Keena. Gerrymandering in America: The House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, and the Future of Popular Sovereignty. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016.
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781316534342Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This book provides an in-depth discussion of the relevant court cases as well as offering a potential legal standard by which to evaluate gerrymandering.
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McKenzie, Mark J. “The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal Courts.” Political Research Quarterly 65 (2012): 799–813.
DOI: 10.1177/1065912911421012Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research concludes that judges only allow their partisanship to impact their decisions when precedent is ambiguous.
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Persily, Nathaniel, Thad Kousser, and Patrick Egan. “The Complicated Impact of One Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation.” North Carolina Law Review 80 (2002): 1299–1338.
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These authors contend that the imposition of the one person, one vote standard contributed to the overall decline in electoral competition by facilitating the advantage enjoyed by incumbents.
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Redistricting Commissions and Their Effects
One of the common means by which reformers hope to reduce or eliminate partisanship from the redistricting process is through empowering a commission instead of the state legislature when constructing district maps. Evidence about the effect of commissions is somewhat mixed. Some argue that since commissions are not motivated by partisan gain, they are able to draw maps in such a way that fosters greater competition. This argument is supported by Carson, et al. 2014 and Lindgren and Southwell 2013. Cottrill 2012 and Edwards, et al. 2017 also reach conclusions that support the idea that non-legislative-based plans increase competition in various ways. Conversely, others, such as Masket, et al. 2012 and Henderson, et al. 2018, contend that overall competition is unaffected by different redistricting methods.
Carson, Jamie L., Michael H. Crespin, and Ryan D. Williamson. “Reevaluating the Effects of Redistricting on Electoral Competition, 1972–2012.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 14.2 (2014): 165–177.
DOI: 10.1177/1532440013520245Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors find states that employ commissions witness greater levels of competition in US House elections.
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Cottrill, James. “The Effects of Non-legislative Approaches to Redistricting on Competition in Congressional Elections.” Polity 44.1 (2012): 32–50.
DOI: 10.1057/pol.2011.14Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The author finds that non-legislative method of drawing districts decreases the instances of incumbents running unopposed.
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Edwards, Barry, Michael Crespin, Ryan Williamson, and Maxwell Palmer. “Institutional Control of Redistricting and the Geography of Representation.” Journal of Politics 79.2 (2017): 1–5.
DOI: 10.1086/690633Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors argue that independent commissions better adhere to traditional redistricting principles, like compactness and respect for existing boundaries, which can foster greater competition than districts that do not adhere to these principles as well.
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Henderson, John A., Brian T. Hamel, and Aaron M. Goldzimer. “Gerrymandering Incumbency: Does Nonpartisan Redistricting Increase Electoral Competition?” Journal of Politics 80.3 (2018): 1011–1016.
DOI: 10.1086/697120Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors suggest that commissions may not actually be neutral as they seem since their maps are statistically indiscernible from legislature-based alternatives in terms of competition.
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Lindgren, Eric, and Priscilla Southwell. “The Effect of Redistricting Commissions on Electoral Competitiveness in US House Elections, 2002–2010.” Journal of Politics and Law 6.2 (2013): 13–18.
DOI: 10.5539/jpl.v6n2p13Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Independent commissions in the 2002 to 2010 redistricting cycle produced more competitive districts as measured by margin of victory and challenger success.
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Masket, Seth, Jonathan Winburn, and Gerald Wright. “The Gerrymanders Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won’t Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It.” PS: Political Science and Politics 45.1 (2012): 39–43.
DOI: 10.1017/S1049096511001703Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors argue that any effects of redistricting on competition are overwhelmed by other political factors such as polarization and geography.
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Measuring Gerrymandering
Though claims of gerrymandering are common, the ability to objectively identify what actually constitutes a gerrymander can be a difficult task. The natural geography of a state or the creation of a majority-minority district can produce a uniquely misshapen district. Nonetheless, many have argued that creating compact districts is one mechanism by which gerrymandering can be constrained, which should increase competition. The logic is straightforward—more compact districts do not possess the irregular protrusions of gerrymandered districts. Altman 1998, however, demonstrates that the relationship is not clear. Another shortcoming regarding the use of compactness to measure gerrymandering is offered by Young 1988. Another factor that complicates how to evaluate gerrymandering is presented in Chen and Cottrell 2016, which supports earlier findings from Chen and Rodden 2013. Given the difficulties of measuring compactness, Niemi, et al. 1990 suggests considering multiple measures simultaneously in order to appropriately assess district shapes. In an effort to measure gerrymandering without considering compactness, Stephanopoulos and McGhee 2015 introduced the efficiency gap. Another way scholars have tried to identify gerrymandering is through the fracturing of “communities of interest.” The logic is that splitting regions that would otherwise intuitively be drawn together typically indicates an attempt at creating partisan bias. However, there is no standard definition of community of interest. Makse 2012, Phillips and Montello 2017, and Stephanopoulos 2012 each provide different suggested definitions. However, all three agree that adherence to preserving communities of interest should curb gerrymandering. This is important as Cox and Katz 1999 shows a strong link between redistricting and bias. Taken together, these works show the difficulties in empirically assessing gerrymandering, which further inhibits the ability of researchers to evaluate the relationship between redistricting and competition.
Altman, Micah. “Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan Gerrymanders.” Political Geography 17.8 (1998): 989–1012.
DOI: 10.1016/S0962-6298(98)00015-8Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work shows that compactness standards can reduce gerrymandering, but only if states impose a strict definition of compactness.
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Chen, Jowei, and David Cottrell. “Evaluating Partisan Gains from Congressional Gerrymandering: Using Computer Simulations to Estimate the Effect of Gerrymandering in the US House.” Electoral Studies 44.2 (2016): 329–340.
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2016.06.014Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors use computer simulations to evaluate redistricting plans and discover that most bias and lack of competition is a product of like-minded partisans concentrating themselves in close geographic proximity.
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Chen, Jowei, and Jonathan Rodden. “Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8.3 (2013): 239–269.
DOI: 10.1561/100.00012033Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors state that Democrats are inefficiently distributed across the country, which subsequently leads candidates of that party winning more votes but fewer seats, even absent gerrymandering.
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Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz. “The Reapportionment Revolution and Bias in U.S. Congressional Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 43.3 (1999): 812–841.
DOI: 10.2307/2991836Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Using a formal model, these authors find strong evidence that partisan control has a direct impact on the redistricting process and can induce bias in subsequent election outcomes.
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Makse, Todd. “Defining Communities of Interest in Redistricting Through Initiative Voting.” Election Law Journal 11.4 (2012): 503–517.
DOI: 10.1089/elj.2011.0144Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work attempts to offer a definition of a “community of interest” in order to evaluate redistricting plans. Specifically, he argues for the use of statewide initiative votes as they are not partisan, but still political, decisions.
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Niemi, Richard G., Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci, and Thomas Hofeller. “Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering.” Journal of Politics 52.4 (1990): 1155–1181.
DOI: 10.2307/2131686Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors suggest using a variety of different measures (as opposed to a single measure) to evaluate entire districting plans (as opposed to individual districts) in order to effectively capture this difficult concept.
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Phillips, Daniel W., and Daniel R. Montello. “Defining the Community of Interest as Thematic and Cognitive Regions.” Political Geography 61 (2017): 31–45.
DOI: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.005Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors attempt to offer a definition of “communities of interest” in order to evaluate redistricting plans. They analyze thematic regions (those distinguished by demographics) and cognitive regions (those distinguished by commonly agreed upon criteria) and find that the two correspond well.
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Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O. “Redistricting and the Territorial Community.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 160 (2012): 1379–1478.
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This work attempts to offer a definition of a “community of interest” in order to evaluate redistricting plans. By relying on “organic geographic communities,” the author contends that this metric helps identify unlawful gerrymanders, which when employed, would, at least theoretically, decrease partisan bias and increase electoral responsiveness and voter participation.
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Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O., and Eric M. McGhee. “Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap.” University of Chicago Law Review 82 (2015): 831–900.
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This measures the number of “wasted” votes for both parties in an election relative to the number of votes cast. A competitive election would see very few wasted votes by the winning party, but an uncompetitive election would see many more wasted votes. Using this metric, they conclude that the most recent round of redistricting produced the most extreme gerrymanders in modern history.
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Young, H. P. “Measuring the Compactness of Legislative Districts.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 13.1 (1988): 105–115.
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The author contends that the definition of “compact” varies so greatly across states and the concept is so imprecise that it cannot serve as a reasonable standard when evaluating district boundaries.
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Redistricting, Representation, and the Voting Rights Act
As previously mentioned, the redistricting process often involves tradeoffs between inducing competitive elections and representative outcomes. At least part of this is governed by the Voting Rights Act, which mandates that some states create majority-minority districts. These are districts in which a majority of the population is made up of a racial minority group or groups. However, these districts have other consequences at well, according to Bullock 2010. Cameron, et al. 1996 expands on this by exploring the tradeoffs of substantive and descriptive representation, and their findings are echoed later in Epstein, et al. 2007. Lublin 1997 reaches a similar conclusion in and argues for a way to balance descriptive and substantive representation. The composition of districts is important, as demonstrated by Canon 1999. Additionally, ensuring minority representation through the construction of these districts can at times be at odds with other redistricting principles. In this vein, Barabas and Jerit 2004 and Bowen 2014 explore some of the tradeoffs between representation and district shape. In totality, these works show that the pursuit of increasing other important factors, like representation, can decrease the number of competitive elections.
Barabas, Jason, and Jennifer Jerit. “Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 4.4 (2004): 415–435.
DOI: 10.1177/153244000400400404Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research finds that drawing more compact districts decreases the ability of racial minorities to influence elections in their districts.
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Bowen, Daniel C. “Boundaries, Redistricting Criteria, and Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Politics Research 42.5 (2014): 856–895.
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X13519127Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work shows that more compact districts result in better communication with and responsiveness from representatives.
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Bullock, Charles S. Redistricting: The Most Political Activity in America. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.
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This book argues that majority-minority districts ultimately had the unintended consequence of “bleaching” the surrounding districts, which led to more white, typically Republican, candidates winning elections.
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Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran. “Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?” American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 794–812.
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They argue that majority-minority districts increase descriptive representation (electing more minority candidates) at the expense of substantive representation in surrounding districts (influencing the vote of representatives).
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Canon, David T. Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
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This book shows that majority-black districts actually serve white constituents quite well since primary elections in majority-black districts feature numerous black candidates, which fractures support among candidates within that voting group. Therefore, the successful candidates are generally the ones that appeal to white voters in order to secure their party’s nomination.
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Epstein, David, Michael C. Herron, Sharyn O’Halloran, and David Park. “Estimating the Effect of Redistricting on Minority Substantive Representation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23.2 (2007): 488–518.
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm031Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work corroborates earlier findings that practices that elect more minority candidates can actually decrease the quality of representation provided to minority communities.
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Lublin, David. The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
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This book suggests that redistricting plans should seek to strike a balance between the number of majority-minority districts and the number of districts with only 40 percent minority populations that can influence representatives.
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Redistricting and its Impact on Citizens
Another way redistricting can impact the competitiveness of elections is through influencing the behavior of voters. By affecting who votes in elections, the redistricting process similarly affects who runs and ultimately wins elections. Hayes and McKee 2009 and Hunt 2018 find that redistricting can depress turnout. The effect of redistricting on turnout varies across groups though, as demonstrated by Barreto, et al. 2004. However, evidence is mixed as Fraga 2016 reaches the opposite conclusion. Henderson, et al. 2016 suggests both may be correct to a certain extent depending on the state being observed, and Fraga 2016, furthermore, finds different effects for different groups. Beyond the population composition of a district, the physical boundaries themselves can also impact participation in elections according to Ladewig 2018. However, other factors impacting the shape of a district do not have the same effect, as Winburn and Wagner 2010 contends. Lastly, redistricting can enhance or disrupt a sense of community among voters, but the relationship is unsettled. Christenson and Makse 2015 finds that voters generally prefer a sense of shared representation at the expense of compactness or copartisanship. However, Winburn, et al. 2017 finds that citizen mapmakers display a preference for partisanship over the preservation of communities. This difference is unsurprising, however, given the findings of Fougere, et al. 2010 that voters are typically uninformed of the redistricting process.
Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura, and Nathan D. Woods. “The Mobilizing Effect of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout.” American Political Science Review 98.1 (2004): 65–75.
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055404001005Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors find that residing in majority-Latino district increases the probability of Latinos turning out to vote.
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Christenson, Dino, and Todd Makse. “Mass Preferences on Shared Representation and the Composition of Legislative Districts.” American Politics Research 43.3 (2015): 451–478.
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X14552127Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research demonstrates that increasingly political nature of voters’ residential decisions, which speaks to their sense of community and accompanying desire to not split that community across districts.
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Fougere, Joshua, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Nathiel Persily. “Partisanship, Public Opinion, and Redistricting.” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 9.4 (2010): 325–347.
DOI: 10.1089/elj.2010.9405Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors find that citizens are generally uninformed and uninterested in the redistricting process.
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Fraga, Bernard L. “Redistricting and the Causal Impact of Race on Voter Turnout.” Journal of Politics 78.1 (2016): 19–34.
DOI: 10.1086/683601Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work concludes that Latinos may actually be less likely to vote when they reside in a majority-Latino district. However, African Americans, whites, and Asian voters are more likely to vote when they reside in a district with a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot.
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Hayes, Danny, and Seth C. McKee. “The Participatory Effects of Redistricting.” American Journal of Political Science 53.4 (2009): 1006–1023.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00413.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research demonstrates how placing voters in new districts after redistricting reduces the information voters have, and therefore subsequently decreases their probability of voting in the next election.
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Henderson, John A., Jasjeet S. Sekhon, and Rocío Titiunik. “Cause or Effect? Turnout in Hispanic Majority-Minority Districts.” Political Analysis 24.3 (2016): 404–412.
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpw013Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Those drawing boundaries in California tended to place Latinos who participated at greater levels in majority-Latino districts, whereas the opposite occurred in Florida and Texas. Therefore, it is important to consider the state and context being observed to fully understand the effect of majority-minority districts on Latino participation.
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Hunt, Charles R. “When Does Redistricting Matter? Changing Conditions and Their Effects on Voter Turnout.” Electoral Studies 54 (2018): 128–138.
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2018.05.007Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Analyzing election in Florida, this author finds that moving voters into new districts depresses turnout.
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Ladewig, Jeffrey W. “‘Appearances Do Matter’: Congressional District Compactness and Electoral Turnout.” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 17.2 (2018): 137–150.
DOI: 10.1089/elj.2017.0466Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This article argues that less compact districts reduce turnout by decreasing communication and information flows between representatives and constituents.
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Winburn, Jonathan, Michael Henderson, and Conor M. Dowling. “From the Constituent’s Eye: Experimental Evidence on the District Selection Preferences of Individuals.” Political Research Quarterly 70.1 (2017): 32–41.
DOI: 10.1177/1065912916671829Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
They argue that citizens seem to prefer to share a district with partisans at the expense of preserving communities.
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Winburn, Jonathan, and Michael W. Wagner. “Carving Voters Out: Redistricting’s Influence on Political Information, Turnout, and Voting Behavior.” Political Research Quarterly 63.2 (2010): 373–386.
DOI: 10.1177/1065912908330728Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research demonstrates how splitting an existing community of interest, like a city or county, across congressional districts does not negatively impact voting behavior.
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Redistricting and Polarization
Despite popular conceptions and narratives, redistricting seems to have little to no substantial impact on the level of political polarization seen in American politics. Theriault 2008 provides a comprehensive summary, and his argument of no relationship between redistricting and polarization is echoed by McCarty, et al. 2009. Additionally, as Ryan and Lyons 2014 concludes in an analysis, “limiting gerrymandering is not a solution for polarization” (p. 234). Nonetheless, an alternative perspective is offered by Brunell and Buchler 2009, which largely comports with Caughey, et al. 2017, whose authors provide suggestive evidence of a relationship between redistricting and polarization. Specifically, they demonstrate that electing Democrats leads to more liberal policies being enacted and that this effect has grown over time. Finally, Carson, et al. 2007 offers a more nuanced perspective, which suggests that redistricting can have a marginal effect but is not a primary factor.
Brunell, Thomas, and Justin Buchler. “Ideological Representation and Competitive Congressional Elections.” Electoral Studies 28.3 (2009): 448–457. [doi10.1016/j.electstud.2009.05.003]
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2009.05.003Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors demonstrate a relationship between district constituencies and the ideology of the representative.
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Carson, Jamie L., Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, and David W. Rohde. “Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Politics Research 35.6 (2007): 878–904.
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X07304263Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors contend that redistricting has a modest, yet significant, effect on polarization across districts that have been redrawn. Therefore, redistricting may be one factor among others that serve to increase polarization.
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Caughey, Devin, Christopher Warsaw, and Yiqing Xu. “Incremental Democracy: The Policy Effects of Partisan Control of State Government.” Journal of Politics 79.4 (2017): 1342–1358.
DOI: 10.1086/692669Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work finds that partisan control of state legislatures has a substantial impact on policy output. Specifically, elected Democrats not only leads to more liberal policies, but the effect of doing so has increased significantly over time.
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McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?” American Journal of Political Science 53.3 (2009): 666–680.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00393.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors find no significant relationship between redistricting and polarization in Congress.
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Ryan, Josh M., and Jeffery Lyons. “The Effect of Redistricting Commissions on District Bipartisanship and Member Ideology.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties 25.2 (2014): 234–263.
DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2013.876425Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The research presented here shows that bipartisan redistricting plans can induce greater moderation among members, but the effect of commissions is negligible.
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Theriault, Sean M. Party Polarization in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511790652Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This book offers a broad discussion of factors influencing polarization, including the role of redistricting, which the author contends is not sufficient to explain the rising polarization.
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Redistricting and the Incumbency Advantage
One of the primary ways redistricting impacts competition and election outcomes is through creating safe districts for incumbents, who already enjoy an advantage over challengers. Tufte 1973 was one of the first to make this argument. However, much of the work since then, such as Desposato and Petrocik 2003 and Hood and McKee 2010, reaches a different conclusion. Given how redistricting can actually make an incumbent more vulnerable as these previous works show, Friedman and Holden 2009 argues, “changes in redistricting have reduced the probability of incumbent reelection over time” (p. 593). This argument is furthered by Crespin and Edwards 2016, which finds that donors are less likely to give to a candidate out of their district. The redistricting process does not affect all incumbents equally though, as demonstrated by Murphy and Yoshinaka 2009. Additionally, Boatright 2004 and Crespin 2010 suggest that incumbent members of Congress will change or modify their behavior, voting and otherwise, in order to better align with their districts and improve their chances of winning re-election. Moreover, Cox and Katz 2002 provide the most robust evaluation of the relationship between incumbency and redistricting in their book.
Boatright, Robert G. “Static Ambition in a Changing World: Legislators’ Preparations for, and Responses to, Redistricting.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 4.4 (2004): 436–454.
DOI: 10.1177/153244000400400405Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This article suggests that incumbents subtly and preemptively change their behavior before redistricting officially takes place in order to counter any negative consequences of a new map.
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Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz. Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511606212Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between redistricting and incumbency. Their primary contribution in this vein is demonstrating how landmark Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s fundamentally altered the decision-making calculus for potential challengers, which is the primary mechanism by which the incumbency advantage is affected by redistricting.
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Crespin, Michael H. “Serving Two Masters: Redistricting and Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Political Research Quarterly 63.4 (2010): 850–859.
DOI: 10.1177/1065912909338465Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research finds that members of Congress will alter their voting behavior to better align with new constituencies, at least on issues that are important and visible to voters.
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Crespin, Michael, and Barry Edwards. “Redistricting and Individual Contributions to Congressional Candidates.” Political Research Quarterly 69.2 (2016): 220–232.
DOI: 10.1177/1065912916634893Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors conclude that donors drawn out of a member’s district are less likely to contribute to their campaign, even if they did so before.
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Desposato, Scott W., and John R. Petrocik. “The Variable Incumbency Advantage: New Voters, Redistricting, and the Personal Vote.” American Journal of Political Science 47.1 (2003): 18–32.
DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00002Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Desposato and Petrocik show that redistricting can actually hurt incumbents by drawing new voters into their districts and therefore reducing their advantage.
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Friedman, John N., and Richard T. Holden. “The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What’s Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?” Journal of Politics 71.2 (2009): 593–611.
DOI: 10.1017/s0022381609090483Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The authors demonstrate that redistricting has not contributed to the increased number of incumbents winning re-election.
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Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman, and Marc Robbins. “Partisan and Incumbency Effects of 1970s Congressional Redistricting.” American Journal of Political Science 31 (1987): 680–707.
DOI: 10.2307/2111288Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work suggests that incumbents are especially hurt when the redistricting process forces them to run against another incumbent.
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Gopoian, David L., and Darrell M. West. “Trading Security for Seats: Strategic Considerations in the Redistricting Process.” Journal of Politics 46.4 (1984): 1080–1096.
DOI: 10.2307/2131243Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
In their analysis of 1982 redistricting plans, they find that legislators will sometimes make their incumbents more vulnerable in an attempt to win an additional number of seats.
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Hood, M. V., and Seth C. McKee. “Stranger Danger: Redistricting, Incumbent Recognition, and Vote Choice.” Social Science Quarterly 91.2 (2010): 344–358.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00696.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work concludes that the incumbency advantage is diminished when the direct link between representative and voter is lost. This disconnect is generally exacerbated by the redistricting process, which can make elections more competitive in theory.
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Murphy, Chad, and Antoine Yoshinaka. “Are Mapmakers Able to Target and Protect Congressional Incumbents?: The Institutional Dynamics of Electoral Competition.” American Politics Research 37 (2009): 955–982.
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X08326385Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Authors find that minority party incumbents are more likely to face a strong challenger when a partisan plan is enacted, therefore making them more vulnerable.
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Tufte, Edward R. “The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party States.” American Political Science Review 67.2 (1973): 540–554.
DOI: 10.2307/1958782Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This seminal work argues that incumbents exploited the redistricting process in the 1960s to advance their own partisan interests.
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The Durability of Redistricting Plans
Redistricting generally occurs every ten years, but circumstances can drastically change between cycles. Niemi and Winsky 1992 offer one such example. Altman, et al. 2005 demonstrates that the practice of redistricting has become increasingly sophisticated with advances in computer technology. However, more precise maps are also more sensitive to changes in populations and political conditions over the course of a decade, which can produce different election outcomes within the same districts. In this vein, Seabrook 2017; Goedert 2017; and Hetherington, et al. 2003 all demonstrate how factors influencing competitiveness vary over the life of a redistricting plan. In their analysis of 19th-century elections, Carson, et al. 2006 reaches similar conclusions. Indeed, as Makse 2014 demonstrates, control of the redistricting process is such a valuable tool that “majority-seeking behavior [of the state legislature] is more intense . . . when redistricting is imminent” (p. 342) Though redistricting generally occurs once every decade, states sometimes redraw boundaries mid-cycle without new census information. Levitt and McDonald 2007 outlines the various state constitutional provisions that parties exploit to this end, and Engstrom 2013 illustrates that parties commonly redrew congressional boundaries mid-cycle in the 19th century.
Altman, Micah, Karin MacDonald, and Michael McDonald. “From Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting.” Social Science Computer Review 23.3 (2005): 334–346.
DOI: 10.1177/0894439305275855Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors investigate the increased use of technology in producing districts maps.
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Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts. “Redistricting, Candidate Entry, and the Politics of Nineteenth-Century U.S. House Elections.” American Journal of Political Science 50.2 (2006): 283–293.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00184.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This research finds that candidate entry decisions were affected by redistricting in earlier eras as well.
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Engstrom, Erik J. Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013.
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This book offers a comprehensive description of the redistricting process in earlier eras. Engstrom finds that some states routinely redrew maps mid-cycle while others would simply refuse to redistrict for multiple decades. He attributes both of these decisions to party competition for control of Congress.
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Goedert, Nicholas. “The Pseudoparadox of Partisan Mapmaking and Congressional Competition.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 17.1 (2017): 47–75.
DOI: 10.1177/1532440016659234Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This article shows that partisan maps drawn to advantage one party will actually induce more competitive elections in later election cycles as national tides turn against the party responsible for constructing those districts.
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Hetherington, Marc J., Bruce Larson, Suzanne Globetti. “The Redistricting Cycle and Strategic Candidate Decisions in U.S. House Races.” Journal of Politics 65.4 (2003): 1221–1234.
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00134Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
These authors find that experienced, quality candidates are more likely to emerge earlier in the redistricting cycle, therefore increasing competition, at least theoretically.
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Levitt, Justin, and Michael P. McDonald. “Taking the Re Out of Redistricting: State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing.” Georgetown Law Journal 95 (2007): 1247–1286.
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This work describes the various state constitutional provisions regarding the practice of redrawing district lines more than once per decade.
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Makse, Todd. “The Redistricting Cycle, Partisan Tides, and Party Strategy in State Legislative Elections.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 14.3 (2014): 342–363.
DOI: 10.1177/1532440014537503Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
This work demonstrates how partisan tides can alter the political landscape later in a redistricting cycle.
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Niemi, Richard G., and Laura R. Winsky. “The Persistence of Partisan Redistricting Effects in Congressional Elections in the 1970s and 1980s.” Journal of Politics 54.2 (1992): 565–572.
DOI: 10.2307/2132040Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
In their analysis of the 1970 and 1980 redistricting cycles, these authors find that the partisan advantage initially created through redistricting eventually disappeared entirely over the course of the decade.
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Seabrook, Nicholas R. Drawing the Lines: Constraints on Partisan Gerrymandering in U.S. Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017.
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This book demonstrates how short-term partisan gains can be achieved through redistricting, but longer-term effects are less certain.
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